Democratising the Arab world is no less a flimsy fig-leaf for Washington's real designs in the region than were Iraq's alleged WMDs and Al-Qaeda links, writes Patrick Seale Ever since the United States invaded Iraq two years ago -- toppling Saddam Hussein, smashing the state, and killing tens of thousands of Iraqis -- commentators have puzzled over America's war aims. What was the strategic plan behind the carnage? What was Washington trying to achieve? If there was a master-plan, where would the US strike next? The early justifications for the war were soon to prove false, even fraudulent. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and no links to Al-Qaida. Was the real aim, then, to weaken Iraq permanently because it posed a challenge to America's dominance of the oil-rich Gulf? Did Washington hope that Iraq could be turned into a US client state? Was the expectation that Iraqi oil, under American control, could serve as a replacement for Saudi oil? Beyond these explanations was the ambitious neo-conservative agenda to "restructure" the Arab world, a plan which involved "regime change" in a number of countries -- beginning, but by no means ending, with Iraq -- and a determined campaign to subdue the three forces seen as irredeemably hostile to both Washington and Tel Aviv -- namely Arab nationalism, Islamic radicalism and Palestinian resistance. It appeared that the aim was to bring about a fundamental change in the regional balance of power to the benefit of the United States and Israel. To cloak these aggressive aims in a semblance of respectability, the neo- conservatives then launched the slogan of Arab "democratisation" as a cure for the region's ills -- a campaign taken up enthusiastically by President George W Bush himself in something like a personal crusade. The argument was that the overthrow of despotic Arab regimes was not only good in itself. It would also make America safe from terrorist attack because terrorism, or so it was alleged, grew in a "swamp" of tyranny and backwardness, of violent religion and "rogue" states. "Draining the swamp" was the way to win the global "war on terror"! This explanation is as flimsy a fig leaf for America's real aims as was the earlier pursuit of non-existent weapons. No one can deny that encouraging Arab regimes to allow their citizens greater freedoms is a worthy ambition and one long overdue. Arab regimes are being forced to open up, under pressure from the forces of globalisation, from an increasingly educated middle class, from satellite television, from a world-wide campaign in favour of human rights, and from a rising tide of impatience with heavy-handed security services and with profiteering by regime cronies. In several Arab countries fear of the state is eroding. A new boldness is finding expression in street demonstrations, of which a striking example is the Kifaya (enough) movement in Egypt in protest against President Hosni Mubarak standing for a fifth term of office. From Morocco to the Gulf, the demand for citizens' rights is undeniable, although the response of the regimes has been slower and more uneven than Arab democrats and civil rights activists would like. American pressure is also a contributing factor but, whatever Bush and the neo- cons may claim, it is by no means the determining one. Destroying Iraq in order to "liberate" it is not the model which even the most impatient Arab democrats wish to emulate. There are two clear dangers in President Bush's new obsession with "spreading democracy". The first is that it is distracting him from the far more difficult, but necessary, task of resolving regional conflicts -- of which the American occupation of Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict are by far the most important. Clearly Bush finds it easier, and politically more attractive, to wax eloquent about the "forward march of freedom" than to devise a clear exit strategy from Iraq or to pressure Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian territories. Yet without progress on these fronts America will not be free from the threat of terrorist attack, nor will genuine democracy be able to take root in Arab soil. Almost without exception, Arab regimes are nervous. They do not know what the United States has in mind and they are deeply suspicious of Israeli influence on American decision-making in the Middle East. Their inclination is to look to their defences rather than to risk democratic experiments. The second danger from Bush's campaign to "spread democracy" is that it will provide cover for further American aggressions, this time against the three centres of opposition to American and Israeli hegemony -- Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Shia movement, Hizbullah. It has become clear that American policy is to deny Iran access to nuclear technology -- if necessary by force -- for fear that it might acquire nuclear weapons. Towards Syria, US policy is to ensure its full withdrawal from Lebanon as a first step -- an aim which has now more or less been achieved -- before proceeding with "regime change" somewhat later. Regarding Hizbullah, while the United States has come round to recognising it as a powerful force on the Lebanese scene, it seems determined to disarm it in the longer term to prevent it projecting power outside its frontiers -- notably against Israel. Syria is seen in Washington as the weakest link in the Tehran-Damascus-Hizbullah axis. In the language used by militant neo- cons it is "low-hanging fruit", ripe for picking. The argument is that a knock-out blow to Syria would bring about the collapse of the entire axis! Syria is also accused of providing a "rear base" for the insurgency in Iraq. Overthrowing the Syrian regime is therefore promoted by the neo-cons as the key to victory in Iraq. It is clearly being set up as the next target for "regime change". The immediate tactic would seem to be to destabilise the Damascus government by exploiting the legitimate impatience of many Lebanese with Syrian control. Although Bush has declared that the "free world would not tolerate" a nuclear- armed Iran, the United States does not seem quite ready to launch a military campaign against Iran. The view in Washington would appear to be that Iran can best be worn down by attrition. To get the Europeans to join the campaign to deny Iran nuclear technology, Washington has thrown a few crumbs in the direction of the European troika -- Britain, France and Germany -- which has been attempting to persuade Tehran to give up its nuclear ambitions. In the event of Tehran agreeing to a complete freeze of its nuclear programmes, the US is now ready to end its opposition to Iranian membership of the World Trade Organisation and to supply Iran with some spare parts for its civilian aircraft. Responding to these American concessions, the Europeans have declared their "determination" to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-armed, and they have undertaken to refer Iran to the UN Security Council if it fails to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA has established that Iran has been experimenting with enriching uranium and with separating plutonium, although it is still some years away from producing sufficient quantities of fissile material for bomb-making. But it has acquired considerable technological expertise. No one seems to know Iran's ultimate intentions. Is it simply buying time in order to proceed with a clandestine military programme or is its real aim to gain a major package of trade and financial benefits from Europe and the US. It may be that the truth lies somewhere in between. Surrounded on all sides by American military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and the Gulf, and regularly threatened with attack by the US and Israel, Iran may wish to push its researches forward to the point that it could cross the nuclear threshold quickly, if it needed to do so in an emergency.
