How does the US fit within the highly complicated domestic political puzzle? Amira Howeidy investigates The front page of this week's Sawt Al-Umma newspaper features a somewhat daring, and certainly telling, banner. On one side of the page, US President George W Bush is pictured talking on the phone. "Allow people to vote without being intimidated," the serious- looking American president is saying. "Allow the opposition to appear on TV... People ought to be allowed to carry signs and express their pleasure or displeasure... People ought to have every vote count..." On the other side of the page, President Hosni Mubarak -- on the receiving end of the phone call -- merely says, "OK!!". As a biting commentary on the political climate, the paper's editors must have felt that the banner was enough. There was no actual story in Sawt Al-Umma about the details of the 10-minute telephone conversation between the US and Egyptian presidents that took place on 1 June. Political observers have by now endlessly dissected that call in the same way they have pored over every single statement about Egypt made by any US official over the past six months. Even though both the government and the opposition consistently and vehemently refute the idea that the US is affecting -- for better or worse -- Egypt's political dynamic, reality shouts otherwise. In fact, Sawt Al-Umma' s Bush-Mubarak illustration perfectly mirrors a general public sentiment that sees Washington as having a great influence on domestic developments. The mere fact that this fearlessly satirical headline appeared in the first place also demonstrates this influence; while the paper was clearly being critical of US pressure on Egypt, it was also in effect taking advantage of the increased margin of press freedom that may have been catalysed by that same US pressure. Hisham Qassim, chairman of the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) and a prominent member of the newly founded Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) liberal political party, believes that "80 per cent of political freedom in this country is the result of US pressure." Only "20 per cent is the result of domestic pressure," he told Al-Ahram Weekly. This equilibrium might change in the future, however, as growing domestic pressure for political reform expands, and takes different shapes and forms. The complicated dynamics of the US's role in Egyptian politics makes for a sensitive topic that both the state and the opposition are keen to avoid. As a result, both sides -- but especially the government -- seem to fall into endless contradictions between things that are said in public, and realities that take place on the ground. So while Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif's recent US trip was a clear effort to promote the government's reform programme, the pro-government media portrayed it more as a confirmation of "mutual strategic" ties between the two countries. That same media has also been rather selective in its coverage of US statements. Bush, for example, is usually only quoted praising Mubarak's "historic" initiative to amend the Egyptian constitution to allow for multi-candidate elections. The US president's more critical statements about the importance of having this election monitored by international observers only appear at the bottom of the story, when they are reported at all. Similarly, when US First Lady Laura Bush praised Mubarak two weeks ago, her comments were promoted on every state-owned publication as proof that the Bush administration was happy with the government's gradual approach to reform -- even though the president's wife is not an official member of that administration. The day after Laura Bush's comments, two peaceful protests opposing the constitutional amendment were violently attacked by thugs claiming to be supporters of the ruling National Democratic Party. The attack took place in clear view of the police. Whether Laura Bush's statements were mistaken for an American "green light" to quash the opposition -- as the opposition itself claimed -- or whether the violent crackdown was bound to happen anyway, remains unclear. Perfectly clear, however, was the way everyone -- including anti-imperialist, anti-US and anti-Mubarak activists -- then impatiently waited for Washington's response. Bush's 1 June phone call with Mubarak shifted the balance once again. While presidential spokesman Suleiman Awwad initially told reporters that the conversation only involved the peace process and other regional issues, the US presidential spokesman, followed by Bush himself, soon revealed that the American president had told Mubarak that the US wants free and fair elections in Egypt. "Now is the time for him to show the world that his great country can set an example for others," Bush said. "People ought to be allowed to vote without being intimidated, people ought to be allowed to be on TV, and if the government owns the TV, they need to allow the opposition on TV, people ought to be allowed to carry signs and express their pleasure or displeasure. People ought to have every vote count," he said. Just a day later, George Ishak, the coordinator of the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya), confidently told reporters that the events that took place on the day of the referendum "would not happen again". When asked if that had anything to do with US pressure, Ishak provides a predictably angry response. Kifaya is "an Egyptian and national movement", he says, and "I am very sorry to hear that as a result of external pressure, the government is allowing freedom of expression." Bush's conversation with Mubarak is "not our concern", Ishak says. After a great deal of back and forth, he finally admits that, "what is being said abroad has an impact" in Egypt. But in the same breath he also adds that, "we clearly do not rely on that; we rely on our own people and our own public opinion." Kifaya's spokesman, Abdel-Halim Qandil, the outspoken columnist and editor of the opposition Al-Arabi newspaper, puts it more dramatically. "The irony of history," he told Al-Ahram Weekly, "might put us in the odd position of being in the protection of the enemy," referring to the Bush administration. That would appear to be a far cry from the way state-owned TV and several newspapers and magazines have portrayed Kifaya and other reform activists as "agents" of the US and the West. Using a metaphor to convey his point, Qandil says, "the US might want to [come to the region] to build a palace, but could end up digging its own grave instead." In other words, by pressuring the government to allow political freedom as part of its vision of a "Greater Middle East", the Bush administration may find itself facing the emergence of strong anti-American political factions. Another irony lies in the fact that even in its second term, the Bush administration might not yet have a precise vision of what it wants to see in Egypt. Thus, while Washington is one of the main catalysts of the ripples in Egypt today, "the Americans don't know what they want from Egypt or anywhere else in the region," said former diplomat and prominent columnist Gamil Mattar. He suggested that Bush's stands vis-à-vis democracy in Egypt were mainly the outcome of pressure from Congress, the Jewish lobby and Coptic groups in the US. "He responds to these pressures by making statements on democracy, but he has yet to offer a vision of what he really wants from the Egyptians," Mattar said. Many in Washington share this view. Gary Schmitt, the executive director of the influential neo-con dominated Project for the New American Century (PNAC) issued a memorandum on 10 May describing the constitutional amendment in Egypt as a "half- measure" that was the result of US pressure. Schmitt warned that such lacklustre reform "will lead to even more frustration and political instability in Egypt". When the London-based, Saudi-owned Al- Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper published the memo as indicative of Washington's view, the debate raged again. Speaking to the Weekly by phone from Washington, Schmitt himself was not sure there was a unified American view of Egyptian democratisation in the first place. "The reason for that," he said, "is because Washington is not quite sure how to approach reform. They're hamstrung by the fact that they think they need a well thought out game plan before they push for reforms. But politics is always more contingent and unpredictable, and you do what you can at the time, and you support those who want peaceful democratic freedom." Schmitt is quite clear, however, about his view that "Washington has been too silent" about the situation in Egypt, especially the violence that marred the referendum. "If you're going to push the democracy agenda, you have to voice your displeasure," he said. And while the movement for change expands to include more groups that are expressing their displeasure with the current regime, the government is not without cards either. Abdel-Moneim Said, head of Al- Ahram's Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, says Egypt is still very capable of political manoeuvering with Washington. "There are the issues of Palestine, Iraq, terrorism, Islam and the west, and Egypt's geo- strategic position in the region. US fleets, for example, have to go through Egypt to get to the region, etc." As such, the one-dimensional depiction of the Egyptian-American dynamic as presented in the opposition press, Said says, "is not very realistic". On the other hand, he also pointed to the "extensive" US influence on Egypt's society (as a natural result of the sole superpower's influence on a globalised world) and economy (as the recipient of $2 billion a year in USAID). Without this influence -- which isn't entirely political -- the US wouldn't be suggesting certain measures for political reforms, Said says. "And everybody -- both government and opposition -- is influenced by that, one way or the other, even though they don't want to admit it. Because at the end of the day, our culture is the outcome of decades of struggle against occupation, and the issue of 'independence' is very important."
