Iraq's tragic drama ascended in intensity to a whole new level, though the worst has been so far forestalled, writes Firas Al-Atraqchi When Operation Bodyguard was launched ahead of D-Day on 6 June, 1944, the military planners said: "in times of war, truth is protected by a bodyguard of lies." This was in reference to the feint that deceived Hitler's forces and paved the way for the allied landings on the beaches of Normandy. Today, the sentiment holds as true as ever, particularly when it comes to the timing and the identity of the perpetrators of the criminal attack on the Askariya Mosque in the Iraqi city of Samaraa. First, the timing: Since Iraqis went to the polls 15 December, there has been political friction between the various parties -- the Sunnis accusing the Shia of massive fraud -- which permeated the air with a sense of tension. In the two months since elections, no viable government has been created. Two weeks prior to the Askariya Mosque bombing, the Shia, Kurd and Sunni parties huddled together to form a government. Almost immediately, the US administration intervened to ensure that a more "inclusive", non-sectarian government would be formed. The pressure for the US to succeed in Iraq has diverted attention to keeping Iran out of Iraqi affairs. After Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal chided the US for handing Iraq over to Iran last September, there has been a subtle policy shift in the US approach to Iraq, as well as coverage of events in the media. No longer do we hear of "insurgents"; US media has gone to great lengths recently to distinguish between Al-Qaeda forces and Iraqi resistance groups, often depicting the two in pitch battles against each other. Then came revelations of torture chambers operated by "elements" in the Shia-led Interior Ministry, and the free-roaming death squads, who, US forces say, are loyal to Shia cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr's Mehdi Army. In the few days immediately prior to the mosque attack we saw the following flurry of activity: Al-Sadr, fresh from a visit to Iran, gives the Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari the needed vote to retain his post in the new permanent four-year government. However, he also said that he rejected the current constitution and believed federalism (the context which the Kurds have insisted be included) should be rejected. He also called on US forces to withdraw immediately just before embarking on a diplomatic tour of Arab capitals. In the meantime, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad began to up the ante by insisting that the Sunni bloc (numbering 55 in the 275- member legislature) be given more power. Reports indicated that the US had wanted to see former premier Iyad Allawi as the next prime minister. All of a sudden, Al-Jaafari's promised post did not seem as assured. US media also increased the pressure as The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post, among others, reported on death squads affiliated with the Iraqi Interior Ministry. When the ministry did not budge on the issue, US media quoted US military sources saying some 1500 highway police could also be part of an extended death squad network. Four days before the Askariya bombing, US media reported that 400 members (including senior level officials) of the Interior Ministry were themselves under investigation for allegations ranging from corruption to involvement in running torture chambers and operating death squads. Two days prior to the Askariya bombing, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw arrived in Baghdad to help ratchet up the pressure on Al-Jaafari and his Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) allies in the government. Iran -- the main SCIRI backer -- reiterated its position that UK forces should completely withdraw from the south of Iraq after the video release of British troops beating Iraqi children. The logic goes that once UK troops withdraw, armed militia will handle security in the south: the Badr Brigades (the SCIRI's armed wing) and the Mehdi Army. Khalilzad in turn accused Iran of meddling in Iraqi affairs in the strongest terms yet: alleging a "comprehensive strategy... by a player seeking regional pre-eminence". Khalilzad's statements -- made a day before the shrine attack -- also alluded to the ongoing breakdown in talks over Iran's nuclear ambitions. He also took a swipe at Iraq's diplomatic relations with Iran (brokered by none other than Al-Jaafari in Tehran in early 2005) saying it was governed by a policy "to work with militias, to work with extremist groups, to provide training and weapons". Less than 12 hours later, the Askariya Mosque in Samaraa was partially destroyed, the 1200-year-old shrine gutted. As Sunni mosques were burned in reprisal attacks and Sunnis were gunned down in the streets, Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim, head of SCIRI and the Badr Brigades, which has come under so much pressure from the Americans, lashed out against Khalilzad. "For sure, the statements made by the ambassador were not made in a responsible way and he did not behave like an ambassador," Al-Hakim told reporters. "These statements were the reason for more pressure and gave green lights to terrorist groups. And, therefore, he shares in part of the responsibility." It is important to note here that Hakim had been asking US forces to relinquish security control to his forces, despite the evidence piling up against his Badr Brigades of running death squads and torture chambers. As hundreds of Sunni mosques came under attack, Iranian cleric in Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani called on the Shia community to protest the attack on the shrine, but to remain restrained. He also made a veiled threat against the Americans, which was significantly downplayed in US media. He said if US forces could not maintain the security of holy shrines, his own forces would take over. It is unknown whether he was directly referring to his own militia, Ansar Al-Sistani, the Mehdi Army, or Badr. The importance of this statement cannot be emphasised enough as it comes after much US pressure regarding death squads, Hakim's demand for more control of security, and Iran's call for a withdrawal of UK troops. On Friday, as a general curfew managed to secure some parts of Baghdad, Iraqi officials said the attack on the shrine was the work of "specialists". Construction Minister Jassem Mohamed Jaafar, who toured Samaraa and inspected the damage incurred to the shrine, said the placing of explosives inside the dome was meticulous and must have taken at least 12 hours. "Holes were dug into the mausoleum's four main pillars and packed with explosives," he told the media, adding that work on each pillar must have taken at least four hours. This means that the perpetrators had a free rein for considerable time to carry out their heinous crime. How did they get access to the shrine in the first place? Initial reports said that four men, one donning Interior Ministry commando garb, stormed the shrine after dawn prayers on Wednesday, took the five guards hostage, and fled before detonating their explosive charge. They released the guards and mingled with worshippers for the dawn prayers before slipping out. Later reports said the attackers were 10 men dressed in commando outfits and that they had been apprehended. The shrine ought to have been protected by a contingent of 35 Interior Ministry troops, because of its particular importance to the Shia community. Questions abound. Why was the security detail reduced from 35 to only five men guarding such an important shrine? If it took at least 12 hours to plant the explosives, why did no one notice that the five police guards had been taken hostage? If it took at least 12 hours to plant the explosives, would that not have meant access to the shrine during evening prayers the night before? Hoping to find answers and interview residents of Samaraa, Al-Arabiya news network dispatched three of its journalists, including former Al-Jazeera reporter Atwar Bahjat, herself a native of the ancient city. Sources in Iraq say she was interviewing residents when a truck full of unknown armed men abducted her as she screamed for help. Bahgat, 30, of mixed Sunni-Shia heritage, was found executed outside Samaraa, along with her cameraman and sound technician. Her field equipment and video were missing. Iraqi websites have speculated as to why Bahgat was so brutally murdered and what became of her video material. According to the Baghdad-based Iraqi blogger, Zeyad, of Healing Iraq, quoting other Iraqi sources, Bahgat had been filming the arrest of two Iranians in Samaraa who were released when Interior Minister Baqer Jabr arrived on the scene. This has not been independently verified. Samaraa eyewitnesses, however, have published accounts on various websites, like www.Iraqirabita.or g, saying US and Iraqi forces had sealed off access ways to the shrine the night prior to the explosion. Some have said that Bahgat had interviewed some of these eyewitnesses. This also could not be independently verified. At the beginning of the week reports from Iraq revealed that Sunni neighbourhoods have formed clustres of militia to protect the mosques, some 196 of which have been attacked, destroyed or razed to the ground. Iraqi sources are saying that despite Al-Sadr's statements that Sunnis should not be targeted by militia, they have continued to attack, kidnap and torture those they suspect of being Sunni. As violence in Iraq continued, but with tension apparently lowered in most areas of Baghdad and Basra by Tuesday, the Samaraa bombings have produced three surprising political outcomes. The first is Al-Sadr's leap in popularity among his followers and his military and political clout with Iraq's Shia marjaaiya (clerical order). While it was Al-Sistani who reacted immediately to the bombing by calling for protests but restraint, it was Al-Sadr who crossed the aisle, embraced the Sunnis and called for unity. By Saturday, after his meeting with the predominantly Sunni-based Association of Muslim Scholars, Al-Sadr's influence on Iraqi politics had become all but complete. It was he who dispatched his associates to meet and pray together with Sunnis in the Sunni Abu Hanifa Mosque (which had been at one point threatened by unknown armed groups) and it was also he who called for Sunnis and Shia to embrace one another. When he visited Basra Sunday, he received the welcome akin to a politician who is yet to assume a major position. Al-Sadr, who was once threatened with prison and death by the Iraqi government and US forces, is at once the unifying, and trouble- making, catalyst in Iraq. The second development is on the destructive power of the militia. They were left virtually unchecked as they engaged in street fights, occupied mosques, and defied both a curfew and travel ban. And so threatening is their menace that US forces steered clear of them, often knowing where and when they were targeting their attacks. The US chose not to interfere. The third outcome is the round-robin phone call US President George Bush put through to several Iraqi politicians across the factional spectrum. All of a sudden, Sunni politicians who had boycotted an emergency meeting with President Jalal Talabani a day earlier announced their readiness to enter talks anew. Iraq may have averted a crisis, but it is not out of the woods yet. A new, inclusive, pluralistic government must be established immediately. Every day is fraught with danger.
