Two weeks ago, I wrote an article entitled “A leap into the unknown” that dealt with an expected new American strategy vis-à-vis Tehran. Iran watchers in the United States and around the world, more particularly in the Middle East, were wondering whether President Donald Trump would certify or not the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by 15 October as per a Congressional resolution of May 2015 known as the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. Since taking office back in January 2017, the Trump administration had certified twice that Iran was in compliance with JCPOA. In the meantime, the US president the second time let it be known that he wasn't sure he would do it for a third time. On Friday, 13 October, President Trump announced his Iran strategy. He came through on his campaign promises of last year when he repeatedly made it clear that he wasn't happy with the agreement with Iran, calling it the worst deal in the history of the United States. The strategy he unveiled two Fridays ago was nothing short of a serious challenge to Iran in the Middle East region, and even to Iran itself. This new American strategy aims, in the long run, at destabilising the theocratic Iranian regime within Iran. In fact, there are unconfirmed reports that the United States could resume its support for Iranian opposition groups. Prior to the remarks of the US president, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stressed, on various occasions, that while Iran had fulfilled the letter of JCPOA, it nonetheless had not lived up to the spirit of this agreement negotiated under the Obama administration with the participation of the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. The US containment strategy of Iran aims at neutralising Iran's “destabilising” influence, and to “constrain” its “aggression”, particularly its support for terrorism, according to the White House. Furthermore, Washington, by adopting such a muscled approach towards Tehran, wants to revitalise its traditional alliances and regional partners as “bulwarks” against what it termed “Iranian subversion”. Not only is the US lending support to allies and partners, but it is also becoming a direct actor in restoring a more stable balance of power in the Middle East. By this active interventionist foreign policy in the region, the United States is looking beyond Iran to Russia amid the latter's growing regional role and clout in the heart of the Middle East. The new containment strategy is in fact a struggle for power and influence between Washington and Moscow. This containment strategy also aims at denying Iran, and especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), funding for its “malign activities”. As a matter of fact, President Trump ordered the US Treasury Department to impose sanctions on this Iranian military force. Moreover, the US president made it clear that the Washington will “counter threats” to the United States and its allies from ballistic missiles and other “asymmetric” weapons at the disposal of Iran. On the other hand, the United States will make sure that Iran will never possess nuclear weapons. Among other reasons for this new US strategy comes Iranian support for the government of Syria under President Bashar Al-Assad, and its “unrelenting hostility to Israel”. No regional power was happier than the Israeli government. Immediately after President Trump finished his speech, Binyamin Netanyahu congratulated the US president for what he called his “courageous decision” to “boldly confront” Iran's “terrorist regime”. He added that if the Iran deal were left unchanged, Israel is certain that in a few years' time, “the world's foremost terrorist regime will have an arsenal of nuclear weapons”. According to the Israeli prime minister, that would be a “tremendous danger for our collective future”. He failed to mention that if that came to pass it would end Israel's military edge in the Middle East. Another regional endorsement for the new US strategy came from Saudi Arabia. According to a White House readout, 15 October, President Trump spoke on the phone with Saudi King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud the previous day. The Saudi monarch praised what he called Trump's “visionary new Iran strategy”, and pledged to support “American leadership”. The US president emphasised the importance of the Gulf Cooperation Council in countering Iran's destabilising activities in Syria, Yemen, Iraq “and elsewhere in the region”. Egypt, likewise, received the changes in US policy towards Iran positively, albeit in a more circumscribed way. It should have kept silent on the issue to ensure greater diplomatic freedom of action in the Middle East in the years to come. Looking at it from a different angle, Egypt has nothing to gain, from the perspective of its national security interests, from the fallout of US containment of Iran in the way it has been articulated. The reactions on Capitol Hill were no less enthusiastic and supportive, particularly among the members of the Republican Party. Senator John McCain (R-Arizona), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, lent his support, and Senator Mitch McConnel (R-Kentucky), Senate majority leader, said that the new US strategy to counter and contain Iran was “an appropriate response to the consequences of the Obama administration's failed policies”. McConnel added that this strategy serves the national security interests of the United States and is an opportunity for Congress to “strengthen” the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). As of now, Congress has 60 days to renew sanctions or certify Iranian fulfilment of its obligations in the framework of JCPOA. Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arizona) called on other Senators to unite around a strategy that would stop Iran's nuclear programme. He pointed to his working with Senator Bob Corker, and in consultation with the administration, on amendments to INARA that will address major flaws in the nuclear agreement with Iran, like the “sunset clauses”, the weak inspections regime, and the failure to “restrain” Iran's development of advanced centrifuges. If these amendments are adopted, it would strike a compromise that would meet the concerns of other signatories to the nuclear deal. Still, it will need Iranian consent, too, something that is not assured yet. On the other hand, the Western powers who signed the deal would have to convince both Russia and China of the proposed changes. Certainly, Washington needs to muster all its diplomatic skills to get the consent of these powers. What is more ominous is the fact that the United States is looking into sending military missions to various Arab countries to help them face Iranian threats, according to head of US Central Command, General Joseph Vautel. The other countries that co-signed JCPOA, particularly France, Great Britain and Germany, as well as the European Union, voiced support for respecting the Iran agreement while leaving the door open to tackling, resolutely, Iranian policies in the Middle East and working with the US administration to face Iran's ballistic programmes. Russia and China reaffirmed their stance of lending full support for the deal. It goes without saying that they will have something to say on proposed American changes to the nuclear accord with Iran. US containment of Iran would serve Israeli and American security interests, tilting the regional balance of power in Israel's favour. It is difficult to see how this new US strategy would help restore security and stability in the region. The writer is former assistant to the foreign minister.
