After nearly a month of conducting daily air strikes, Russia is beginning to reveal its political calculations and strategic intent in Syria. The Russian outreach to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), while dismissed as disingenuous by the West, is in fact a reflection of Russia's desired outcome. Wary of getting embroiled too deeply in the Syrian quagmire, Russia is all too aware that it needs Washington and, by extension, the Gulf States, to help steer the conflict towards an endgame. Meanwhile, lacking Russia's diplomatic reach, Iran is mostly focused on the battle on the ground, not only to shore up the position of the embattled Syrian government but, equally importantly, to protect its Lebanese ally Hezbollah from the fallout of the conflict. Unlike Russia, the Islamic Republic cannot afford to see elements of the armed Syrian opposition gain even minimal influence in Damascus as part of a final peace settlement. To that end, Iran does not have a pressing stake in the territorial integrity of Syria. What's important to Iran is that the Syrian state maintains full control over the “useful” parts of Syria, comprised of Damascus, Quneitra Province, much of the central regions and the entire Mediterranean coast. By reaching out to elements of the armed opposition, Russia is signalling a strong preference for territorial integrity and a return to the status quo, which can only be achieved at the expense of the ideological cohesion of the Syrian state and its possible exit from the Iran-led regional “resistance” axis. By reaching out to the remnants of the FSA, Russia is retreating from its earlier position of branding all the armed factions as terrorists. More damaging for the integrity of Russian diplomacy is the appearance that the Kremlin is in part buying into the Western narrative on the Syrian rebel groups by dividing them into “moderates” and “radicals”. This simplistic division was rejected at the outset by Syria and Iran, whose ideological and strategic impulse is to seek the destruction of all the armed groups. On the face of it, the Russian outreach bears the hallmarks of Russian propaganda and doublespeak: it was immediately rejected as disingenuous by the bulk of the FSA factions in the central and northern regions of Syria. FSA factions in the south, however, gave a more nuanced reaction, urging the Russians to stop the bombing before talks can start. The degree of any split with Iran will be determined by the precise strategic calculus that underpins the Russian outreach. If the Russians are seeking to divide the non-jihadist armed elements with a view to weakening their position in the peace talks, then the potential split with Iran will be minimal. Iran has also been talking to the Syrian rebels, most notably in August when an Iranian delegation allegedly negotiated with Ahrar Al-Sham, an Islamist faction close to the jihadists of Al-Nusra Front. The delegation sought to secure a temporary ceasefire in the besieged town of Zabadani, in exchange for a cessation of the fighting around the Shia villages of Foua and Kfarya in the northwest. If, however, the Russians are reaching out to Syrian rebels not out of any strategic, tactical or operational consideration pertaining to the battlefields, but in order to accommodate American interests, then the fallout with Iran will be considerable. The offensive launched by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to the south of Aleppo is a clear sign of intent by the Syrians and their Iranian allies. By vigorously attacking rebels and jihadists on the most northerly fronts, the Syrians and the Iranians are signalling a strong preference for securing a major victory with a view to a prolonged stalemate, as opposed to strengthening their hand in the follow-up peace talks. By all credible accounts, Iran has committed considerable resources to the Aleppo offensive, possibly deploying thousands of Iranian troops. The strength of the commitment can be gleaned by the casualty figures: at least a dozen troops have been killed in the past ten days in and around Aleppo and casualty figures are released daily by the Iranian media. Some of these slain combatants were senior commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). They include Mostafa Sardarzadeh, commander of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and Abdollah Bagheri, from the elite Ansar Corps of the IRGC, which is tasked with close-quarter protection of Iranian officials. Bagheri is said to have been a bodyguard for former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. What is interesting about the Iranian casualty list from Aleppo is the apparent deployment of specialised units of the IRGC in Syria. Previously, only members of the Al-Qods Force (the expeditionary wing of the IRGC) were deployed to Syria in an advisory capacity. The deployment of personnel from different branches of the IRGC to fill combat roles in Syria marks Iran's first major foreign military deployment since the late shah of Iran's intervention in Oman's Dhofar rebellion in the early 1970s. At a strategic level, the Aleppo offensive points to yet another divergence in Iranian/Syrian and Russian plans. While the Russian air strikes have clearly prepared the ground for the offensive and may be an important factor in its eventual success, Russia's putative allies are not necessarily pursuing the same aims. The Russians are keen to present their air campaign as a prerequisite to diplomacy, with the Kremlin attempting to create the conditions necessary for peace talks. Meanwhile, judging by the remarkable strength of the Iranian deployment in Aleppo — and the resulting casualties — it is clear that the Iranians seek to relieve pressure on the SAA on all the important fronts with a view to securing the “useful” parts of Syria. For the Iranians, the desired outcome is not an awkward peace process that threatens the political supremacy of the Syrian elites, but a prolonged war of attrition that tilts the balance of power in favour of the Syrian government. The writer is an Iranian political analyst and director of the research group Dysart Consulting.
