Reflections: Enter the absent actor? By Hani Shukrallah As the presidential bombshell was being thrown into their midst by their respective speakers, members of the two houses of parliament appeared, in turns, dumbstruck, glum and half-heartedly cheerful; like awkward adolescents, they seemed wholly unsure of how they were supposed to behave in a rather delicate social situation. Used as they are to fervently cheering and heartily applauding each and every presidential pronouncement that comes their way, Mubarak's landmark declaration had his party's legislators looking worried, bemused and befuddled. The sheer weight of the surprise may partially explain such a starkly untypical response. During the second half of 2004, there was a feeling that significant changes were afoot. Longstanding NDP bosses Youssef Wali and Safwat El-Sherif were abruptly removed from their cabinet posts, while the president was undergoing surgery in Germany. The ruling party's Policies Committee, headed by the president's son Gamal, seemed on a roll. The younger Mubarak, surrounding himself with a new breed of party cadre -- young, bright and modernist in outlook -- appeared to have become an agenda setter of sorts for the regime headed by his father. The change of cabinet that followed soon after fell short of the higher side of elite expectations, but gave both the premiership and practically all of the government's economic portfolios to the "Young Turks" of the Policies Committee. And while the anticipated surprises that the NDP's September conference was presumed to have had in store were not forthcoming, no one could help but take note of the preeminent influence Gamal Mubarak wielded over the conference's televised proceedings. Yet by early 2005, the expectations curve seemed on a steep downward slope. The "old-guard" of the NDP -- Soviet-style party bureaucrats who received their political training in Nasser's Arab Socialist Union -- were not only as firmly entrenched as they ever were, it was becoming increasingly clear how indispensable they actually are to the continued preponderance of the ruling party. When it came to co-opting the opposition, ensuring the NDP's fortunes in parliamentary elections and laying the ground- work for the presidential poll, it was up to savvy veterans such as Safwat El-Sherif and Kamal El-Shazli (respectively, the secretary- general and deputy secretary-general of the NDP) to save the day. No less significantly, the ruling party and the president himself seemed to have put the lid on the political reform debate as whole, and most especially on the question of constitutional amendment. The "national dialogue" with opposition party leaders, ostensibly launched to discuss domestic political reform, was effectively transformed into a "united front" effort against foreign, particularly, American intervention in Egyptian affairs. The opposition leaders easily conceded the postponement of constitutional amendment till after the forthcoming presidential election. The arrest of Al-Ghad Party leader Ayman Nour lowered expectations even further. And by the time the second round of national dialogue was coming to a close, most observers expected little more than a few cosmetic changes to legislation governing political life, and, perhaps, a backroom deal with the main opposition parties allowing them a greater share of parliamentary seats. Their current share is so meagre as to allow the NDP considerable room for largesse. Then came the president's bombshell. Little wonder then that the NDP's parliamentary majorities were stunned. One cannot help but suppose, however, that surprise was not the only, or even the most important element behind the MPs' obvious discomfiture. It's almost certain that there was a considerable number of very worried people among the half-heartedly cheering and applauding parliamentarians. The bombshell form with which the president's decision was announced is vintage Egyptian presidency. It smacks of the "strategic deception" tactics adopted by Sadat in the prelude to the October War of 1973, and seems to explain some bewildering aspects of the mixed messages of the past few months, most notably the relative freedom allowed the Kifaya (Enough) movement to publicly protest the president's re- election. Some analysts are describing the constitutional amendment put forward by Mubarak as heralding the birth of Egypt's "Second Republic". This assessment may well prove to have been apt. Yet the big question is whether it will be a truly democratic republic. The answer to this question goes well beyond the current debate over the conditions for presidential nomination -- how restrictive or otherwise. It also transcends the possibility that the president has other bombshells up his sleeve such, for instance, as stepping down in favour of another NDP candidate, be that Gamal Mubark or someone else. It even goes beyond the currently infinitesimal possibility of a non-NDP candidate actually winning the presidency. After all, what guarantees do we have that a new popularly elected president will be more democratic than Mubarak or any of his predecessors of the First Republic? The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Akef has recently declared the group's support for a fifth term for Mubarak on the ostensibly religious grounds that Muslims should show obedience to their rulers. Akef is the leader of Egypt's largest, and quite possibly only viable opposition force at the present, and notwithstanding the obviously tactical maneuvering involved in his statement, it behooves one to wonder about the extent of "obedience" Akef would expect of us if he were to become our "ruler". There is much more to democracy than multi-candidate presidential elections, however free these may be. It is not even merely a question of recognising and respecting -- in law as in public sentiment -- that even as we are citizens of the same country we have different and often widely divergent interests, inclinations, needs and hopes. It is above all about people's ability to organise, balance, counter-balance and peacefully negotiate these differences. Neither the Americans nor the current opposition parties, nor even Mubarak himself can guarantee that the Second Republic will be a truly democratic republic. Only the Egyptian people can. Meanwhile, a stone has been dropped into the stagnant waters of Egyptian political life. Whether its ripple effects will help bring this hitherto absent actor onto the political stage or not remains to be seen. The future of democracy in Egypt , nevertheless, depends on it.
