On 13 April 1975 Phalangist gunmen ambushed a busload of Palestinians in Beirut. The incident marked the beginning of a bloody civil war which lasted 15 long years and claimed the lives of 150,000. Since 1990, the Lebanese have been trying to simultaneously come to terms with the legacy of war and to forget. Ironically it was Rafiq Al-Hariri -- whose assassination last February threatened to revive the ghosts of the past -- who had planned to mark the occasion with a series of festivities celebrating Lebanese national unity. This week, Al-Hariri's sister, Bahia, inaugurated the celebrations which her brother had planned. But will Lebanon truly heed the lessons of the war? Serene Assir, in Beirut, seeks answers from some of Lebanon's most prominent past and present players on the political arena Former Lebanese prime minister Selim Al-Hoss (b. 1929) is perhaps Lebanon's most senior politician. Three times prime minister -- his first two terms (1976-1980 and 1987-1990) mark the beginning and the end of the Lebanese civil war -- Al-Hoss is renowned for his political integrity and insight. This interview was conducted in Arabic at the former prime minister's office in Beirut on 7 April 2005. How do you assess the current atmosphere in Lebanon? The tension in Lebanon's political arena is intense, but the key to its relaxation is obvious, namely the reshaping of the government. Such reform, which would enable a new government to respond to the immediate needs of both the people and those in positions of political responsibility, can only take place through the staging of fair and just elections. If elections do take place, a new political framework will emerge, along with a new ruling class, and the needs of the Lebanese people will thus be transferred directly from the street to the governing institutions. Only in this way can we cross this threshold and enter a new phase. How can we guarantee that fair elections will indeed take place? Well, to start with, the elections will happen for sure -- for there is no Lebanese precedent for the all- out cancellation of elections. They may be postponed, but by no means will they be cancelled. What is clear though is that the chances for the elections to be held on their scheduled appointment are very, very slim. All we can do at this point is hope that they are not postponed for too long. I just hope that they are held, at the most, within two months. In contrast to my visit to Lebanon exactly one year ago, I was struck this year by increased social fragmentation along sectarian lines. Will elections bring about true intra-Lebanese unity? There is no denying that, to date, the problem of sectarianism remains. I am unsure whether it is possible to quantify sectarianism, for it is a phenomenon which either exists or is absent -- and here in Lebanon, it is present. It is a reality. And I believe that this fragmentation is Lebanon's greatest fault. I also believe that it is one of the expressions of the corruption that is so deeply entrenched in the politics of this country. For corruption is protected by sectarianism. Accusations of corruption never undermine leaders of a given sect. followers of such leaders never judge their leader on the premise of his actions, as they too would then be affected. The leader is thus protected by his context within his sect. Corruption and sectarianism are two sides of the same coin. As for how to deal with sectarianism, this requires a very long process. The Taif Accords laid out a specific mechanism for dealing with the various sects. Remember that in 1992, it was agreed that power in government would not be sought according to sect but rather according to electoral results. But until now, there has been no implementation of this particular aspect of the Taif Accords, and, 13 years down the line, we are still waiting. I believe that the best route to overcoming sectarianism would be through the implementation of a plan spanning various phases and affecting all institutions. That way, we would ensure that change is profound, and at the same time gradual and realistic. What the lack of the full implementation of the Taif Accords proves is that the state is not yet ready for such a radical step as to open the gates of power to all, and thus things remain as they were pre-1992. Where do we start? I oppose the notion that we should start by reforming the electoral law, which is what parliament is currently doing. This is also what Rafiq Al-Hariri was doing prior to his death. But his plan was stopped and a new one was put into action. The current plan is, in my view, very poor. To start with, it feeds sectarian fragmentation -- given that the underlying principle states that each sect elects its representative, and thus renders each voting district more isolated and powerless. Consider that if we divide the country according to sect, then we end up with 26 voting districts. If, on the other hand, we divide the country according to civil districts, we end up with just five. The chances for unity under a sect-based plan are obviously by far slimmer. Such a plan would be destructive for Lebanon's political life. I believe the solution lies in the reform of the higher legislative institutions in government, which can then, in turn, reform the electoral system in such a way as to overcome sectarian fragmentation. And if those running for seats in parliament find themselves seeking power within the context of a district- based framework, they will have to distance themselves from sectarianism in their rhetoric and plan of action in order to succeed, as all districts are highly variegated in terms of the religious groups who inhabit them. But don't you feel that a significant proportion of the electorate could be opposed to such a reform which would remove sectarian divisions and systems of power? There are always problems. There is no country in the world without problems. In democracies the world over internal differences emerge daily. But these differences are resolved through reliance on governmental institutions, and sometimes on referenda. That is why internal differences do not lead to national crises in the United States or in Britain. Our history, on the other hand, is composed of a series of national crises resulting from internal differences for which there is no immediate solution, the most obvious case being that of the 15-year- long war, which was so destructive. Today we are undergoing yet another. This simply indicates that we do not have the instruments of democracy here in Lebanon. Though we have great freedom, we should not confuse this with democracy, which in itself brings stability. For now, Lebanon is incapable of translating its freedom into a profound democratic system. Could the Syrian pullout help true democracy to take root? We will, on the whole, benefit from this new reality. Firstly, we will be able to reshape and improve our relation with Syria, and this is important as Syria constitutes an extraordinary strategic ally. Secondly, we will no longer have internal differences over the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and our intra-Lebanese relations may somewhat improve as a result.
