Despite being an old dream, Egypt could still harness and maximise the potential of the Suez Canal for competitive national development, writes Abdel-Moneim Said This is not an appeal for an early start to the summer vacation so that people can set off to seaside resorts, frolic in the water and refresh themselves in maritime breezes. It is only April and we still have a lot of work to do before we rest. In all events, there are plenty of holidays these days anyway. Rather, this is a different kind of appeal. It calls for a redrawing of the Egyptian map so as to transform its conceptual and physical topography from a narrow land-based terrain with a river nexus to a far- flung network stretching from our river through our deserts to all our shores. Some devious souls might protest that this proposal represents a deliberate digression from the current agenda of public debate in which priority must be given to political and constitutional reform and its socioeconomic extensions. More open-minded and well-meaning people will understand that it is not only germane to the current debate, but also that it has the potential to enrich it with new perspectives, ideas and substance. The more that we ground our ideas about changing the shape of government in Egypt on democratic geographic and demographic realities, the more credible they become. The more the drive to generate prosperity is linked to existing resources and to the concrete accumulation of wealth, the solider and more sustainable the development process becomes. Similarly, Egypt's aspiration to attain international status can only be realised when Egypt improves its global competitiveness, which nowadays has much less to do with a country's regional role than it does with its ability to influence the world by means of its wealth, technological prowess, manufactures, and humanitarian values. It so happens that this question of "global competitiveness" was what triggered the idea about changing the map of Egypt. The story opens with a phone call from my good friend, Dr Hossam Badrawi who, in addition to his university professorship and membership in the Shura Council and in the National Democratic Party, heads the Egyptian National Competitiveness Council. This important NGO produces an annual "Egyptian Competitiveness Report", which assesses how well Egypt is competing against other nationals of the world. As you might imagine, our conversations are generally not about the weather; they tend to be lengthy discussions on the state of Egypt and how to better it. In recent years, Badrawi has been an increasingly ardent advocate of the need to improve our educational system and he has become a mine of information and statistics on this issue. Our last conversation, however, was not about education. It was about a no less crucial issue: a new key to enhancing Egypt's competitiveness, one that offers a unique opportunity to give a tremendous boost to its global standing. Briefly put, the idea centres around one of Egypt's blessings (although some had once regarded it as a curse), the Suez Canal. Three-fourths of world maritime trade passes through this strategic passageway, yet all Egypt does is play the conductor who collects fees. According to Badrawi, Egypt should not let things stop at that. It should exploit this resource much more fully. Instead of just a passageway, it should become a place for the storage, exportation and re-exportation of goods and products; for the production, modification and reassembly of manufactures, and for the reception and departure and accommodation of tourists. These and other such activities would transform the 170 kilometre-long Suez Canal zone into a bustling hive of production and commerce, and into an engine of progress. Consider, too, that the three Suez Canal zone governorates -- Suez, Ismailiya and Port Said -- are among the highest ranking governorates on the human development index. In other words, the relatively high levels of education, income and health are conducive to such a comprehensive global-oriented project. In addition, the Suez Canal zone bridges Sinai to the east and the eastern desert to the west and is situated within a well-developed transportation and communications network, through which one can reach the Nile Valley within a couple of hours. As Badrawi spoke, I cast my mind back 15 years to when Egypt hosted the Middle East Economic Conference, which was one of the offshoots of the peace process at the time. It was widely believed at the time that international powers were pushing for the creation of a "golden triangle" of progress and development comprised of Jordan, Palestine and Israel. The reports or rumours of such a drive sparked no small amount of resentment in Egypt. We had borne the brunt of war and the brunt of making peace, and now we were going to be left out when it came to reaping the benefits of peace. Prompted by such sentiments, then Foreign Minister Amr Moussa created a committee, chaired by Ambassador Raouf Saad, to study the situation. The conclusion, to which I had the honour of being able to contribute, was that the Middle East needed several such golden triangles, because of the general poverty of its peoples, their poor standards of living, and their endless suffering from warfare and injustice. We also knew that Egypt possessed something no less important, no less lucrative from the economic standpoint and no less useful to the economy and the world: the Suez Canal that could serve as a centre for regional and international trade. That simple idea engendered dozens and dozens of proposals for IT projects, environment-friendly industries, and free trade zones, all of which could change the concept of the canal from a mere maritime route to an economic zone and hub for international trade. Little happened after that economic conference in Cairo. Not many participants attended the follow-up conference in Doha the following year; people stopped speaking of the "golden triangle" and the entire peace process faded into painful memories and a lost dream. In addition, in spite of an initial burst of activity, all that remained of the Suez Canal project was a handful of isolated enterprises. A new port at Ain El-Sukhna was built, various other local development projects were put into effect, improvements were made to the transportation infrastructure linking the canal zone with the Nile Valley, and a cornerstone was laid towards the development of a high-tech valley. However, the notion of comprehensiveness had vanished, or no one mentioned it anymore, or it was being implemented in such small and widely spaced increments as to make no discernible impact. Undoubtedly, there were several reasons why the project was shelved or deferred. For one, we were always preoccupied by a lot of issues, among which comprehensive development did not rank high. Although we were constantly talking about Egypt's future and "where we are headed," no one was prepared to deal with long- term issues. Also, no one was ready to think the unthinkable, which was to redraw the conceptual map of our country in a way that brought it in line with geographical and demographic developments. During the past three decades, the inhabited area of Egypt increased from three to seven per cent. Much of the newly inhabited area is well outside the Nile Valley. This is the beginning of a revolution by all standards. The revolution will be at hand when the ratio surpasses 20 per cent of our country's 1,002,450 square kilometres. Some tangible progress has already been made towards reaching this goal, such as the Ain El-Sukhna-Cairo, the Al-Karimat-Beni Soueif, and Qena-Red Sea roads. Still, these are all government-sponsored projects and if they proceed at their current pace it will take a few centuries before Egypt reaches its goal. Unfortunately, we cannot afford to wait so long. At present, over a seven-month period our population increases by the size of the population of Bahrain; over eight months it increases by the size of the population of Qatar; in a year-and-a-half it increases by the equivalent of the population of Kuwait. At its current growth rate, our population will reach 104 million by 2020, which is not that far off, and 160 million by 2050, which is to say in another generation from now. The solution is to start now, not only by boosting Egypt's competitiveness through the comprehensive Suez Canal project that Dr Badrawi proposes or by means of an Egyptian-based "golden triangle," as Raouf Saad has proposed, but also by spreading Egypt's demographic mass into development zones. I suggest development strips equivalent in land area and population to such countries as Singapore or Dubai and bordering the shores of the Sinai and the Red Sea coast at Shalatin, Marsa Alam, Ghardaqa and, of course, Zaafrana. I imagine, however, that the major locus for growth will be on the north coast, in the governorate of Matrouh, where there are 166,000 square kilometres just across the street from Europe. The name of that street, by the way, is the Mediterranean. We might differ over constitutional amendments, but we must agree that the Egyptian people, by virtue of their population growth rate, cannot wait until we settle our political debate, in which not a word is said about the future of our children and how we will assure them a dignified life.
