2005 was another year of grinding occupation, a questionable political process, and violence that continues to rip apart innocent Iraqi lives, writes Omayma Abdel-Latif Shortly before January's elections to select a one- year assembly, an Iraqi was asked what the elections might achieve? "End the occupation," was his reply. By the end of the year, after Iraqis went to the polls three times in 12 months, they seemed no closer to achieving that goal than they were before. Instead, the polls -- touted as a harbinger of a viable political process -- seem to have deepened tears in Iraq's social fabric; the elections held a couple of weeks ago were testament to the fact that Iraqis are now voting according to sectarian, rather than political, affiliations. This situation makes a mockery of the much hyped "purple revolution"; an allusion to the so- called democratic process in Iraq. While every major political event has been touted by the US media machine as a landmark and a milestone, while last year Bush administration spin doctors made some headway in convincing the public that all was well in Iraq, that the fight was not being lost to terrorists, Iraq became a full blown headache for Washington; so much so that the ocean of bad news coming out has forced previously muted voices to speak up about the need for an urgent "exit strategy". Many are questioning the nature of Iraq's emerging democracy. The 30 January elections -- from which would emerge a 275-seat assembly assigned with the task of running the country's affairs and drafting a permanent constitution -- were part of the political process outlined by former US-imposed ruler Paul Bremer. A key issue that haunted the grand plan all along, throwing its legitimacy into doubt, was the conspicuous absence of Iraq's Sunnis. One of the main characteristics of this year's political wrangling was over attempts to bring Sunnis in. Those efforts bore limited fruit later in the year, when Sunni figures joined the committee charged with drafting the constitution. Towards the end of the year, there had been a qualitative shift in the deadlock, with Sunnis in surprisingly large numbers going to the polls to elect a four-year parliament. There were two mainly Sunni political lists contesting the elections. Optimism that accompanied Sunni participation, however, soon faded as election results began to filter in. Disappointed by dismal gains, supporters of both the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and the list fronted by former Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi took to the streets, threatening to bring the political process back to square one. But even the best-case scenario of Sunnis being part of the political process and having representatives in the assembly -- say at least 50 MPs -- leaves the key demand of all Sunni groups of setting a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops unresolved. During the year, pressure has been mounting on and within countries that have troops in Iraq to set a date for their withdrawal. British and American officials continue to downplay talk of a definite timetable. Yet one important development took place when US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared last week that 7,500 troops would pull out next year. The announcement coincided with hints made by British Prime Minister Tony Blair during a lightning visit to Baghdad of a limited reduction in British troops sometime in 2006. The death toll of US soldiers in Iraq reached 2,100 by December, with more than 15,000 wounded. The figure seems trivial in comparison to the Iraqi death toll -- either that recognised by US administration officials (30,000) or more likely estimates made by other teams of investigators (100,000 plus). Until this year, such figures were shrouded in secrecy by the US occupation. Indeed, this year saw innocent Iraqis continue to be the target of attacks carried out by US-led occupation forces, which unleashed operations almost monthly under the pretext of chasing terrorists. Painful counter-occupation operations by the Iraqi resistance, which developed its tactics throughout the year, have forced, observers say, the decision to reduce troops. American officials cite the reason behind the decision as "progress in the training of Iraqi forces". Realities on the ground tell a different story. Though Iraqi officials are eager to reach the point where Iraqi forces are able "to protect the country from terrorist violations", they admit it is far off yet. Iraqi police and army forces have been the worst hit by an uninterrupted, daily stream of resistance operations. Police recruitment centres became a frequent target, with thousands of would-be officers killed. The first six months of the year were the bloodiest since the supposed end of major hostilities. Kidnappings of foreigners also continued, with the fate of a group of hostages from the Christian Peacemakers Team, captured in November, still unknown as 2005 neared an end. If this year is anything to go by, the formation of a new government, which the newly elected parliament is obliged to select, is likely to take a very long time. One of the main characteristics of the year was prolonged and sometimes bitter haggling between political and sectarian forces over key posts. This year's interim government only emerged following a ten-week deadlock in the National Assembly. The Kurdish-Shia alliance, which in 2005 was the main player in Iraqi politics, winning 215 out of 275 seats in the January elections and dominating key posts in the government, gave Iraq its first ever Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, in April. The role of the president, however, is much reduced in the US-written framework of present Iraqi politics. Amid political jockeying and rising sectarianism, the role played by Iraqi militias came into focus in 2005, seen by many as fuelling sectarian tensions and contributing to a sense of permanent terror. It became almost a daily occurrence to find mutilated and disfigured bodies showing signs of torture. Sunni groups accused the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq's Badr Brigade militia of committing such atrocities against former Baathists and Sunni clerics. The torture scandal against mostly Sunni prisoners in a detention centre found in an Iraqi Interior Ministry building only confirmed many Sunnis' fears that Interior Minister Jabr Baquer Solagh was adopting a sectarian policy. Further compounding an atmosphere of sectarian strife, several media outlets fanned the flames by publishing what were later exposed as fabricated stories about sectarian killings and kidnappings. One such story, which broke in June, concerned hostage taking in Al-Madaen. Iraqis followed the news in astonishment as a stream of reports about militant Sunni Iraqis taking Shias captive in the city kept surfacing in numerous media outlets. Iraqi forces raided the city, but no hostages were found, the story no more than a hoax. Nonetheless, it tested already strained relations between the country's Sunnis and Shias. As the year reaches an end, and despite reconciliatory talk from clerics on both sides, Iraqis remain caught between atrocities committed by the Badr Brigades and fatwas of Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi inciting Sunnis against Shias. According to Sunni figures, 100 doctors, 35 pilots, 125 Muslim clerics and hundreds of former Baathists have been murdered at the hands of the Badr militia. In light of such continued harsh realities on the ground, the national reconciliation conference held under the auspices of the Arab League, which brought together Iraqi forces from across the religious and political spectrum, does not seem to have borne any fruit. Even though the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006 marks the beginning of permanent rule and end of the interim period, few believe the future will be smooth sailing. Indeed, as long as Iraqis fail to reach a consensus view regarding the most important issues -- the withdrawal of occupation troops, the Arab identity of Iraq, and most importantly, federalism -- it is unlikely that conditions will get better any time soon.
