Ali Belail looks at some important historical landmarks which help us understand the significance of Sudan's recent electoral activity The esteemed writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal wrote a famous article in 1964 following what was known in Sudan as the October revolution. The peaceful revolution was a public strike that brought down the military government of General Ibrahim Abboud. It was hailed as the ultimate democratic act brought by a highly sophisticated, civilised and politicised nation. The article was entitled: Wa Maza Baad? -- literally, "And what next?" What most Sudanese understood it to mean was: "And so what?" Heikal's assertion, or at least what many Sudanese understood it to mean, was that the revolution or uprising was nothing but a storm in a tea cup. The Sudanese resented the Egyptian big brother casting doubt on their bright future. They have a very long memory especially in all things Egyptian related to Sudan. They never forgave Heikal. But his words have come back to haunt them. Sudan was, and arguably still is a hodge-podge of different ethnicities and cultures that were brought together on a map. The manifestations of a mature politicised population and elite were merely cosmetic, and Sudan as a nation and state was unable to nurture and sustain a democracy. The 1964 revolution brought a democratic government that lasted four years and ended with a coup in 1969. There was another revolution in 1985. That one was called an uprising and it brought down the then mighty government of Numeiri. That uprising brought a democratic government that lasted three years; three years of lost opportunities with the main parties, when on the outside, preoccupied with bringing down the coalition whenever it was on the verge of signing a peace treaty with the SPLM. Finally the National Islamic Front (now the NCP) seized power in 1989 before yet another treaty was signed. They wanted to safeguard Sudan's Islamic laws and were adamant in their war against the South. Sudan's new-born democracy -- Mark IV -- is different than the previous experiments; it comes not as a result of a coup but rather with the existing government ostensibly having competed in a free and fair election. Although the pre- election and election processes were wanting, the outcome may be a blessing in disguise. That the ruling party has won the election outright means that there will be no coalition governments with all the manoeuvring and politicking that they entail. The mandate for the ruling party is absolute and therein lies the challenge for them. The challenge lies not in the northern opposition -- they are weak, fragmented and their support in the street is questionable at best. Nor is the challenge with the northerners, for they seem to have been tamed in one way or the other. The real test will be in the regions: Darfur and others that will want their share of the wealth and power. So far, this government has followed the path of all previous northern governments only with more zeal: to deny the regions their rightful stake in government and development. It is difficult to see them making a genuine reversal of that attitude, for the motivation and reasoning that drove that policy is deeply engrained. Namely, the rejection of the diversity of Sudan. Nearly fifty years of exclusion and underdevelopment have left the people of many regions weary from and wary of the north. Some fear that the probable separation of the south next year will be hindered by the government. That they will manipulate tribal tensions that straddle both sides of what would be the border which will in turn drive other regions to conclude that the government is not interested in real change and a slow, long painful break-up of Sudan will ensue. But that suggests the regions are willing to give the government a chance. The nightmare scenario is that they are now simply waiting for the most opportune moment to launch their own separatist projects regardless of how the formal separation process of the south unfolds. The viability and validity of these potential separatist projects seem almost irrelevant when seen in light of the past 50 years. Issues like secularism, the role of Islam in politics, religious diversity and multiculturalism were ignored by the north at their own now evident peril. Such fundamental issues seem that much more crucial in a country like Sudan, still searching to define itself. These are not issues just for the politicians and intellectuals to debate. Northerners have to share in the responsibility. These are the very issues that have directly determined the lives of millions of disenfranchised people and whether they will spend the rest of their lives confined to a refugee camp on the outskirts of some semblance of a city in many parts of Sudan or have the opportunity to live with safety, security and the possibility of a better life. They are also the issues that have claimed many millions of lives, whether by war, starvation or by a wretched existence. So, the Sudanese, or rather the northerners, should be careful about celebrating themselves as the venerable democrats of the Arab world. Sudan's democracy is more than a token gesture. It must be more than just a historical footnote to be spoken about with pride, because as it stands, it appears that is all it is. It seems, for all the talk of democracy, in plain English, the day of reckoning for the north is nigh.
