The fine print of recent pardons granted to Islamists illustrates that the state in the Arab world remains omnipotent and set against true democratisation, writes Khalil El-Anani* Within the space of less than a week activists belonging to radical Islamist movements in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria were granted amnesty and released. In spite of the different justifications and circumstances applying to each individual case, the sudden wave of amnesty rulings across North Africa has raised a number of questions. Is it pure coincidence that these rulings were issued at about the same time in these neighbouring countries? Do these rulings reflect some collective revision of the eradication approach in dealing with Islamist groups, especially those with a fundamentalist agenda? Is this the beginning of the assimilation of Islamists into the political system or just a cosmetic measure? In Egypt, a pardon was handed down to a group of members of the Egyptian Jihad. First coming to public attention in 1980, Jihad is the most radical of the Egyptian Islamist organisations, counting among its members Al-Qaeda number two, Ayman El-Zawahri. The group is said to be responsible for numerous acts of violence in the 1980s and 1990s, the most notorious of which was the assassination of President Anwar El-Sadat in October 1981. Although no official announcement has been made with regard to how many Jihad members will be released, it has been estimated that they will be no more than 20 out of the more than 5,000 arrested over the past two decades. The release of Muslim Brotherhood detainees in Libya brings to the fore, again, the relationship between this Islamist organisation and the Libyan regime. The relationship has been a shaky one since the initiation in the 1990s of dialogue between the two, sparked by the arrest of dozens of Brotherhood members. Among these were the organisation's leader, Abdel-Qader Ezzeddin, and his right-hand man, Salem Abu Hanak, both of whom had received death sentences but who were released a few days ago. From Tunisia came the surprise announcement that 70 members of the Nahda (Revival) Movement would be included in the general amnesty embracing more than 1,600 political prisoners and detainees. Meanwhile, in Algeria, dozens of members of militant Islamists were released within the framework of the implementation of the "Peace and Reconciliation Charter" approved by general referendum last September. Prominent among those released recently were Ali Belhaj, second in command of the Islamic Salvation Front, and Abdel-Haq Ayadia, founder of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group. One is immediately struck by the ideological diversity of those granted amnesty, ranging as they do from the ultra radical right (the Egyptian Jihad and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group) to moderates on the Islamist spectrum (the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, the Nahda in Tunisia and Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front). This may not be accidental. Clearly the amnesties were an expression of the executive will of the ruling regimes in these countries, as opposed to the product of judicial findings regarding due process and the like. As such, they conveyed several messages. Above all, they tell us that the omnipotent state is still there and as robust as ever. It has the power to grant and to withhold amnesty, and the ability to withstand all challenges to its prestige. To the Islamists, the amnesties are saying, "Don't even think about defying this power again because this state can be just as tough as it is magnanimous." At the same time, the amnesties are intended to demonstrate to society how weak and frail this Islamist foe is, that government authorities have it down for the count and can afford to show a little mercy before it passes out. In all four cases, the amnesties, thus, fall within the matrix of the confrontational relationship between the Arab state and the Islamist movement, one of whose defining features is the swinging pendulum between repression and tolerance. It is therefore difficult to accept the contention that the amnesties signal a rapprochement between the two groups, especially as there is nothing to indicate that any of these four states is prepared to accept the principle of partnership or power-sharing with Islamists. That the amnesties are little more than an exception to the general rule of anti-Islamist repression seems borne out by the irony that this amnesty season arrived on the heels of another season: the two-year season of US pressures aimed at persuading governments in the region to come to an accommodation with Islamist "moderates" and which quickly began to peter out in the wake of the "surprise" electoral victories the Islamists won in Iraq, Egypt and Palestine. The small print that accompanied the amnesty decrees further substantiate that they are virtually Xerox copies of one another and that none of the four governments has departed from its typical attitude towards Islamists. In all cases, amnesty recipients had to issue pledges to the effect that they would never again resume political activities, which is to say that they would never to contemplate working, even through peaceful means, to alter the status quo. In a sense, therefore, the amnesties were a kind of pre- emptive strike against Islamists and their drive towards official legitimisation. Some read the amnesty decrees as indicative of a qualitative shift in the official approach towards Islamists, away from blanket eradication towards selective assimilation. However, the fact that the decrees were issued against a backdrop of high security measures suggests otherwise; that, if anything, the situation is heading towards greater polarisation between the state and Islamists, inclusive of the moderates. If there is anything in the nature of a compromise between eradication and assimilation at work, the concept of "rehabilitation" would be more in line with the official way of thinking, the idea being not to provide for the inclusion of Islamists, moderate or otherwise, into the political process, but rather to pave the way for their re-absorption into society as peaceful apolitical individuals. The foregoing is not to deny that there is a strong cosmetic element to the amnesty decisions. More than ever, ruling authorities must feel the need to make some conciliatory gesture, especially in view of widespread popular sympathy for the Islamist phenomenon and growing support for their movement, as evinced by recent parliamentary elections in Egypt and Palestine. It is equally important to consider the reaction of Islamists themselves to the amnesty decisions. With regard, in particular, to those who had been apprehended on the grounds of pursuing an agenda of violence, one wonders whether there has been any retraction on their jihadist views or softening of their militancy. Previous experience in this regard suggests vast differences among Islamists in their response towards imprisonment and, hence, their reaction to their release under amnesty. According to official assessments, Islamists fall into two categories, which officials label positive and negative. The "positive" label designates members of extremist groups whose isolation following arrest entirely transforms their personalities. This is clearly borne out in the cases of Egypt and Algeria. In Egypt, Jihad members who received pardons were not released until a large number of their leadership cadres submitted written retractions on their former religious and political beliefs. In addition to renouncing their condemnation of the government and society as heretic and their espousal of violence, they also had to pen apologies for their acts of violence. Their ideological revisions are expected to appear in book form within coming months. The release of Islamist extremists following the renunciation of their beliefs is not a new phenomenon in Egypt. In 1997, the Gamaa Islamiya issued what it described as a comprehensive initiative to halt violence, after which a large number of its members were released. In Algeria, the presidential amnesty embraced detainees belonging to all shades of Islamist organisations, including the Armed Islamic Group, which was responsible for much violence against state and society in Algeria in the 1990s. In this case, the group's leader, Abdel-Haq Ayadia, was only release after authorities ascertained that the remnants of the group were no longer operative independently or in connection with another militant group. As for the "negative" label, it can be seen in the behaviour of the adherents to the moderate Islamist groups who were released in Libya and Tunisia recently. It is likely that this response is ultimately counterproductive to the authorities' mode of handling moderate Islamists, which hinges upon tarnishing their image and piercing the "balloon" of popular sympathy for them. Instead, moderates, because of their pacifist credentials, emerge stronger, their popularity only enhanced by official harassment and detention. This applies, in particular, to the Muslim Brotherhood, the arrest of the members of which generally works contrary to the government's aims. Instead of sapping their will, detention only seems to strengthen their determination to take on the government through peaceful means in the hope of gaining acceptance in the political game. Undoubtedly, the recent electoral victories of Brotherhood members and their "brothers" in Palestine and, before this, in Jordan and Morocco, will augment their resolve, as will the growing tide of domestic pressures for democratisation throughout the Arab world. If anything, the recent spate of amnesties across North Africa underscores the fact that the relationship between state and society in the Arab world remains skewed and that the historical conditions for rectifying it are still out of reach. It is a situation that holds out little hope for serious democratisation in the region. * The writer is a political analyst for Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya magazine published by Al-Ahram. By
