Most observers agree that the Arab world has reached a pitiful state of fragmentation and loss. The most telling phenomenon in this regard is that the Arab League, in spite of being one of the oldest —if not the oldest —regional organisations in the world, has not achieved a single accomplishment of note and, consequently, has failed to realise any of the goals it sought to attain since it was established 70 years ago. In fact, many observers have reached the conviction that the Arab League has become an obstacle to rather than a facilitator for collective Arab action. This, in turn, has called into question the value and sustainability of this organisation and whether it can or should be replaced. During the preliminary consultations before the Arab League Charter was signed, some Arab states had proposed more ambitious projects, advocating a federation or a confederation between Arab states. However, other Arab states were more concerned for their sovereignty and autonomy than for the cause of collective Arab action and these persuaded most other Arab decision-makers at that time that the “minimum” was better than the “maximum” degree of integration was probably preferable, as this would help maintain an all embracing Arab framework and avert the scenario of competing axes or coalitions. Accordingly, the Arab League, when it was born, assumed a form more in the nature of a “policy coordination forum” between sovereign states rather than an actual international organisation with an autonomous will and the powers and jurisdiction to compel member states to abide by decisions reflecting the collective will of its members. The more hardline pan-Arab nationalists were never particularly keen on the Arab League. To them, its “minimum” formula was a means of entrenching Arab fragmentation as opposed to a step toward the comprehensive political unity they sought. Nevertheless, many were of the opinion that the creation of the Arab League, despite the minimal approach, was a sign of progress and reflected the determination of Arab governments to stand together and to use the League as a platform for developing collective Arab action in the future. They saw it as a step that would soon be followed by bolder ones that would meet the aspirations of all Arab peoples who were bound by deep cultural and historical ties and faced many common challenges. Unfortunately, over the course of 70 years of practice, the Arab League has proven more conducive to promoting Arab division than to paving the way for comprehensive Arab unity or effective integration. A quick comparison between the Arab and European experiences in this regard bears this out. Despite the fact that European peoples are of diverse ethnic origins, speak many different languages and dialects, and have fought long and brutal wars against one another in the course of their history, they were able to launch an exciting project for regional integration. The starting point was the European Coal and Steel Community that forged a core of six Western European nations at the outset of the 1950s. From there the project moved forward in accordance with a gradually staged and systematically implemented process until complete economic integration was achieved. The community then proceeded to build its political unity with the establishment of the European Union, which now consists of 28 states from across the continent. True, the EU is currently grappling with some very grave problems, especially since the Brexit referendum; however, the accomplishments of the European integration experience are of such a magnitude that the paltry results of the longer Arab experience pale in comparison. Even before the Arab Spring revolutions, the Arab League failed to establish a unified customs zone or an Arab common market. What this comparison tells us is that common historical, cultural and social bonds are not always or necessarily the most crucial and effective factor in the success of regional unification or integration projects. When the Arab League, which is the agency charged with protecting and promoting collective Arab action, becomes incapable of resolving the simplest disputes between member states, let alone defending these states in the face of outside threats, all talk of Arab unity or integration becomes a matter of imagination. In spite of all the discussion on reform that took place inside the Arab League, the organisation has been unable to reform anything. To speak of reform again, today, is mere idle prattle or an attempt to sell illusions. In many people's opinion, the League is moribund, but no one dares issue the death certificate in spite of their conviction that the time has come to bury it. The majority of observers today believe that the Arab League exists only on paper or in the presence of the organisation's employees in their offices. But to pronounce the death of the league and actually halt its activities would be tantamount to an official acknowledgement that the Arab regional order has collapsed. Therefore, member states have only two choices. The first is to search for an alternative. In such a case, the desired order regionally and internationally under the current circumstances would be a Middle Eastern one that would include Israel. Some are actually pursuing this alternative behind the scenes. The second choice is for the Arab states to free themselves of any affiliation with any regional organisational framework, whether Arab or Middle Eastern, and for each state to act independently in accordance with what it deems will serve its interests under the conditions imposed by regional and international circumstances and developments. In my opinion, neither choice will be acceptable to most Arab states. The first appears too audacious and perhaps precipitous and, therefore, would probably be a source of more problems rather than source of solutions. The second would appear too risky, perhaps because it would eliminate the object on which Arab regimes can blame their mistakes. Consequently, most Arab states would opt to maintain the status quo and refrain from issuing an official death certificate. But this third option, in my opinion, is not an acceptable solution either. It might help gain some time and defer having to deal with the problem, but in the long term it is not a real solution and, in fact, it would become part of the problem. So what is to be done? I believe the predicament in which the Arab regional order finds itself requires an original vision for the creation of a new, alternative system, while retaining the old one until the new one is sturdy enough to take its place without significant risk. The space available here is not sufficient to discuss in detail the nature and mechanisms of the new system. However, the idea essentially entails the creation of a small group of Arab states, which we might term the “core group”, whose members would possess certain features or qualifications in terms of human and material resources and the credibility of desire on the part of their leaderships to save the Arab order from collapse by means of collective mechanisms for the realisation of integration between these members in a gradual and properly studied manner. The most important of such mechanisms are: 1- A mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes. This would consist of two components, one political/diplomatic (a council consisting of the leaders of the core group's members and that would carry real political weight) and the other legal/judicial in character (a court of justice whose rulings are binding on member states in certain cases). 2- A collective security mechanism. This would include a decision-making body equipped with broad powers and the jurisdiction to enable it to intervene in cases requiring the defence of all member states against all types of threat and danger. This agency, moreover, would have to have access to sufficient resources, including a military force, to enable it to undertake its tasks effectively. 3- A mechanism to promote economic, social and cultural integration in accordance with a phased agenda and using recognised conventional means and methods for this purpose. Perhaps those studying this alternative will differ on the countries that they feel possess the ability and willingness to save the Arab order and on whether there exists the necessary political will to carry out such an Arab national task. Nevertheless, there are two countries that are a sine qua non for any core group: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, as I am not sure that the relationship between these two countries is strong enough yet for them to begin any serious dialogue over spearheading the “core group”, I am compelled to say that the state of decay of the Arab order is likely to deteriorate further in the coming months and years. Accordingly, I fear that the Arab order could be declared defunct before Egyptian-Saudi relations attain the degree of solidity needed to rescue that order. The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
