Gamaa Islamiya wants to integrate into the political system, but it has some way to go, with major revisions to make, in order to do so, writes Khalil El-Anani* It is no longer enough to be an Islamist "moderate" in order to exercise the right to participate in the political process. That hardly requires proof. Nor are we convinced by some of those Islamists who had practised violence for decades but who now ask to be included in the political process the moment they agree to put down their arms and acknowledge the legitimacy of the existing regime. The record of Islamists of various shades -- from those who arrived to power through peaceful means (Hamas, for example) to those who came to power by force (in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan) -- offers abundant testimony to the dangers of relying on their "moderation". At the same time, their practices and positions have given us a good lesson on the risks of overly hasty democratisation in Arab societies. Clearly, therefore, it would be naïve to accept some of our Islamists' renunciations of violence and pledges of "moderation" in exchange for accepting them as an alternative to existing regimes without a close scrutiny of their political rhetoric and ideology. This applies as much to the "established" movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as it does to the more recent applicants for acceptance such as the Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt. Although the latter group has succeeded during the past decade in distancing itself from radical movements that espouse and practise violence in the name of religion, it is still at the start of the road in revising its ideological discourse in a way that could justify its stated aspiration to take part in the political process. Briefly, we could say that over the past 11 years Gamaa Islamiya passed through three fundamental phases, the first beginning with its famous renunciation of violence in 1997 and lasting until the beginning of 2004. During this time, its leaders produced a number of partial theological and political revisions that were laid out in more than 20 documents. It was clear that its strategic decision to renounce violence was serious and irrevocable. Moreover, it condemned Islamist groups that continue to practise violence, most importantly those associated with Al-Qaeda. At the same time, there was constant allusion to an unwritten contract between the regime and Gamaa Islamiya, in accordance with which the latter agreed not to engage in organised political activity. More recently there have been unmistakable indications that Gamaa leaders are keen to free themselves from this commitment or at least modify it. The second phase began when the regime released most of the leaders and members of the group from prison. Lasting until the end of last year, this phase was characterised by the transition from "ideological revisions and rectifications" to active involvement in various social and religious public concerns. The group's website, through which it addresses its followers and observers, has guaranteed it a "virtual" presence that compensates for its tangible organisational absence. In the third and current phase we detect a change in the general mood of Gamaa Islamiya, and a growing impatience on the part of some of its members to move beyond the current ambiguity into a period of open and legitimate public activity. Although leaders such as Nageh Ibrahim and Karam Zohdi have firmly denied this, the way the group has engaged with many current issues suggests the contrary. Moreover, a few weeks ago Gamaa Islamiya issued a statement on its website beneath the heading, "Urgent message: To whom it may concern", appealing to Islamist movements to refrain from engaging in politics and, instead, "to dedicate themselves to their fundamental task which is to instil faith in the hearts of the people in their countries, to reform their societies and to relinquish the ambition to attain power". It further appealed to Islamist movements to "ally" themselves with current regimes, as opposed to clashing with them. The statement naturally provoked considerable speculation within Islamist circles and among analysts of the Islamist phenomenon. Some interpreted it as a form of obsequiousness towards the regime and a pledge to abide by the implicit contract between the two. Gamaa Islamiya's political committee chief and member of its Shura Council Essam Darbalah hastened to correct that impression. In an interview published by Islamonline several days ago, he urged Islamists to assimilate into political life and appealed to the regime to "revise its positions and prejudices" against Islamists. However, there appears to be some dispute within the group over how to manage assimilating into Egyptian political life. Certainly, members are aware of how difficult, if not impossible, it is for them to obtain a permit to found a political party. The experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in that domain serves as a warning. On the other hand, they want to take an active part in shaping public opinion and not to appear isolated and aloof from the social ferment that the country is currently experiencing. But, if they are to do so, in what capacity should they act as a group? They appear to be having difficulty defining themselves. Are they a purely religious organisation that should confine itself to proselytising activities? Or are they a movement with a socio-political vision that they would hope to implement in a peaceful fashion? The question of the possibility of assimilating Gamaa Islamiya aside, which is ultimately a government decision, there remain serious impediments to the movement's ability to work effectively within the Egyptian system. Foremost among these is its religious and political rhetoric. Although it has indeed placed its bitter legacy of violence behind it with its renunciation of recourse to force and its retraction of its sweeping condemnations of heresy, its religious discourse remains little different to conventional Salafi (ultra- fundamentalist) rhetoric, especially as pertains to rules of conduct, penal jurisprudence and jihad, with regard to which it derives most of its concepts and principles from ancient theological and juristic texts. Its political rhetoric, too, remains a long way from the more progressive thinking of other Islamists in Egypt and abroad, particularly as pertains to democracy and such democratic values as plurality, civil and individual liberties, and acceptance of others. While I have seen the occasional "flash" on these issues on the Gamaa Islamiya website, I have yet to find a solid document that clarifies how the group stands on any of them. Meanwhile, their actual record of involvement in such concerns as the status of Copts and women suggest a high degree of rigidity and an inability to move towards a more liberal outlook on these matters. The second impediment resides in the Gamaa's relationship with other Islamist movements and with other political forces. Towards the former, the movement has issued a general call for unity and brotherhood among all Islamist movements, although it has simultaneously aired reservations with regards to some groups. For example, it has levelled criticisms at Muslim Brotherhood leaders, reproaching some of them for their relations with President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. It further enjoined the Muslim Brothers to relinquish political activity and, instead, dedicate themselves to religious work. With regards to other political forces, the Gamaa remains ideologically intolerant of liberals, leftists and secularists. The Islamist group faces, thirdly, the difficulty of establishing a new organisational structure. The problem appears insurmountable, not only because the regime opposes any attempt on the part of Gamaa Islamiya to revive their organisation or even to resume activities in mosques or community associations, but also because of its inability to distinguish itself politically and theologically from other fundamentalist groups. Both these factors combined deprive it of the ability to attract and recruit members and supporters. It might not seem fair to ask the Gamaa to rise to these challenges before being allowed to assimilate into the political arena. Nevertheless, it has so far failed to respond to social, political and cultural contexts in a way that might rehabilitate its image in the mind of the public that remains unconvinced that the Gamaa has indeed shed its legacy of violence for which society paid a heavy toll throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Of course, no one has the right to deny the members of Gamaa Islamiya or other such movements their right to participate in politics. However, it is unjust to ask society to suspend their already floundering transition towards democracy on the basis of the doubtful hope that the Gamaa will one day espouse a democratic discourse. * The writer is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
