The supposedly unimaginable -- a new Lebanon, for all its inhabitants -- is neither as impossible, nor as far off, as many believe, writes Karim Mruah* Considering the uncertainties that remain from our past, uncertainties which bloody terrorist acts continue to exacerbate, it may seem strange to speak of a new future for Lebanon. But it seems to me that the necessary conditions for the creation of a new vision of our history have far more chance of coming together now than ever before, despite the difficulties. The changes that have taken place in Lebanon over the past year can be compared to an earthquake, both in their negative and positive impacts. The 14 March Intifada, which was closely followed by the departure of the Syrians, was the most dramatic event, one that it is both possible, and necessary, to utilise in envisaging the future. I say this not because I am betting on the million Lebanese who came together in Freedom Square beneath banners proclaiming independence, sovereignty, freedom and truth, however important that event was; rather, I am banking on the eventual triumph of all those Lebanese who wish to see their country emerge from crisis into the kind of action that turns an exceptional event into the threshold of a new future, one that we all await. Meanwhile, a strange anomaly persists and continues to haunt those who bear the standard of Lebanon as a true nation. There are some Lebanese, and some Arabs, who continue to form their perceptions of Lebanon on old equations, the foundations of which have collapsed, and on old ideologies that no longer have any raison d'être. They are blind, perhaps because of reasons beyond their will, perhaps unconsciously, when it comes to recent changes and their implications. When they hear us speak of a new future for Lebanon they accuse us -- secretly or openly -- of demanding the impossible. Such points of view conceal themselves within those who, consciously or not, are attached to the past or who despair of the future because of the obstacles they see along the way. They harbour the conviction that Lebanon must either be under the tutelage of Syria or else cease to be. In the eyes of these cynics the fate of Lebanon, since its birth, has been to become an appendage of Syria; it is a territory, they believe, that cannot constitute a nation, nor its inhabitants a people. The strangest thing is that some Lebanese who claim to be attached to Lebanese nationalism and to the legitimacy of the Lebanese nation offer proponents of this view pretexts for their arguments, supporting by their actions the belief that any efforts to establish Lebanon as a real nation will fail because of confessional divisions that seek in vain to coexist. But calls for coexistence, which Lebanese of diverse orientations profess and adopt, express tacitly, objectively -- even involuntarily -- the existence of the Lebanon which the majority seek, a Lebanon that can be attained through a formula for co- existence that does not necessitate the sacrifice of separate characteristics, or even a definition. This ambiguous situation has emerged from loyalty to the democracy referred to in the Taif accords, though in a spirit that runs contrary to the actual text of the document. The consensus foreseen in the text, after all, limits itself to big ideas such as peace, war, and the amendment of the constitution. It does not discuss the sharing of ministerial portfolios, administrative functions or the nitty-gritty of our country's life. The Taif accords, though, are by nature transitory. They are not a constitution. Syrian tutelage enforced itself in such a methodical and constant fashion not just so as to deform the fundamental clauses of the Taif accords, designed to end the civil war and eliminate the possibility of sequels and the destructive logic of division, but also so as to systematically transgress them. It has worked deliberately to deepen sectarian divisions, to paralyse political life and to marginalise parties and syndicates after it had first succeeded in dividing them. The obvious goal of such a policy, as of all Syrian practices in Lebanon, was to show that the Lebanese people are incapable of forming a nation, and that the tutelage of the great Syrian neighbour over this divided people constitutes the most viable means of avoiding new upheavals that might further weaken the structure and in turn affect the stability of neighbours. The destructive effects of such policies have not been limited to Lebanon but have also affected Syria and the objective historical relationship between Lebanon and Syria -- a relationship built upon mutual interests which Lebanese of diverse persuasion, in their vast majority, want to see based on friendship and a reciprocal respect of sovereignty, independence and the specific nature of the two countries. The basic ideology of such policies, in Syria as in Lebanon, lauds Arab unity, though one that deliberately ignores the diversity of peoples and states, that seeks to realise itself by attaching small countries to their larger neighbours, necessitating coercion and military intervention, dismembering and division achieved primarily, though not exclusively, through the creation of armed and economically aligned patterns of allegiance. The Lebanese version, in rapport with the Syrian Baath Party, is not the only example of such a policy in the Arab world. But it renders clear just how much such an approach to Arab unity rests on the deformation of its given objective. It also contradicts the legitimate aspirations of Arab peoples to realise their states on democratic foundations, respectful of the specifications of each country. Amid all these old and new complications, and after so much suffering, the question Lebanese are now asking themselves is this: how can we progress towards a new future free of the flaws of the past, in the shortest time possible and at the lowest possible cost? The difficulties that accompanied the dissolution of Syrian tutelage -- given the earthquake that event caused -- from the criminal prorogation of President Emile Lahoud's mandate to the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri and other assassinations and assassination attempts, passing through the 14 March Intifada -- are growing. These difficulties manifest themselves on several levels. Their sources are equally diverse, as are their consequences. Targeted assassinations have continued, in a programmed fashion, notably after the independence Intifada, starting with Samir Kassir and George Hawi, passing through the attempt on May Chidiac's life and before that on Marwan Hamade, and with the murder of Gibran Tueni. Circumstances prevent any clear identification of the culprits, and a legitimate apparatus capable of identifying and neutralising assassins has not yet been put in place. Power is now divided between the president of the republic, who is holding onto his position despite the multiplicity of voices demanding his departure, and insists on remaining at his post as the representative of an old security apparatus, and a government whose prime minister and a majority of members are trying to bring the country into a new phase of national life but are failing because of the blockade imposed on them by a minority. This is what has kept the country in a state of quasi-paralysis for almost year, preventing the administration from assuming its responsibilities to the Lebanese, most notably in the creation of a security plan, the most sensitive issue of the moment and the one that causes the greatest fear and uncertainty. In addition Hizbullah's continued attachment to its weapons, which played their role to perfection in the liberation of Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation, also constitute an obstacle to the solution of the crisis and the government's return to its responsibilities. Hizbullah's position is unjustifiable. It reflects a claim by Hizbullah that it is the only national party, the only party responsible for the defence of the nation and its borders, as if it were a substitute for the state and its army. During the first few days following the liberation, though, many felt that weapons had lost their raison d'être and that the job of the defence of the country had returned to the state and its army. Palestinian weapons, whether they are inside or outside the camps, constitute a supplementary source of oppression and humiliation for Palestinian refugees, transforming them and their camps into potential bombs that must sooner or later explode in the service of foreign interests and without any consideration of the Palestinian cause. These arms constitute a secondary obstacle to the construction of a Lebanese state, to the building of unified institutions and, most notably, to Lebanon's armed forces. The international community, mobilised, in the absence of any true Arab role, to support Lebanon during its crisis, also creates acute political controversy. Yet this international role, for the time being at least, has been positive; we had an absolute need for it to be able to emerge from our internal crisis. We have no choice but to count on such support, while remaining prudent and alert, if we are to continue along the path towards independence, Lebanese sovereignty and democracy. The internal situation in Lebanon becomes ever more complicated as a result of the blockading role played by Syria and its Lebanese allies. Will we remain passive before the difficulties posed by Syria's persistent denial of Lebanon's independence? Will we wager on the time factor, or on other issues that are less urgent? Such a course is out of the question. The only alternative to a fatal wait is responsible action. It is our responsibility to promote a new consciousness among the Lebanese, far removed from the false and troubled consciousness that has hitherto dominated our lives, before, during and after the civil war. We must, in our efforts, reach out to Lebanon's young, to those who, consciously or half-consciously, went out into the streets after 14 February and on 14 March, to follow behind the coffins of Kassir, Hawi and Tueni. The slogans called out during these demonstrations were all the same: freedom, sovereignty, independence. Regardless of the calculations made by Hawi, Kassir and Tueni, despite the differences in their language and ideology, freedom, sovereignty and independence lay at the heart of their beliefs. The three most important conditions, it seems to me, for the creation of a new future for Lebanon are: that the political, cultural and media elites carry out their roles, clarifying and breathing life into Lebanon's spirit of renewal, completing the work of these three martyrs who displayed such clarity, courage and self- sacrifice; that democratic forces play a clearer and more courageous role in the mobilisation of the masses in defence of a national consciousness that has been attacked by sectarian allegiances and the interests of leaders who have abused their right to speak in the name of their communities; that the secular forces of democratic change, whether leftist or nationalist, return to the positions they have abandoned, or else that these positions be taken by those who have the competence to do so, whatever political force they represent. These are the tasks we face, now and in the immediate future, and they are not impossible. Working on realising these conditions is the basis of all hope for change, change that will bring about a fundamental transformation in the concept of the Lebanese people and in the comprehension of the Lebanese nation, as home to those who will be Lebanese first, and Arabs too, and in the concept of the state. And this state will have to be both democratic and modern, in all senses, if it wants to avoid emulating the many models, both old and new, of oppression that exist in abundance across the Arab world. The birth of a new Lebanon, however painful, and whether or not it is the result of a cesarean, will soon be one of the most important events to have taken place in the Arab world. The decline of oppressive regimes has begun. The dawn of democracy is coming to the Arab world though the rays will take time to warm us. After long decades of oppression, humiliation, distraction and marginalisation, the people are approaching a role of which they have been deprived too long, helping to realise the renaissance of their nations and participate in the elaboration of a new civilisation. * The writer is a prominent Lebanese intellectual.
