The grassroots Palestinian uprising in the towns and cities of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, has entered its fourth month against the backdrop of provocative Israeli policies and actions. Ongoing settlement expansion, the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the decision to close this Muslim holy place to worshippers on Jewish feast days have inflamed Palestinians' religious and patriotic passions. Violent clashes between young protesters and occupation forces have continued since September to the present. The significance of this uprising is not just that it may evolve into a third intifada but also that it has brought a shift in the centre of gravity of developments inside Palestine, from Gaza to the West Bank. This is the first time such a geographic shift has occurred since December 2008, and perhaps even before then. During this entire interval, news of Israeli military operations against Hamas and the militia factions in Gaza (Cast Lead, Pillar of Cloud, Pillar of Defence) have garnered the lion's share of public attention. Locally, people tracked body counts: more than 2,200 people were killed and at least twice as many wounded in a single operation — Pillar of Defence — in July 2014. Abroad, the media followed the international and regional diplomatic and political activities that attempted to contain the flames and restore calm to Gaza. Then, in the aftermath of the Israeli attacks, talk of reconstruction efforts and the attendant conferences on this subject occupied most of the rest of regional and international attention toward the Palestinian cause. The upshot of this was that the West Bank had virtually vanished from the scene. It received little media or political attention apart from brief periods, lasting no more than a few months, in which the Obama administration tried to restart negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel. This occurred twice: in 2010 and 2013. Apart from those few months, the West Bank disappeared behind the smoke and dust generated by the bombing and destruction of Gaza. This is actually quite an irony, as there is really no comparison between the relative weight of the West Bank and Gaza in the Palestinian national project, whether in terms of geography, demographics or even the requirements of Israeli security. The West Bank is more than 16 times larger than Gaza. The population of the West Bank is about 1.2 million more than that of Gaza. Jerusalem is in the West Bank. The West Bank is the main source of subterranean water. It is adjacent to the coastal plain in Israel, home to about 80 per cent of the Israeli population.
THE WEST BANK RETURNS TO CENTRE STAGE: It appears that the popular uprising has now restored the balance and given the West Bank the attention it merits. The uprising entered its fourth month with, on the Palestinian side, more than a hundred dead, hundreds of wounded and 2,300 arrests, in contrast to more than 20 Israelis killed and twice that number wounded. The Palestinians have demonstrated an amazing determination to sustain the confrontation against the occupation, despite the extraordinary brutality of the siege. Some observers do not see a future for this movement in view of the chaos that is raging throughout the region as a whole. It is also true that the uprising still lacks an effective framework in the form of a clear political programme to drive it, unify efforts and promote its sustainability until it yields something positive and concrete for the people under occupation. However, it is also true that the uprising has refused to ebb quickly, even if Palestinian factional animosities have prevented it from gaining momentum and developing into an overwhelming popular tide. In light of the foregoing, we can say that what is currently taking place in Palestine might be headed in the direction of what we might term an “intifada of attrition”, as opposed to a comprehensive confrontation. Israeli policy, up to now, has been to strike forcefully and relentlessly at the flash points, especially after Israeli lawmakers made it easier to kill Palestinian youths. But there is no sign, as of yet, of a move to reoccupy Palestinian cities or even levy punitive economic measures against the PA. Certainly this would be informed by a number of calculations. Above all, Israeli authorities do not want to see a repeat of the destruction of the Palestinian security agencies that occurred during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, when many members of those agencies joined the intifada, with some assuming leadership positions. Also, the uprising activities so far lack a concrete organised structure that can be targeted in an open confrontation; otherwise, we would be seeing full-scale incursions into the cities as a practical response to a broadening of the scope and organisation of the intifada. Until now, the reaction of all Palestinian factions has essentially been to sit on the sidelines and shout encouragement. This presents no useful target for the occupation.
MESSAGES TO FOUR FORCES: It is important to note that the current uprising, which has taken the form of individual acts of resistance and relatively limited confrontations against the Israelis, delivers messages to four forces that have emerged in the occupied territories during the past 20 years. These forces are not an antithesis to the activist youths. Nor are they necessarily driven by unpatriotic or dishonourable motives, or are unwilling to engage in confrontation. However, it seems that they have been transcended by a new way of thinking. The first of these forces is the PA. Perhaps the addressee is not so much the individual leaders of Palestinian factions themselves, but rather its composition and function as a bureaucratic institution that offers job opportunities to youth but within the framework of security and political regulations emanating from political agreements. The message delivered during the past four months is that PA mechanisms and institutions no longer activate or regulate the movement of the street. Moreover, the PA no longer embodies a project for a state or national independence that is satisfactory to the street. It has lost its ability to convince the youth of the efficacy of its instruments and means and, therefore, its ability to attract members of the new generation. Naturally, the current uprising has aggravated the crisis of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and cast into relief that organisation's failure to rejuvenate itself by bringing on board new generations. The second recipients are the post-Oslo economic and social forces. Whether economic projects, companies or even NGOs, these were to be the forces — according to the ideas and plans of donors and investors — that would presumably shape the features of the future. But they have gradually lost that role. Many of these organisations/NGOs have begun to review their work plans, outlooks and even their funding mechanisms with an eye to developing a more realistic approach in light of the occupation, Israeli policies, the demands of conflict and the burst illusion of peace. The third force is dedicated itself to creating a new reality that would overcome Palestinian rifts and factionalism. This took the form of youth movements that began to surface in 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring that had just erupted in several Arab countries. However, these movements soon began to reproduce the shortcomings and ailments of the factionalism that had tried to transcend the same types of rifts and schism, personal rivalries, and inability to formulate a clear and unifying programme. The result was that they lapsed into merely reacting to events, having lost the scope or ambition to evolve into a cohesive and effective political force. The fourth is made up of the popular resistance committees, especially those operating in rural areas, which were formed to fight the Separation Wall. These committees were instrumental in filling a certain gap in national action and they achieved some important successes. However, they lacked strong grassroots foundations and were unable to mobilise people behind them. Perhaps they had better luck developing international and global support than they did local support. They were certainly the object of attempts on the part of the factions and the PA to contain and rein them in. In all events, they have lost much of their momentum despite popular respect for them that, in any case, remained somewhat passive in view of the lack of active backing.
ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, US AVERSION: During his visit to Washington in November, Binyamin Netanyahu said that there would be no peace and no withdrawal before 20 years. Naturally, he was playing his familiar double game: working to win more time while pouring more fuel on the flames. Nevertheless, I believe that Netanyahu, this time, was not just expressing his own point of view or that of his party, or even his government. He was reading between the lines of the current Israeli social and political scene, which is characterised by systematic shifts toward ultranationalist extremism and exclusivism, and religious fundamentalism on top of that, as well as the mounting influence of the “settler lobby” in legislative and executive decision-making circles. I also believe that Netanyahu's proclamation came as a shock to all who had negotiations in mind. He was frank enough to admit the “Israeli realities” to which so many politicians have turned a blind eye. Nearly a quarter of a century after the Madrid Conference and more than 20 years after Oslo and the creation of the PA, Netanyahu wants to prolong the whole process another 20 years. At the same time, he refuses to give any indication that the next two decades will bring the Palestinians anything different to the two preceding decades. The Palestinians, for their part, are simply required to believe him, pin their hopes on his long-term plans, and exercise the highest degree of self-restraint as Israeli policies and interests take their course. Given that Netanyahu's remarks coincided with a spate of decisions for wholesale settlement expansion in the West Bank, even a blind man can see what the occupied territories will look like 20 years from now. It is perfectly obvious that Netanyahu's plan is to buy time and calm in order to push through his project of gobbling up the rest of Palestinian land and Palestinian rights with minimum cost. Unfortunately, all these Israeli positions, practices and policies coincided with an American reluctance to intervene between the Palestinians and Israelis. In the month that Netanyahu visited the US, the Obama administration made it clear that it had no intention to promote an “initiative” for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during its remaining time in the White House. The leaks to this effect were more in the nature of statements issued by Washington in advance of Netanyahu's visit. The administration is no longer certain, according to these “leaks”, that the so-called “two-state solution” is still possible given all the changes that have been imposed on the ground in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the abovementioned changes in Israeli society, and the signs of a possible third intifada. The American leaks signify that, for Washington, the Palestinian-Israeli subject has been put into the deep freeze for at least the next two years, during which US elections will be held and a new administration will come to power. In that two-year period, the US will be busy with elections and administration hand-over. The Palestinian question will hover in a vacuum that various parties will seek to fill, politically and diplomatically, by initiatives that will be devoid of substance and merely serve as a way for European capitals to while away the time and forestall the descent over the precipice into comprehensive confrontations. Meanwhile, on the ground, various parties will enter the fray of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations as the vacuum heightens the chances that the grassroots uprising will evolve into a third intifada, and this in turn opens up more prospects for the various Islamist movements.
POLITICAL VACUUM PAVES THE WAY TO CONFLICT: Putting negotiations on hold for the next two years will strengthen Palestinian voices calling for the escalation, and perhaps even the militarisation, of this Intifada. The PA will find itself in a very awkward position. Its Arab allies and international friends expect it to contain the situation and put a lid on Palestinian anger, but it no longer has the domestic clout or influence to succeed in this task. This in turn will strengthen the hand of Palestinian parties who have given up hope for the two-state solution. They now advocate for “thinking outside the box” and lean towards a “one-state solution.” This solution would be much more difficult and complicated to realise than the two-state solution, not least from the Israeli perspective which is adamant on the Jewishness of the Israeli state and fearful of the Palestinian demographic bomb. At the same time, the vacuum will strengthen the hand of Islamist forces that will see the conflict over Al-Aqsa as an avenue to reassert themselves and strengthen their influence, and as a means to shift the trenches of the “liberation” struggle to the broader spaces of a religious war. It certainly helps propel things in this direction when Jewish feast days occasion the organised entry of Jewish settlers into Al-Aqsa Mosque following the forced expulsion of Muslim worshippers by Israeli soldiers. This phenomenon has occurred numerous times. Occupation forces come into the mosque before 8am to clear the way for Jewish settlers until around midday. It has been billed as a kind of timeshare for the holy precinct. True, this practice appears to have subsided somewhat. However, this is only temporary. Every step of this nature is geared towards partitioning Al-Aqsa chronologically and physically (to designate places where Jews can stay whenever they want). In this regard, preparations for a new infrastructure for the precinct features special gateways and barricades to monitor and control the entry and exit of Muslim worshippers. One can already foresee whole days when Muslims are not allowed into the mosque, as occurs at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Cave of the Patriarchs) in Hebron. In sum, a new front is on the verge of opening in a region already ablaze with numerous fronts in many states, while the Palestinians are staring at two fraught years without the smallest glimmer of hope of any improvement in their lot in the years that follow. Certainly, some of the fallout from Palestinian recalcitrance will reach other Arab spheres, foremost among which is Jordan, which should prepare itself to contend with a number of choices and scenarios.
