Despite an immediate endorsement from the different Iraqi groups to the Iraqi premiere's national reconciliation plan, it nonetheless failed to address some of the key issues facing Iraq, analysts told Omayma Abdel-Latif When Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri presented a national reconciliation plan to the parliament last Sunday, it came as hardly a surprise. The plan, many argued, was the culmination of 's concerted efforts -- ever since he was appointed to the premiership last May -- to inject some blood into the stalled political process by reaching out to the Iraqi groups that had opted out. The 24-point plan was the latest in a series of moves taken by in order to show a gesture of goodwill. Insisting on the need to dissolve the militias, which are said to have been responsible for much of the sectarian violence claiming the lives of thousands of Iraqi civilians, and releasing hundreds of detainees were two such moves. Among the key proposals included in 's national reconciliation plan are 'resorting to national dialogue as the means to embrace all viewpoints that oppose the government' and that 'the Iraqi government, institutions and parliament are the sole legitimate representative of the Iraqi people'. Most importantly, however, are the two proposals concerning Iraqi detainees and the policies of debaathification. The plan proposes issuing an amnesty for Iraqi detainees not implicated in 'terrorist activities' and with no Iraqi blood on their hands, and a reassessment of the debaathification policy to ensure that it be conducted through 'professional and constitutional channels'. But as the euphoria which surrounded 's plan began to fade, questions about the fate of the plan arose, and despite many Iraqi groups' immediate endorsements, some had reservations about the content and the way in which the proposals are to be implemented. Iraqi analysts argue that one of the weaknesses of the plan is that it fails to address some of the key issues central to righting the wrongs of the United States-led invasion and occupation of the country some three years ago. "Dissolving the militia and purging the state security apparatuses of its elements comes at the heart of the national reconciliation process and yet this issue has not been fully addressed in the plan," political observer Nadhim Al-Jassour told Al-Ahram Weekly. Despite Al-Malaki's previous firm position on the issue of the militias, the plan seems to have adopted a rather ambiguous stand. "The armed forces," said the plan, "should not be under the influence of any of the political groups vying for power. A settlement for the issue of the militias and the illegally armed groups should be sought through political, economic and security channels". But one important point of contention, which Iraqi observers say the plan has failed to address, is where Iraqi resistance groups fit within such a national reconciliation initiative. While Iraqi newspapers, like the pro-government daily Asabah and Al-Adalah, hailed 's plan, saying that it offered "an olive branch" to resistance groups with no "Iraqi blood on its hands", himself insisted, during his speech to Parliament, that there will be no reconciliation with the "terrorists or the Saddamists". The invitation to dialogue, according to , will only be extended to those Sunni groups that have shown themselves willing to be part of the ongoing political process. A source close to one of the Iraqi resistance movement told the daily Al-Hayat newspaper that such a proposal is not feasible because "the government failed to know who are the legitimate representatives of the armed resistance against the occupation". "Until now, the talks have been conducted with former army officers and Baathists who are willing to give up arms and enter the political process if the government pledged to protect them," the source said. He added that there are other armed groups that will only enter into talks with the government on the condition of a clear-cut timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq: an issue which 's plan chose to ignore, referring only to "the need to work hard to reconstruct the Iraqi armed forces which should take over the security issue and pave the way for the withdrawal of the multi- national forces from Iraq". Some Iraqi figures criticised the national reconciliation plan for failing to draw the line between resistance against the foreign occupation and the terrorist acts committed against the Iraqi people, including those carried out by the occupation forces themselves. "The plan did not underline the difference between resistance and terrorism and this explains why some Iraqi Sunni groups, such as the Muslim Scholars Association (MSA), have reservations on it," said Essam Al-Rawi of the MSA. Nonetheless, he added that had the plan been more inclusive, it would have been in the interest of Iraqi resistance groups to engage positively with the government. "If the government took the initiative and dissolved the militias and set a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops and insisted on punishing those who are responsible for the shedding of Iraqi blood, then it would be guaranteed that the resistance would call for a truce because the excuse to carry arms will cease to exist. This will also encourage the Iraqi religious men -- both Sunni and Shia -- to issue fatwas to ban the carrying of arms outside of the state establishment." But others saw the initiative to be ineffective and will not lead to putting an end to violence in Iraq. "Iraqi resistance groups will not respond to this plan because it -- the plan -- does not recognise the existence of the resistance in the first place," Sheikh Ali Al-Jboury, a spokesperson for Iraqi leader Jawad Al-Khalisi, told reporters. Al-Jboury said the plan, as it exists, ignores the fact that the US-led occupation is the source of all evil in Iraq. Other Sunni leaders acknowledged that the plan was not "attractive" enough to encourage Iraqi resistance groups to come to the negotiation table. "The timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops and recognising the resistance as a legitimate right for people under occupation have been the two main shortcomings of the plan," Tariq Al-Hashemi, vice- president and head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, told reporters on Monday. Al-Hashemi cited five main groups as the backbone of the Iraqi resistance movement, most important of which are the Islamic Army, the 1920s Revolution Brigade and the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance. Getting those groups to engage positively with the national reconciliation plan would, according to Al-Hashemi, necessitate a recognition of their right to defend their occupied country and to free thousands of detainees who have been arrested just because they carried arms against a foreign occupation. But Al-Hashemi has some words for the resistance as well. "The rules of the game have changed in Iraq. It is no longer 2004 and it is clear that the US project in Iraq has failed and the Americans are looking for an exit strategy, so it is about time for the resistance to reconsider the way it is managing the politics of resistance," he said.
