Arab summits habitually reveal the Arab condition. That held in Khartoum is symptomatic of just how lethargic our leaders have become, writes Hassan Nafaa* The Arab Summit held in Khartoum last week received its fair share of commentary, as happens on such occasions. Commentators could not resist the temptation of comparing this summit to another held in that same capital some 40 years ago. The Khartoum summit of November 1967 is renowned for having declared that the Arabs refuse to either negotiate with Israel, recognise it, or make peace with it. Most parallels drawn with the 1967 summit start with the reminder that soon after that famous rejection expressed in the three "no's" these negatives quickly became three "yes's". With its signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt broke ranks with the Arab states which rejected negotiating with Israel. Madrid in 1991 marked the collective and embarrassed Arab abandonment of the "rejections" of Khartoum 1967. And, in Beirut 2002, the meek innuendoes of Madrid evolved into more boldly explicit affirmatives. It is perhaps inevitable that the players in the Middle East conflict should have undertaken this reversal of positions during a fraught and extended period and that the Arabs who scorned Israel's overtures should now become its supplicants. The reason for the change of heart is that the Arabs have lacked the resolve needed to support their continued snubbing of Israel's pleas or, later, to lure Israel and its supporters way from their aloofness in the face of the Arabs' new-found supplication. Whereas Israel has consistently enjoyed long- term strategies, and an arsenal of tactics and fall- back options, the Arabs have no plans for either war or peace. When they said "no" to negotiation and "no" to recognition and "no" to settlement, they were only reacting to plans proposed by the other party instead of promoting their own. When they changed their position into the affirmative they mistakenly assumed that their agreeing to negotiate with Israel would of itself be sufficiently "seductive". The Arabs have unfortunately woken up to the reality that what they are now offering is not enough to satisfy Israel's insatiability. It is also too late to retract to former positions. The Arabs have no option but to continue to escape forward. They pressed for a settlement at the very moment in which they lacked the leverage to negotiate it. Israel on the other hand, outstripped them with unilateral action which it had the means and resolve to implement. The Arab governments were understandably at their wit's end as they headed to this year's Khartoum summit. They did not have the collective will to challenge Israel and keep it from pressing ahead with its unilateral disengagement. Neither did they have the openness to tell their people the painful truth that they have no choice but to cave in to Israel's demands. Given these realities and against the backdrop of the Arabs' incomparable record, it is no surprise that those attending in Khartoum should come up with an ambivalent combination of rejection and acceptance. "No", they said, to the separating wall and unilateral disengagement and "yes", they affirmed, to a peace settlement in accordance with the Beirut initiative. This provided fodder to Arab commentators of course. Some latched on to the negatives, gloating at what they saw as a predictable reversion to stereotypical behaviour. Others seized upon the unrealisable plea for a settlement to resume their habitual self-flagellation that the Arabs are hopeless to the extent of being on the verge, if not already "left behind by history". One cannot understand why some would scoff at comparisons between the two Khartoum summits, that of 40 years ago and today. Despite the clear differences between the two, an objective comparison could help determine the reason for the Arab's current malaise and find a remedy for it perhaps. When the Arab rulers headed to Khartoum in 1967 they were painfully conscious of their recent military defeat by Israel. They realised as well, however, that the political will of their peoples had not been broken. The most tangible evidence of this was the spontaneous mass demonstrations in Egypt on 9 and 10 June of 1967. The people refused to acknowledge defeat and urged the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser to retract his decision to step down. The demonstrations were echoed in November of the same year when another similar demonstration welcomed Nasser in Khartoum, again urging him to remain steadfast against the enemy. Had it not been for these two momentous outpourings of popular feeling, the 1967 Khartoum summit would not have proclaimed its famous "no's", and the Arab oil-producing states would not have agreed to the provision of enormous amounts of financial support to the frontline nations with Israel. The aim was to compensate them for their losses sustained in the war and help them with reconstruction and the re-building of their defeated armies. It may be fairly said that Khartoum 1967 established the cornerstone for a comprehensive and substantive strategy for standing up to Israel. The three resolutions, combined with material support for the frontline nations enabled the Arabs to gradually regain the initiative. This was embodied in the three- year War of Attrition on the Egyptian front, followed by the full-scale coordinated assault against Israel on it, and the Syrian front in October 1973. These endeavours were effectively backed by one of the most important tactical moves in contemporary Arab history, that of resorting to oil as a political weapon in the battle. Because of the resolutions of the first Khartoum summit, the Arab world succeeded in overcoming the effects of the 1967 defeat in the span of only six years, emerging from the experience much stronger than it had previously been. Some commentators went so far as to predict that the Arab world was poised to become the world's sixth most powerful force, after the five permanent members of the Security Council. Forty years on, the Arab world is in a vastly different position. Arab leaders have had to practically drag themselves to Khartoum, so low was their enthusiasm. Nearly half of them, most representing the most influential Arab countries decided not to attend, dispatching top-level ministers instead. Particularly notable for his absence was the Egyptian president at a time when the host country Sudan -- Egypt's backyard -- is facing serious threats to its unity and territorial integrity, in turn jeopardising those of Egypt. Stranger yet was Hosni Mubarak's excuse for not going to Khartoum: he was too busy tending to important events at home, ( Al-Musawwar, 4251, 31 March). Summit conferences have apparently become venues where Arab leaders can only spend their leisure time, if they can spare it. Although the Egyptian president was not the only Arab head of state to be absent from the summit, hence not the only party to blame for the weakness of its resolutions, his absence sheds light on an even graver concern. That is the gaping vacuum at the level of leadership in the Arab world. There is a vacuum here, and, more so, no role-models to be emulated. The problem which Khartoum so patently underscored was not so much that the Arab nation is leaderless, inasmuch as that it is comatose. Khartoum II convened against a backdrop of enormous challenges in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere. The challenges are no greater and no worse than those that existed during Khartoum I. But the difference between then and now is the current absence of leadership and of will. In 1967 the Arab world had Nasser, a leader in whom the Arab peoples believed. Their trust continued even after Israel inflicted upon him an ignominious defeat. The masses possessed sufficient political will to resist, providing their leadership with an important reserve from which to tap as it strove to overcome defeat and eventually turn the tables on the enemy. Although this leader died before the ultimate day of revenge, he laid the groundwork for such a day. The tripartite alliance between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia subsequently succeeded in compensating for Nasser's unique charismatic energy, leading the Arab world to victory in October 1973. The combination of political will, effective Arab leadership and an active core group of nations made it possible to transform the 1967 defeat into victory. These factors do not exist today, and the recent Khartoum summit cannot but reflect an Arab order which can at best be described as clinically dead. Consequently, no resolutions emerging from Khartoum II are likely to withstand the dangers and challenges lying ahead. In this connection, the real tragedy of the Arab order does not reside so much in its current weakness, as it does in its inability to create the mechanisms that can halt its continuing and rapid degradation. This means that we may expect things to go from bad to worse in the region's hot spots, notably Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon and Syria. It also means that our Arab summits are destined to go from bad to worse and that someday, perhaps in the not-too-distant future, it will become difficult to convene even an ordinary Arab summit. Arab governments are undoubtedly aware of this reality, which is why they no longer vie to host such summits and pray instead that their turn to play host will never come. This is one manner in which one can interpret Saudi Arabia's generous decision to pass over its turn to host the next summit. It did this, ostensibly on grounds of its "esteem for the country where the Arab League headquarters are located". In the wake of the last Khartoum summit, one finds it difficult to believe that the little cosmetic surgeries which the Arab League is currently undertaking -- notably the creation of an Arab parliament, an Arab peace and security council or an Arab court of justice -- will generate a qualitative shift in collective Arab action. Such a breakthrough will never occur as long as the Arab countries, large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak, acknowledge that the Zionist enterprise poses the greatest threat to their future and that none can take on this threat alone. The Arab states need to come up with the collective resolve to face this challenge as their foremost priority. This is not to suggest that the Arab countries should suddenly declare war on Israel or its unequivocal ally the US. What is proposed is a collective and rational management of the conflict with Israel, in addition to the carefully-planned channelling and deployment of Arab resources. Only then can the Arab countries effectively and rapidly push for a just settlement to the conflict. If Arab governments truly want to bring about a settlement based on their initiative adopted in Beirut in 2002, they must begin with the immediate overhaul of the Arab order. Superficial facelifts are not enough. If that is all they are prepared to do, then they should at the very least be open about it with their people and let them, finally, take matters into their hands. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
