Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy assess the feasibility of joint American and European initiatives in promoting political reform in the Middle East The United States and Europe share concerns about the danger of political instability and economic stagnation in the Middle East, the potential for chaos and the threat of terrorism emanating from the region. They have, as a consequence, a common interest in socio-economic and political reforms in the area. Recently, this commonalty of concerns and interests has led to attempts to launch joint US/EU reform initiatives in the Middle East, the most concrete being the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), launched at the G8 meeting last summer. Yet even this initiative is vague. It establishes a Forum for the Future, which will periodically gather representatives from the region and the G8 in parallel gatherings of ministers, civil society and business leaders. A preparatory meeting took place in New York in September while the first forum convened on 11 December in Morocco. With no clear organisational framework, and above all no funding to give it substance, BMENA risks producing little. The United States at present relies most heavily on the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to implement concrete initiatives. Since 2002, MEPI has spent $129 million on mostly small projects to promote entrepreneurship, political change, educational reform and women's rights. The EU still considers older initiatives to be its principal lever for change. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, was launched in 1995, and has led to the signing of Association Agreements between the EU and most Arab countries on the rim of the Mediterranean. More recently, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy, first outlined in March 2003 as the Wider Europe Scheme, designed to deepen economic and political ties with the countries of the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe that are the enlarged EU's new neighbours. BMENA activities remain a secondary focus for both the US and the EU. This lukewarm commitment to joint initiatives is the result of real differences between the two sides concerning how to deal with the Middle East. In order to be acceptable to all joint initiatives have to be whittled down to the lowest common denominator and as a result do not have much substance. Foreign policy differences between the US and members of the EU, old or new, have been the object of much recent discussion. There is little disagreement about the nature of the differences but it is worthwhile revisiting them briefly since they are being ignored in current discussions of BMENA. The US is both more capable and more willing to project power and thus tends to take a hectoring, menacing position in its relations with other countries. European states are more reluctant to threaten, both as a matter of principle and because they are short of the means to project power outside the old continent. Whether the differences are due to discrepancies in military strength or in ethical and political choices is immaterial. Either way, they are real and well-rooted, and affect how the two sides approach political reform in the Middle East. In addition to the basic character of their foreign policies the US and Europe also bring to the table different assets and liabilities when they deal with the Middle East. America's one major asset in the region is its power, and this power cannot be ignored by any of the Middle East regimes. Arab countries may not like what the US says but they have to listen. Listening does not mean complying with American requests, but it means responding in some fashion. But the US brings a constant liability to the table when it deals with Arab countries -- its unstinting support for Israel. US attempts to compartmentalise the issue of Arab domestic reform from the Israeli- Palestinian conflict -- the original BMENA proposal did not even mention the conflict -- have proven unrealistic. The EU's major assets in its relations with Arab countries are the strength of its economic and trade relations as well as geographical proximity and cultural affinity. The EU is the major economic partner of all Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries except Jordan, which has a Free Trade Agreement with the US. European countries enjoy a higher level of credibility than the US. Arabs believe the European position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more balanced. The EU has also pursued less aggressive and more Arab- sensitive policies in times of crisis. The French and German positions on the war in Iraq, their rejection of occupation and fears over the potential dismantling of Iraq's territorial integrity, echoed Arab concerns. However, when it comes to the pressuring Arab regimes over political reform the EU's assets are slim. Arab governments know that Europe's major interests are economic and security driven and do not take seriously EU pressure to reform politically. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is an attempt to deal with the shortcomings of the EU's political reform efforts, offering countries that successfully initiate political reforms accelerated integration into the European market and significantly more funds. The US brings to the table power that cannot be ignored, but this asset is counterbalanced by enormous scepticism about US intentions on the part of Arab governments and hostility on the part of the Arab public. The EU brings credibility based on its long-term engagement, counter-balanced by a sense among Arab governments that there is no urgent need to respond to European initiatives when they address political reform. Could close cooperation between the US and Europe increase US credibility and European clout? American officials believe that such cooperation would enhance their credibility. The Europeans fear, however, that such an approach would be more likely to drag down their own credibility than to pull up that of the US. The Europeans are probably right. Anti- American sentiment runs deep while attitudes towards Europe are positive, if not enthusiastic. It is likely that neither the US, nor the EU, would gain much by jointly promoting political reform in the Middle East. The issue of reform in the Middle East is too important for the US and Europe to launch joint efforts simply because this might help overcome trans-Atlantic tensions caused by the war in Iraq. Political reforms in the Middle East are a necessity. Most countries in the region are stuck in a pattern of authoritarian governance that is increasingly problematic in the 21st century. This authoritarianism is no longer bringing stability to the region. Many Arab regimes are under siege. The public is dissatisfied, with radical and moderate Islamist movements gaining followers and liberals increasingly powerless. The region is unlikely to settle down again until genuine political change takes place. Promoting reforms that will lead to democratic outcomes is thus an important task. The US and Europe need to maximise their effectiveness and they can do this more easily separately than together. The US and Europe need to increase their assets and decrease their liabilities. There is only one way Washington can address credibility: not by hoping that association with Europe will refurbish its image but by implementing pro- reform policies consistently, over a long period and in a less contradictory fashion than it does now. The US needs to make it clear what kind of reform it is seeking. At present, the resounding rhetoric about democracy and liberty is interpreted by many Arabs as meaning "regime change". At the same time, they are also convinced that pro-US authoritarian regimes will continue to receive US support for the sake of stability, and even gain praise for small cosmetic changes. Europe's greatest liability is its own timidity in using the potential assets it has accumulated by keeping a low profile, taking a long-term view of political reform and emphasising patient dialogue over drastic regime change strategies. Europe has not taken advantage of the opportunities its record offers. It needs to broaden the scope of the dialogue, stressing political rather than economic reform. It needs to make the dialogue more inclusive, seeking to bring in not only governments and moderate, mainstream intellectuals and civil society groups but also more difficult players, in particular the Islamist organisations and networks that have the ear of a large segment of the public. European countries have tended to only talk to the secular or Islamist opposition groups that incumbent authoritarian regimes are willing to accept. In practice it was the Arab countries that introduced the notion of political conditionality in their relations with the EU, and not vice versa. Europe should not give up its low profile in dealing with the Middle East or its style, which is less flamboyant than the US. But it should introduce, in the process of long-term dialogue, benchmarks of compliance, putting more pressure on Arab countries and conveying to them a sense of urgency. Like re- establishing America's credibility in the Middle East, creating an assertive image for Europe in the region will take time. Encouraging signs of this new assertiveness are evident in the ENP, but Europe needs to maintain this stance in a consistent manner. Of course, broadening the dialogue to include interlocutors Arab regimes would like to exclude and imposing conditions could make European countries more controversial. But as long as Europe's strength as a promoter of democracy resides in its capacity to engage in dialogue over the long run, it is important that it be less timid about those with whom it engages. The writers are senior associates in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.
