Should priority in development be given to tourism or to industry? asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed Last month, the head of Al-Dabaa's municipal council wrote to inform the nuclear power station under construction in the town that the minister of tourism and the governor of Matruh would be visiting the site of the project on 18 September. The project management asked him to notify the minister of electricity and energy of the impending visit, in order to coordinate efforts in this respect, but for some obscure reason the required notification was never made. An exclusive report on this strange non- event was published by the left-wing member of parliament Abul-Ezz El-Hariri in the weekly Al-Tagammu. According to the report, since it was established in 1976, the Egyptian Nuclear Stations Authority tested no less than 11 potential sites in different regions of the country before reaching the conclusion that none but Al-Dabaa met the required specifications for a nuclear site. Apparently this conclusion did not sit well with certain parties who had a vested interest in developing the area as a touristic site. One of the first countries to focus on the peaceful use of atomic energy, Egypt established the Atomic Energy Commission headed by Nasser himself in 1955, followed in 1957 by the Institute of Atomic Energy. In the early 1960s, it constructed its first modest Two Megawatt nuclear reactor at Inshass, which was designed for the generation of electricity and the desalination of sea water. In 1964, it invited bids for a 150MW nuclear power station in Sidi Kreir capable of desalinating 20 thousand cubic metres of seawater a day. The tender was awarded to the American company Westinghouse, but the outbreak of the 1967 war put an end to the project. After the 1973 war, the idea was revived and an international tender was held for the construction of a 600MW nuclear station in Sidi Kreir. The Egyptian Nuclear Stations Authority (ENSA), was established under Law 13 of 1976 to oversee construction of this and future nuclear power plants. Once again, Westinghouse presented the winning bid but just before the contract was signed in 1978, the US tried to insert a provision giving itself the right to inspect all of Egypt's nuclear installations. Not surprisingly, Sadat considered this to be a violation of Egypt's sovereignty and the deal fell through. Meanwhile, under mounting international pressure and at the urging of his advisers Sadat, who had refused to ratify the Non- Proliferation Treaty unless Israel did so too, finally committed Egypt to the treaty in 1981. Following the collapse of the Sidi Kreir project, some business tycoons in the late president's entourage succeeded in convincing him that Egypt's interests would be better served if it developed its long stretch of Mediterranean coastline, including Sidi Kreir, as a tourist destination. And so what was once the potential site of a nuclear power station was transformed into a tourist resort. Much of the coastal town is now occupied by tourist villages and housing estates, with a small part used as a heliport and the only nod to industry a power station run by the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. However, the Sidi Kreir fiasco did not end Egypt's aspirations to establish a nuclear industry. In 1980, a presidential decree was issued designating Al-Dabaa as the site of a 1000MW nuclear power station for the generation of electricity and the desalination of sea water. A specialised French firm was commissioned to conduct geological, seismic, meteorological, hydrologic and demographic studies to ensure that the site could accommodate the planned nuclear station and that it met international safety standards as established by the International Atomic Energy Agency. These studies and the preparatory infrastructural works carried out on the site cost Egypt half a billion pounds. The ENSA began to invite bids on the Al-Dabaa station and negotiations with the bidders continued through 1983 and 1984. Meanwhile, Egypt was coming under strong US pressure to abandon the project, including a statement issued by the American Export- Import Bank (EX-IM) advising states not to finance the project because the Egyptian economy was weak! The Egyptian government vigorously denied the charge and pressed ahead with its plans, but two weeks before the winning bid was announced, the Chernobyl disaster struck, offering a face-saving way to suspend the project. And so matters stood until the Hariri story broke. According to his account, on the appointed day a delegation, which included the minister of tourism and the governor of Matruh but not the minister of electricity and energy, arrived at Al-Dabaa project site. Accompanied by a number of foreigners, the dignitaries went directly to specific locations apparently agreed upon beforehand, took pictures and left one hour later. A short news item published the following day in Al- Ahram reported that the minister and governor had visited "several sites" along the North Coast but made no mention of Al-Dabaa. The future of Egypt's nuclear programme, suspended since 1986, is hanging in the balance. It does not appear that a final political decision has been taken in this respect but there are signs that it is now in the making. In the years since Al-Dabaa project was suspended, powerful interest groups have argued in favour of abandoning any attempt to establish a nuclear industry, but never more forcefully than they are now doing. The real question here is whether the present tendency is to have tourism and services, not industry, play the key role in developing the Egyptian economy. A number of economic experts believe this to be the case. Is what we are now witnessing evidence of compliance to American and Israeli pressure? It is common knowledge that Iran is under tremendous pressure to give up its nuclear programme, even though it has repeatedly announced that it is developing its nuclear capability for peaceful purposes. Will Egypt be treated in a similar manner? On the issue of nuclear power, the US administration has until recently divided the states of the world into two categories: "rogue" states, which are not allowed to develop nuclear capability even if they claim that it will be devoted to peaceful purposes on the one hand; and "friendly" states, (headed by Israel), which are welcomed into the nuclear club, albeit secretly, and allowed to build up massive arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction for "defensive" purposes on the other. Today it seems the US administration is no longer making a distinction between rogue states, accused of developing internationally banned weapons and supporting terrorism and any other state (aside from Israel) which exercises it sovereign prerogatives to establish a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. The Bush administration invented the doctrine of preemption to justify its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and is expected to apply it even more stringently if Bush is re-elected in November. This argument is probably being used by those in Egypt who favour making tourism, not industry, the key sector of the economy, who are for restricting industrial development on the grounds that industrialised states can be equated with rogue states. There is no doubt that tourism is an important component in increasing Egypt's national income. And that is why terrorist groups fight against it with such ferocity. But defending national security as well as national dignity cannot be achieved by resorting only to the carrot and not the stick. There is a basic principle that Egypt cannot disregard, namely, that of not relying on one source only for its energy requirements, exactly as no state can afford not to diversify its weapon sources. Russia, the United States and Canada are all rich in energy resources but, despite this fact, the first two depend for 20 per cent and the third for 16 per cent on imported energy. Egypt's petroleum resources are limited and they will dry up one day. Egypt's gas resources may now be increasing, but only temporarily and will also dry up sooner or later. Energy must be preserved for the coming generations. It must not be wasted for short run gains. That is why Egypt cannot afford to transform its Al-Dabaa nuclear project into a touristic venture.
