When the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Israel met in Istanbul the Greater Middle East moved one step closer, writes Mustafa El-Labbad Last week's meeting between the Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers in Istanbul signals the shape of things to come in the post-11 September Middle East regional order. It was the first public meeting between officials of the two countries and, as is often the case in international relations, the timing and venue help unravel the subtexts of the meeting. It is no coincidence that Khurshid Kasuri, foreign minister of the only Islamic nuclear power, should choose to meet his Israeli counterpart, Silvan Shalom, in Istanbul, former capital of the Ottoman Empire and the last seat of the Muslim Caliphate, nor that the meeting should coincide with the annual celebration of the Prophet's midnight journey to the seven heavens from Jerusalem. The message this was intended to convey was that if Israel wants to secure official recognition not just from another Islamic nation, but a major regional power as well, it should abide by international resolutions regarding Palestine. The symbolic substance of time and place also lend credence to that suggestion circulating in the Arab press that Pakistan's "Islamic bomb" may come in handy as a strategic asset for the Arabs in their struggle with the Hebrew state. Israel and Pakistan were founded within a year of one another -- Pakistan in 1947, Israel in 1948. Both base their national identity on religion. They pursued similar strategies to enhance their leverage in the conflict to which they were a party within their respective geographic and demographic environments, first entering into an alliance with the international power -- Great Britain -- that occupied the territory upon which they would eventually declare a state and then, once they were established, shifting their primary allegiance to the US which, in turn, gave them a place within its scheme of international relations, encouraging their regional ambitions and bids to become nuclear powers. In spite of the overlap in their international alliances, regional and international balances of power prevented Pakistan and Israel from publicly acknowledging any meetings between officials before last week. Pakistan had long needed Arab and other Islamic nations to lend it strategic depth and economic support in its contest with India, which is demographically, militarily, economically and strategically superior. This remains the case though other important factors have come into play. That India had once opted for a set of alliances that brought it close to the Soviet camp enhanced Pakistan's standing with Washington. India's shift in alliances in the last decade and a half effectively pulled the rug from beneath Pakistan. Pakistan could still serve as a staging point for the war against the Taliban, and was able to contribute towards dismantling the infrastructure of the terrorist organisations that had operated in Afghanistan, though the irony was that the more successful it was in this regard, the more it compromised its strategic importance. Not only had Islamabad lost an important negotiating card that it had played astutely throughout the Cold War, it was also losing its negotiating power as an ally in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan has been compelled to explore other strategies to bolster its regional position. Taking advantage of recent changes in the regional balance in the Middle East, Islamabad felt it was time to try to avail itself of the possible services of the powerful Zionist lobby in the US, hoping to kill two birds with one stone, i.e. recuperate its strategic status and neutralise Tel Aviv in its conflict with India. Attempting a conciliation with Tel Aviv was never likely to jeopardise Pakistan's relations with Arab and Islamic countries which are also under considerable international pressure and lack a common agenda. But to cover itself Islamabad issued a stream of statements for public consumption in the Islamic world. It would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel before the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, it declared. And the Pakistani foreign minister's meeting with his Israeli counterpart was "a gesture to underscore the importance Pakistan attaches to Israel ending its occupation of Gaza". Many Arab commentators have chalked up the meeting to a conspiracy being hatched by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in collusion with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Such an oversimplification ignores the intricate interplay between a host of regional and international weights and balances and by attributing the meeting to the will of a handful of individuals misdirects reactions against the alleged conspirators while sapping our own manoeuvrability and ability to come up with alternative strategies. There is no denying that Erdogan was keen to host the meeting as a means to promote Turkey's role as a bridge between East and West. It is this role that Ankara hopes will eventually ensure Turkish membership of the EU, a goal shared by the majority of Turkish political parties which are also seeking to augment Ankara's standing in the new Middle Eastern regional order. Pakistan is motivated by similar geo- strategic considerations. Musharraf rules on behalf of the Pakistani military-industrial establishment, which may explain the implicit support for the meeting between the Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers offered by the opposition People's Party. The Pakistani-Israeli meeting brokered by Ankara represents a tangible acknowledgement of the ascendancy of the concept of the Greater Middle East that has gained such prominence in American strategic research and policy planning centres. This concept extends the Middle East beyond customarily recognised borders to encompass an area stretching from the Caspian Sea in the north to the Indian Gulf in the south and from Morocco in the west to the Indian subcontinent in the east. The addition of other nations to a geographical entity originally defined by the British but which is now American by default necessitates a shift in regional balances. Within the framework of this expanded Middle Eastern seven regional powers come into play: India, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. As each of these nations differs in its strengths and weaknesses it is only natural that they will seek to compensate for the latter by forging alliances among themselves. As these alliances coalesce strategic axes will emerge. Regional alliances are one of the ways in which states seek to bolster their strategic position and enhance their tactical manoeuvrability and it is difficult to imagine Pakistan chasing after an alliance that is no more than a hypothetical possibility. Islamabad, Tel Aviv and Ankara were not engaging in a joint exercise in geo-political theory. The Pakistani-Israeli foreign ministerial meeting hosted in Istanbul constitutes a recognition of the Greater Middle East as a reality that is no longer around the corner.
