The conclusion of the second round of the majlis (parliamentary) elections late last month in Iran significantly boosted the “Hope” (Omid) list allied to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. By securing an extra 38 seats, against the 18 new seats won by the conservatives/principalists camp, Rouhani's allies have effectively broken the latter's domination of the majlis. Moreover, the strong performance of ostensibly “independent” candidates, who secured 12 extra seats in the second round of the elections, reinforces the centrist/reformist support base in parliament and gives Rouhani's allies a slim majority. This is a better than expected result for Rouhani and his allies, and clearly a major setback for conservative and principalist factions that are bitterly opposed to the president's foreign and domestic policies. The slim majority in parliament, provided the “independents” throw their weight behind the government, could make it easier for Rouhani to continue his outreach to the West and, most importantly, to oversee the successful implementation of the nuclear accord. On the domestic front, the newly elected 10th majlis also allows Rouhani to innovate and implement a wide range of neoliberal socio-economic policies designed at least in part to complement his foreign policy. On closer enquiry, however, Rouhani's position is not as strong as his supporters make out. And the precise composition of the 10th majlis means that Rouhani is now even more dependent on reformist, technocratic and so-called “independent” support. Authoritarian by instinct and reportedly sensitive to criticism, Rouhani will have a hard time bending the new majlis to his will. It is true that many hardline principalists and implacable opponents of the government have departed the arena at least for now, affording the president greater leverage over the legislature. But the principalist retreat is balanced by the fact that most of the elected MPs, especially new entrants to the majlis, identify more with established reformist and technocratic political currents than with Rouhani's newly contrived “centrist” brand. While the majority of putatively pro-Rouhani and independent MPs will likely support the government on key issues, and in particular on the much-anticipated economic reform policies, they cannot be considered a bedrock of support. In terms of their strategic long-term outlook, many of the newly elected MPs, in particular the younger ones with no previous experience in politics, will be aiming to cement their own personal positions in the wider context of their factional affiliations. It is noteworthy that many of them identify with the reformist current and its figurehead, former president Mohamed Khatami. The reformists have dramatically toned down their rhetoric and attendant political demands, but behind the scenes and perhaps now more overtly in the 10th majlis they are preparing the ground for a comeback. This development dovetails with the plans and aspirations of another former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose supporters are understandably jubilant at his strong performance in the Assembly of Experts elections in late February. While Rafsanjani is unlikely to become the chair of the Assembly of Experts, the controversial former president (whose son is languishing in jail) will exploit his new electoral platform to increase his and his allies influence over the Rouhani administration. Hitherto Rouhani has demonstrated considerable political skill at assembling and harnessing support from reformists and pragmatists alike, primarily to compensate for his lack of a strong and established political base. In view of this inherently loose coalition of convenience, the president's renowned micro-management skills will now have to be fully deployed to keep control over the disparate parliamentary forces that pass as his allies. The parliamentary victory notwithstanding, Rouhani's long-term political prospects have not necessarily improved. On the contrary, the growing reliance on Rafsanjani allies and the reformists in particular potentially weakens Rouhani. The reformists are potentially troublesome as their ideological origin in the leftist camp contrasts sharply with Rouhani's consistently centre-right economic outlook. Furthermore, the reformists, even in their contemporary watered-down version, are genuinely committed to political liberalisation, whereas Rouhani is by instinct and conviction more authoritarian than most conservatives and principalists. A “securocrat” by training, it is doubtful whether Rouhani has the temperament or the requisite skills to maintain a loose coalition over a long period. At a deeper level, the nature of the president's support base militates against a strong alliance with the reformists. By the same token, it renders him vulnerable to serious pressure from the establishment. In view of his long career in Iran's national security bodies, Rouhani's network is almost entirely embedded in the security and intelligence apparatus, in particular the Ministry of Intelligence. By definition, this closed and secretive network will close ranks behind the establishment in the event of a political crisis, which is one reason why Rouhani's opponents are dramatically ratcheting up the pressure on the president. Some reports have suggested that influential elements in the establishment are pressing Rouhani not to contest next year's all-important presidential elections. This pressure is likely to intensify in the coming weeks and months as the new parliament goes into session and Rouhani attempts to capitalise on his qualified election victories. But this mounting pressure should not be interpreted as a serious attempt to unseat Rouhani. More likely, it is designed to modify the president's behaviour with a view to sabotaging the uneasy centrist-reformist alliance. The writer is an Iranian political analyst and director of the research group Dysart Consulting.
