Sinai-style terror, delinked from doctrine, is difficult to handle and necessitates addressing the social and political reasons of grievance, writes Amr Elchoubaki* The face of terror is changing in this country. Call it neo-terrorism if you will, or call it terrorism of the third millennium. It is here and it has hit Sinai four times in less than two years -- twice recently in 48 hours. The neo-terrorists are evidently quick on their feet, even in rugged terrain. And they may be harder to trace than the sophisticated types of the past. My contention is that it would be also more difficult to clamp down on neo-terrorists through security measures alone. But let me remind you of the old type of terrorism, the one we've experienced over the past three decades. When Jihad and Gamaa Islamiya appeared in the 1970s, they both had a doctrinal and political plan, one they drew from a particular interpretation of Islamic tradition. Both groups branded the government as atheistic, denouncing it for its failure to enforce Islamic laws. Jihad and Gamaa called for jihad against the government, but stopped short of branding all society as apostate. Only one group, Gamaatal Muslimin, commonly known as Takfir wal Hegra, denounced both government and society. The book that inspired many of the violent religious groups is Al-Farida Al-Ghaeba, or "Absent Tenet". The book calls "jihad" the absent tenet and admonishes Muslims for neglecting it. Leaders of Jihad wrote extensively about the need to fight against any ruler who doesn't enforce Islamic law. So did Gamaa Islamiya. In its famous document, the Charter of Islamic Work, Gamaa urged its followers to fight rulers failing to enforce God's laws. Gamaa was more flexible in organisation and accessible in doctrine than Jihad, and it consequently had a large following, especially in south Egypt. Both Jihad and Gamaa recruited thousands of people in a strict organisational fashion, offering a centralised command and a doctrine dedicated to the recreation of an Islamic state. Both groups sought to restore the caliphate, promised to liberate Palestine, and swore to bring down the existing regime through force. Both groups fought a bloody battle with the regime. Jihad assassinated President Anwar El-Sadat in 1981. A continual confrontation ensued between the government and major jihad groups throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The Egyptian regime ultimately succeeded in dismantling both Jihad and Gamaa. Remnants of Jihad, led by Ayman Al-Zawahri, helped form the Islamic Front for the Confrontation of Crusaders and Jews, also know as Al-Qaeda, in 1998. By that time, Jihad had disappeared from the Egyptian scene. The surviving leaders of Gamaa Islamiya eventually announced their repentance, even while incarcerated in Egyptian prisons. In a perfect world, social and political forces should have stepped in and recruited "repentant" members of violent groups in their ranks, thus rehabilitating them into a life of peaceful political action. This didn't happen. Instead, the government relied on the iron grip of security to keep former and potential terrorists in check. Generally speaking, the local soil remained fertile for discontent. And terror eventually came back, albeit in a different form. The Taba attack of 6 October 2004 marked the beginning of what I call neo- terrorism in Egypt. A second attack took place in Sharm El-Sheikh on 23 July 2005. The third incident belonging to the same category happened in Dahab on the eve of Sinai Liberation day two weeks ago. And that was followed swiftly by a minor attack in northern Sinai. The form and motives of terror have changed over the past three decades. The new type of terror is individualistic in character. People who do not belong to any of the major jihad organisations and lack the desire to form an intellectual or doctrinal framework explaining their goals carry it out. The perpetrators lack the requisite discipline to be part of a structured hierarchy. One may say that we've moving from jihad as an idea to jihad as act. In recent attacks, violence appears a personalised quest for salvation that begins and ends with a single deed. One fails to see the collective vision and grand schemes that marked terror in the 1980s and 1990s. Neo- terrorists act for any number of reasons that may change over time. This wasn't the case in the 1980s, when both Jihad and Gamaa had a clear goal; namely that of fighting "the enemy at home," in reference to incumbent regimes. In the Taba operation, perpetrators were punishing Israelis for the injustices done in the Palestinian territories. In Dahab, attackers used crude devices in an apparent act of revenge against the government and police. Harsh police tactics in Sinai following the Taba bombing triggered desire for revenge. Neo-terrorists have so far targeted the "enemy within", which is the Egyptian regime, as well as the "enemy without", which is the West and Israel. The attacks were mostly random in character, depending on the grievances felt by any group or individual at any given time. The attack against foreign tourists last year in Al-Azhar adds another twist to the story. The perpetrator was a university student in the Faculty of Engineering, a distinguished academic institution. He wasn't a member of any of the major or minor groups of terror. He just surfed the net and was fascinated by the fundamentalist literature he found. The dissemination of terror ideas over the Internet is a characteristic of the third millennia. The Internet is a media that is hard to regulate. It is also a suitable media for linking overseas conflicts with domestic grievances and religious propensities. The new wave of incidents features amateurs as well as professionals. We know that the 2004 Taba attack involved professional planning and execution. The fourth attack, following that in Dahab, was clearly amateurish. This new brand of terror may have external support from individuals or fundamentalist groups that have no cohesive organisational structure. Al-Qaeda style and tactics were somewhat present in the Taba attack. Dahab, however, seems to be an act of vengeance driven by domestic events. This random mosaic, while not belonging to any of the known violent groups, and not representing a major doctrinal or organisational framework, can be judged a result of frustrations with the domestic social environment, of social and cultural marginalisation, and also of the widespread abuse to which Sinai inhabitants have been subject since the Taba attack in 2004. Generally speaking, these neo-terrorists have limited objectives. They cannot and don't even aim to overthrow the incumbent regime. All they want to harm it and get even with it. These cells have no widespread following in various cities and provinces. They are moving cells that get together to carry out one operation or a few. They have no profound literature, aside from the rhetoric Al-Qaeda followers post on the net. Unlike the case in the 1980s and 1990s, neo-terrorists lack a clear objective; not even a far-fetched one such as overthrowing the regime. Some cells bear a number of the cultural characteristics of the Sinai region. They are nomadic in character, not urban in style and sophistication. Their motives change from one moment to another. The jihad idea is still there, but it is only skin deep, a veneer that covers deeper layers of anger, frustration and vendetta. This doesn't make the problem simpler. On the contrary, the major terror groups of the past were easier to comprehend and handle. Perhaps the new wave of violence is never going to match the systematic and successive waves of past decades. Perhaps we'll see more individual incidents of the type seen in Sinai and Al-Azhar. But whereas police could identify and infiltrate major groups of the past, the mission now is bound to be harder. Due to the specific nature of this new brand of terror, the state is at a disadvantage. This is why we cannot rely on stiff security alone to defend ourselves. Sooner or later, we'll have to address the political and social motives of neo-terrorists. * The writer is a political analyst at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
