Since Ambassador Ahmed Abul-Gheit assumed the position of secretary-general of the Arab League, Egyptian officials have tended to see it as a development that will again put Egypt in a leading position in the league. The Egyptian foreign minister's speech at the Arab summit in Nouakchott perhaps best reflected this view. Proponents of this idea say that Abul-Gheit's presence will enable Egypt to redirect dynamics within the league, recently dominated by other states, in order to serve Egyptian interests within a common Arab framework and joint action. We are witnessing an Egyptian moment in the Arab League, according to proponents of this view. But though an optimistic take on what the new secretary-general can accomplish is good, we should not let optimism turn to fantasy and lead us to overlook several pertinent facts in the region since the eruption of Arab revolutions in 2011, which have clearly influenced the balance of power within the Arab League. First, the history of the Arab League demonstrates that the success of the secretary-general is credited to him personally, not to the country from which he hails. So we talk about the history of Abdullah Azzam in the Arab League, Esmat Abdel-Megid, and most recently Nabil Al-Arabi. In the future, it will be the era of Abul-Gheit. The position of secretary-general as revealed by actual practice is a coordinating position, reflecting the level of coordination and accord among member states or, more precisely, among the most influential member states. In turn, the secretary general does not represent his country in the league. He stops being an Egyptian diplomat and becomes an employee in the Arab League. Second, the degree to which Egypt can benefit from the fact that the secretary-general comes from within the Egyptian diplomatic corps depends on its ability to develop mechanisms that recognise the independent nature of the position while also utilising opportunities generated by his presence in the position, either by suggesting ideas and initiatives related to salient issues in the Arab region or by information exchange. This is a common practice used by many states whose representatives reach the position of secretary-general in regional and international organisations. Third, Egypt has retained the position of secretary-general despite developments since the 2011 Revolution as part of a tacit power sharing agreement within the Arab League and its 12 specialised adjunct organisations, as explained repeatedly by Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, most recently in an article in Al-Ahram published 9 June 2016. The division of power and influence has tended to serve the interests primarily of the Gulf states while marginalising all other Egyptian or non-Gulf Arab representation. This affected former secretary-general Nabil Al-Arabi's ability to steer the work of these organisations or influence them. Fourth, Egypt's policies in the current period are shaped by complex domestic considerations, which limit its scope of action in the region generally, not only within the Arab League. These considerations include its strategic relationship with Gulf states and its need to accept the shifting balance of power in the region, to allow other states to take a leading role on issues that impact Egyptian interests. In other words, Egypt's waning influence in the Arab League is a result of its declining action in the region, not the opposite. The fate of the initiative to form a joint Arab military force, proposed by President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi in February 2015, is perhaps the best demonstration of this. The proposal ran up against Egypt's limited room for manoeuvre within the Arab League absent specific concessions that could affect Egyptian interests. And keep in mind that the idea was not a new one, but had been explored within the Arab League's national security division since late 2014. Fifth, and perhaps most important for decision making circles in Egypt, opportunities for coordination between Egypt and Gulf states to allow the adoption of common policies that reflect the interests of both parties — whether within the framework of the Arab League or outside of it — are extremely limited, despite the crucial support given Egypt by these states. There are key differences between Egypt and Gulf states in the current phase, especially among the most active of these states — Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These differences concern three areas. First, they disagree on the source of the threat to their security and interests. Saudi Arabia sees the principal threat as growing Iranian influence in conflict areas, specifically Iraq, Syria and Yemen, while the UAE sees the primary threat as the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood in conflict areas, à la Egypt 2012-2013, as well as Qatar's increasing scope of action in the region. Egypt, meanwhile, sees the major threat as terrorism, the collapse of the central state in conflict areas, and Egypt's exclusion from the stability axis in the region. The second area of disagreement is over the vision for the future of the region. Saudi Arabia believes the Sunni-Shia regional conflict will persist, so strengthening the Sunni side through the Islamic coalition it declared several months ago is a priority. Other Gulf states share this view to varying degrees. In contrast, Egypt believes regional stability requires maintaining the centralised nation state, not confronting the Sunni-Shia conflict, although Egypt did suggest a possible shift in its position towards the Sunni-Shia conflict. This was demonstrated by its non-objection to the Arab League resolution designating Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation, a resolution that represents an extension of the regional conflict with Iran and its allies in which Egypt has no direct stake. The third area of disagreement concerns foreign policy and action. Saudi Arabia and the UAE currently have the most active foreign policies and seek to play the role of a regional power. Saudi Arabia aspires to be the leading state confronting Iranian regional expansion, while the UAE wants play the role of the influential state. Kuwait and Oman are both cementing their position in the region as mediator states that sponsor talks between parties in conflict, and both states are playing an important role in the conflict in Yemen. Qatar is less active on the policy front now, after a period in which Prince Tamim took the reins of power to compete with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In order to achieve their objectives, all these states are developing leadership qualities, whether as an economic power, a military power, or a network of diplomatic relations. This is an important policy development in the Gulf states, reflecting a shift in calculations of action and interests from previous decades. As for Egypt, it is adopting an adaptable strategy to accompany the changes in the region. Initiatives it has proposed since the 2013 Revolution are primarily linked with counter-terrorism, as seen in the proposal to the Arab League to create a joint Arab force. Cairo was careful to put this initiative in an Arab framework with a high cost and requiring specific concessions that could impinge on strategic state interests in order to see the proposal approved in the Arab League. These five facts must be understood and used to determine a pragmatic course of action for Egypt in the phase to follow Abul-Gheit. Abul-Gheit's assumption of the post of secretary-general is not the end of the road, but the beginning of a reassessment of the opportunities available to Egypt within the league as well as the constraints on Egyptian action in light of these facts. Substantially increasing these opportunities can be achieved if the Egyptian state decides to abandon the adaptive, flexible strategy for a strategy of active involvement and poses qualitative ideas and initiatives, for what happens in the Arab League is a reflection of what is happening in the region. The writer is senior researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
