Ending occupation traditionally is prelude to the restoration of sovereignty, but in Gaza's case, this is highly unlikely, reports Sherine Bahaa Of all the occupied territories, Gaza has survived the longest nights of tension and violence. Mere mention of the word "withdrawal" relative to the 365 square kilometre impoverished Strip evokes the notion of a breakthrough. Will Israel's disengagement rekindle hope in a broader negotiated two-state solution? Or when the dust clears from Gaza will Palestinians find themselves cornered behind razor-wire fences? "By withdrawing from Gaza, Israel will legally end the occupation of an estimated 1.4 million Palestinians," Israeli minister of construction and housing, Isaac Herzog, wrote in The Guardian. "Israel will no longer need to set up checkpoints and roadblocks within Gaza, and evacuated settlements will provide desperately needed buildings to ease Gaza's crowding," explained the Israeli official. The question is, what is the difference between legal and de facto occupation? Beyond the rhetoric, this crucial issue remains unanswered. Gaza, a coastal region in the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean, was administered by Egypt from 1949, occupied by Israel in 1967 and granted relative autonomy in 1993. Since 1994, it has been administered by the Palestinian Authority (PA). It has an 11km border with Egypt and a 51km border with Israel. Concerns that Gaza will become a giant prison are well founded and will remain until Israel agrees to a "safe passageway" linking the Strip to the West Bank, as well as a working new harbour and the re- opening of Gaza's airport. "Instead of building bridges with the Palestinians, Israel insists on building walls and fences of suffocation," Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat has said. Emad, 35, perceives the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a "sell and buy transaction" between the Palestinians and the Israelis. When asked by one Arab satellite TV reporter about his view of the withdrawal, Emad gave a blunt answer: "Withdrawal? What withdrawal?" For Emad, as for many others, if Israel withdraws from inside the Strip but controls its outward borders then this is not a withdrawal. "Gaza is my county and so is the West Bank. How can I celebrate when I see the Israelis moving troops and equipment from Gaza to the West Bank?" Indeed, Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem indicate that its unilaterally imposed disengagement was never meant to start a peace process but rather to end one. Israel has intensified its aggressive moves to consolidate its occupation of Jerusalem's eastern Palestinian sector, putting the entire peace process at risk. According to Ali Jarbawi, professor of political science at Birzeit University, Ramallah, "[implementing] the withdrawal in a unilateral move is a clear gesture that the Israelis give us what they want, not what we want." Indeed, in the words of late Israeli prime minister Yitzak Rabin, "Let's throw Gaza in the sea." Israel has never wanted it anyway. It has always been the West Bank and Jerusalem -- by their Jewish names, Judea and Samaria -- that are of significance to the Israelis. "By giving up Gaza, the Israelis are winning 15 years advance in materialising their project," Jarbawi explains. "The formula for Sharon now is not land for peace, but land for time," he added. "Demography is the buzz word," concludes Jarbawi. Indeed, if Israel were to do nothing, by 2025 it would face a Palestinian-Arab majority in the territories it controls between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan. By giving up Gaza, the Israelis will be isolating one per cent of historical Palestine. "By doing this, Sharon is getting rid of Palestinians; throwing their burden to the Arabs to employ them and solve their problems," argues Jarbawi. "Israel's plan is to use concessions in Gaza to remove Jerusalem from the negotiation table," Khouri, PA minister of state for Jerusalem affairs, wrote in The International Herald Tribune. "But without Jerusalem as a shared capital for Palestinians and Israelis, there is no two-state solution," he added. With the international community focussed on what is going on in Gaza, Israel has been proceeding adamantly, and openly, in building the Separation Wall in East Jerusalem. Israel is unashamedly using the wall to redefine Jerusalem's borders, routing it through occupied territories in such a way as to maximise the number of Palestinian Jerusalemites behind the wall and the amount of Palestinian land on the de facto "Israeli side". Comments from the Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz hours before the beginning of the Gaza withdrawal confirm that Israel will not consider any similar evacuation from major settlement blocs in the West Bank. However, it seemed that the negative signal did not ring a bell with PA officials who hailed the Gaza withdrawal as a victory that would roll forward to include all of the occupied territories. "The Israeli withdrawal is important and historic for us, but it must only be a first step," Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas said in the eve of the Israeli disengagement. Indeed, it would seem as if the two parties are speaking different languages, Palestinian officials believe Gaza is but a prelude to the liberation of Jerusalem and the West Bank while the Israelis are reiterating that no more retreats are expected, neither now nor ever. Jarbawi, for one, refutes the conclusion that the withdrawal is a victory for the resistance. "This is the real irony; if they are perceiving the Israeli withdrawal as flight from the fire of the Palestinian resistance then why would the PA be asking the resistance to put down their arms?" Meanwhile, Israel has weakened Abbas politically by reneging on promises to ease the economic siege and release Palestinian prisoners, and by delaying any co-ordination of its Gaza pullout. If the Israeli pullout triggers a free-for-all between Hamas, Fatah and PA security forces, few could predict the outcome. Israel itself may be saddled with early elections after the resignation of Benyamin Netanyahu from government over the disengagement issue. With electioneering and subsequent political manoeuvring, either on the Palestinian side or the Israeli side, or possibly across both sides at once, it is evident that in the short term nothing further of a substantive nature will occur. Political posturing and faux diplomacy may be all we can expect as the sunset of Gazan sovereignty falls against a backdrop of perimeter fences, empty concepts and dashed hopes.
