On the eve of the upcoming parliamentary elections, it is unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary representation will be as substantial as that in the outgoing parliament, writes Dina Ezzat Speculation about the number of seats that the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to secure in the 2010-2015 People's Assembly has been integral to debate over the upcoming legislative elections. Some officials in the know say they have "indicators" that it will be in the single digit range only. Others say maybe double digits, but not far beyond 10. The debate comes at a time when Muslim Brotherhood members are expressing concern about the absence of direct judicial supervision at ballot stations. And while candidates and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood decline to go on record in stating the number of seats they assess they would get, many are willing to acknowledge expectations of a serious drop. "I think it would be around 30 to 40 seats in the next parliament," suggested Amr El-Shobki, a political analyst and expert on Islamic movements. According to El-Shobki, this drop should not be attributed strictly to possible intervention on the side of the government. The performance and positions of the Muslim Brotherhood also count in this respect. El-Shobki suggests there is a failure on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood. So far the group -- even if unlicensed -- has failed to formulate a solid political platform on all issues of interest to the wider public. While the "2007 Platform" of the Brotherhood was a rare exception to a policy of general ambiguity, including on the structure of the state that the Brotherhood sees as compatible with the precepts of Islam, and the status of women and Christians in this assumed state, the 2007 document offered little to encourage sceptics with regards to the intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to a recent book by Hossam Tamam, a well-versed author on the Muslim Brotherhood, the platform was long on principles and short on clear-cut positions. In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood were criticised for entertaining the establishment of a higher council to supervise the performance of parliament and ensure compatibility between that performance and Islamic rules as stated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The exclusion of women or Christians from accessing the top jobs in the executive on principle was also criticised as discriminatory, even though it is an untold rule that no woman and no Christian could access much lesser roles in the executive hierarchy under the current supposedly semi-secular system. To date, critics say, the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to offer an updated and platform. And while many Muslim Brotherhood leaders insist that the 2007 document was just a preliminary draft, their critics -- sympathisers included -- insist that if this was the case then a revised draft should have been issued. In his book, Tamam notes that some statements made by some members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including from within the Guidance Bureau, reflect tolerance to the access of Christian candidates (while there is no reference to women) to top executive jobs. However, he acknowledges that these remain just statements and lack the characteristics of a clearly adopted policy on the part of the Muslim organisation. Tamam and Hassan accept that contrary to hardline positions adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood on social matters (for example, the veil seen as obligatory for all Muslim women above 15), the profile of the Muslim Brotherhood on political, and perhaps economic, matters is becoming less rigid. For state officials -- especially those in the security quarters -- what the Muslim Brotherhood says is one thing and what they actually believe is another. For the state, the Muslim Brotherhood only stoops to conquer, and once they get their hands on power it would be impossible to remove them. As such it is not possible to tolerate their presence "mushrooming", whether in student unions or professional syndicates or in parliament. As to Muslim Brotherhood leaders going on the record that they only seek to participate in the political process: "This is nonsense, and they are not fooling anybody," said one security official. "It is obvious that the state would like to see the representation of the opposition in the next parliament coming more from the licensed political parties than from the [outlawed] Muslim Brotherhood," said Gamal Abdel-Gawwad, director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. He added that some pre-voting media and campaigning "efforts" on the part of the government could push considerable votes towards licensed parties. According to Abdel-Gawwad, ultimately, "the favoured political discourse for Egyptians is a nationalist one -- maybe for some with a religious component." "In 1919, the call for nationalism was made jointly through a Muslim and a Coptic clergymen. It was a call for nationalism made in churches and mosques by religious leaders. This is the kind of mix that Egyptians could go for, long-term," he argued. That said; state officials and NDP members know that the capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood to reach out to the poor and offer services makes them a hard target to topple in the next elections. In his book, Tamam criticised the attempts of the state to overcome the Muslim Brotherhood by either passing legislation that hinders their political advancement or by applying strict security measures that ultimately augment the sympathy the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys. According to El-Shobki, the state should not seek to contain the Muslim Brotherhood, but rather should seek to advance the overall political sphere. It is only by offering voters serious options that the Muslim Brotherhood would cease to be the only credible alternative to the NDP, whose close association with power -- El-Shobki finds -- limits its ability to evolve into a political party with a firm constituency. "Nobody could overlook the physical and emotional damage that the authorities impose on the Muslim Brotherhood in the run-up to elections day," says Ammar Ali Hassan in his recent book. However, as commentators, voters, and Muslim Brotherhood candidates note, the unimpressive performance of the NDP government is unlikely to serve the electoral interests of the NDP, but rather to serve the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to a recent book by prominent political scientist Wahid Abdel-Meguid on the Muslim Brotherhood, the main difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition parties is that the Brotherhood are more able to formulate an appealing message to their constituency, and are more willing to work hard to reach out to this constituency. Brotherhood candidates say they have faith that the people are with them. "We are not giving up and we are not changing our political creeds," said Hamdi Hassan, an Alexandrian MP affiliated with the Brotherhood. "There was a time when people were apprehensive about us, but now is the time where people are surrounding and supporting us," Hassan added. Diaa Rashwan, a senior political analyst of Islamic movements in Egypt, is convinced that while the state would like to see the Muslim Brotherhood contained, it does not really seek to fully eliminate the group, because when all is said and done it is through the battle to constrain the Muslim Brotherhood -- proposed by the state as sectarian and violent -- that the state has a pretext to apply a wide range of extraordinary measures, including decades long and routinely extended emergency laws. Both El-Shobki and Rashwan agree; the next elections will bring no great news -- neither for the Muslim Brotherhood nor for democracy.
