To mark the beginning of Ramadan, the Egyptian presidency decreed an amnesty for 165 persons who had been convicted on various charges. The amnesty was not solely linked to the religious occasion. The presidency had received numerous appeals from the public to grant an amnesty, especially to individuals associated with what has been called the 30 June front, even if there have been sharp differences in outlook between constituents of the once unified ranks, some of whom have been prosecuted and sentenced to terms behind bars. The amnesty included one of those found guilty in the so-called “Ittihadiya (presidential palace) demonstrators” case in which the well-known political activists Sanaa Seif and Yara Sallam stood in the defendants' box. The person who received the amnesty was Moataz Mahmoud Mansour Ragheb, who had been sentenced to a two-year prison term. The case revolved around those arrested for protesting the Protest Law. Most of the appeals received by the presidency were on behalf of those young activists in order to promote a form of social reconciliation and recovery, especially given that the law, itself, had been a subject of controversy and elicited numerous criticisms and reservations. But far more surprising was that the amnesty included individuals convicted in other, more notorious cases. One, referred to in the press as the “Rod Al-Farag events” case, involved demonstrations staged by Muslim Brotherhood members following the breakup of the Rabaa Al-Adawiya sit-in in 2013. Some 44 defendants in that case were granted amnesty. All had been sentenced to three-year prison terms that were due to expire on 16 August 2016. The second was the case involving the storming of Al-Azhar University, again in the wake of the breakup of Rabaa Al-Adawiya. Six students were granted amnesties for their sentences that were to expire 31 October 2016. The amnesty also included 10 of those found guilty of rioting and violence in Kafr Al-Sheikh following the breakup of Rabaa Al-Adawiya, and whose prison terms were to end 15 August 2016. Amnesties were extended to many convicted in numerous other cases involving Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations and violence. They covered nine who had been found guilty in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations in Abdeen to mark the first anniversary of the breakup of the sit-ins (their sentences were to end on 17 August this year), five who had been found guilty in Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations in Marsa Matrouh in November 2013 (and whose sentences would expire on 25 November 2015), five who were sentenced to prison in the case involving the violent demonstration in Alexandria on the occasion of the first anniversary of the breakup of the Rabaa sit-in (their prison terms were due to end on 16 November 2016), three of the defendants charged with perpetrating violence and protesting without a license in Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations in Ismailiya in late 2013 (with prison terms ending 27 April 2016), and two defendants in the case of perpetrating violence and protesting without a license in Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations in Maadi in January 2014 (whose prison terms were set to end on 3 January 2016). The amnesty also included Hossam Shaker Sayed Ali Tantawi who had been one of the defendants arrested and charged with demonstrating without a license in Talaat Harb Square in September 2014 and whose prison term was due to end 16 October 2016. It is no overstatement to describe the inclusion of all the foregoing individuals (Ragheb aside) in the amnesty as a surprise. All were Muslim Brotherhood members and all were found guilty in cases involving the perpetration of violence, so severe in some cases that it was described as practising terrorism against civilians and police. Therefore, the surprise is enveloped in a haze of mystery, especially as it ignored another category of young people who had long awaited a presidential amnesty. This is all the more curious as some individuals close to the circles of the presidency and who had personally attended meetings with the president stated on several occasions that the president understands the dilemma and the suffering of those youths some of whom were tried and sentenced during the period of Muslim Brotherhood rule on charges such as “engaging in anti-government activities”, which happens to be a charge of which the majority of the Egyptian people were guilty in those stressful times. One attempt to explain the mystery holds that the amnesty will stun the Muslim Brotherhood who intensified its campaign to mar Egypt's reputation abroad following the sentencing of their leaders. The Muslim Brotherhood was, indeed, thrown into confusion with the amnesty granted to many of its youth. The organisation tried to shrug it off as an attempt to alleviate the level of anger caused by the sentences passed against former president Morsi and his fellow Muslim Brotherhood leaders. It was also argued that the amnesty would embarrass the Muslim Brotherhood abroad and expose the falsehoods they are spreading about rights violations in Egypt. This explanation takes as a premise that the Egyptian regime knows perfectly well what it is doing and is better informed than others on many issues. It holds that the presidential amnesty was geared to take the wind of the sails of the Muslim Brotherhood and the enemies of the regime who claim that it oppresses its opponents. The release of a long list of young people will not only undermine the bids of the Muslim Brotherhood and those who call themselves rights activists to distort Egypt's image abroad, but also it will deprive the Muslim Brotherhood the card of the physical presence of its younger members in prison, which will throw it and its supporters into disarray with regard to their strategies and tactics in the coming period. The foregoing arguments are both logical and valid and help to explain an aspect of the mystery. But the fact remains that the amnesty did not include any of those arrested in front of the Shura Council for demonstrating against the Protest Law or any of the young male and female activists who participated in the demonstrations at Ittihadiya. The list was restricted, with one exception, to defendants accused of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in its capacity as a terrorist entity. The grounds for the amnesty, therefore, are not sufficiently clear. Moreover, the fact that it was not extended to youth who are not Muslim Brotherhood members and who belong to the civil (secularist) forces that took part in the 25 January and 30 June Revolutions raises numerous questions regarding the amnesty. Why were these youth, in particular, exempted? Surely their inclusion, or at least the inclusion of some of them, would have helped restore political tranquility in a tangible way. Among many circles at home and abroad these individuals are referred to as prisoners of conscience, especially since the charges brought against them concern their opposition to a law that, in their opinion, unjustly restricts the right to protest. Presidential amnesties are the product of a decision taken by a committee drawn from the ministries of justice and interior on the basis of a review of a number of cases. In this case, those that were released had been charged with belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and it appears that the committee decided that they did not pose a threat to security and deserved a chance at a better future. However, one would presume that those who also faced charges of acts of violence would not be included in the presidential amnesty, which again begs the question as to how the names were selected and whether a specific set of conditions or criteria was applied. Presidential amnesties should be promulgated with an eye to delivering a message to whom it may concern. One would imagine that the addressee of concern at this point is the whole of public opinion, which is expected to stand as one behind its leadership. If the amnesty decision does not convey a clear and specific message this is a grave mistake in and of itself, as a presidential decree of this sort should not be routine and devoid of meaning. If there was an intended message, what has reached the public is full of riddles and shrouded in fog, which raises suspicions. Who would want to put the regime in this position? Who would not want it to win twofold by making the amnesty more inclusive than it currently appears, suspended in a void offering no gains to anyone at a time when all parties are in dire need of them? The writer is director of the National Centre for Security Studies.
