Egypt has emerged as the Palestinians main political broker in Gaza -- and many Palestinians are unhappy about it, writes Graham Usher One of the several successes of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan has been the marginalisation of the Palestinians. The plan was broached, negotiated and agreed with Washington before being foisted on the Palestinian Authority as a "unilateral" Israeli fait accompli. The pattern is being perpetuated in disengagement's aftermath, but with Egypt rather than the United States (and certainly not the PA) the anointed "partner". Three recent events attest to Egypt's unprecedented engagement in affairs that were once the domain of the Palestinians. The first was the so-called Philadelphic Agreement approved by the Israeli cabinet on 28 August. This enables Egypt to station some 750 soldiers and several patrol boats along the 14-kilometre border that separates Palestinian Rafah from Egypt, with the remit of "countering terrorism, smuggling and infiltration". Egypt also undertook not to sell or transfer arms to the PA, in deference to the stricture that no materiel could go to the Palestinians without Israel's consent. The agreement passed easily in the cabinet but will meet a rougher ride in the Knesset. Among its opponents is former Finance Minister and now Likud leadership contender, Binyamin Netanyahu. He argues that the Egyptian deployment amounts to the "remilitarisation" of the Sinai in violation of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. There are also other reasons, closer to home, and especially in election year. "Sharon's decision to put Israel's security in the hands of the Egyptian army, instead of the IDF, is yet another mistake that will give a prize to terror and allow weapons to arm the terrorist infrastructure that will be built in Gaza," said Netanyahu on 28 August. Sharon, however, was fully behind the deal. He understands that with the settlers out of Gaza there is no purpose to be served by an Israeli military presence on Rafah border. He also understands that the introduction of Egyptian troops will massively boost his diplomatic case that Israel is no longer an occupier in Gaza. This case will be aired when Sharon addresses the UN General Assembly later this month and at just about every other international forum. But -- as Israeli analyst, Aluf Benn, noted in Israel's Haaretz newspaper on 28 August -- the most significant thing about the agreement is what it does not contain. "The Palestinians are not mentioned and are not partners to the security arrangements, although the Egyptians will be operating along their border. In addition, no date for Israel's withdrawal (from the border) is cited. Security sources explain that they did not want to commit themselves before the government decided on the issue," he writes. The second event was the arrival in Gaza on 29 August of Egypt's intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman. Officially he is in town to sustain the Palestinian "calm", rocked by Israel's killing last week of five Palestinians in Tulkarm and a reprisal suicide bombing in the Israeli town of Beersheba on 28 August that left two Israelis severely wounded. He will also oversee an Egyptian team in Gaza "advising" the Palestinian police on how to keep the peace, primarily by preventing revenge operations like Beersheba. But his actual role is political -- negotiating issues that Israel cannot or will not negotiate with the Palestinians. The most pressing of these is the status and location of Gaza's future border crossing into Egypt. The PA's insists this should remain the Rafah terminal, free of any Israeli presence, but with a "third party" in place to assuage Israel's security fears. Israel has no problem with Palestinians exiting through Rafah. But, it says, the entry of goods and people must go through Kerem Shalom, a territory south of Rafah where the Israeli, Egyptian and Palestinian borders meet. Needless to say, this arrangement would leave Israel the same veto power over Palestinian commerce that it has today. According to Israeli sources, Suleiman's "compromise" is to accept Israel's terms for a period of six months, after which the status and location of the border will be reviewed. It is unclear how pleased the Palestinians would be of such a deal, given their experience of "interim" arrangements in the past. But the fact that it is Suleiman, and not they, making the compromise underscores their powerlessness. The third event is the rumour that President Mubarak plans to visit Jerusalem after the Egyptian presidential elections on 7 September. Even should this not happen -- and Israeli diplomats are denying that any such trip is in the offing -- Mubarak will almost certainly meet Sharon at the General Assembly, one of a chorus of leaders on hand to applaud Sharon's "courageous" decision to leave Gaza. Officially, the PA welcomes the Egyptian "mediation" as an example of "President Mubarak's ... unlimited support for any measures required to ensure the success of the peace process," in the words of Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Quriea. But on the street, in the press and among commentators there is increasing Palestinian disquiet about an Egyptian role whose main result so far has been to displace that of the PA. And this for one basic reason, says Palestinian analyst Mahdi Abdel-Hadi. "Egypt's exclusive focus on Israel's security agenda conforms to Sharon's essential political aim with the disengagement," he says, "which is to find an Arab solution to Gaza, not a Palestinian one".
