The articles below are translated and abridged versions of two papers on reform in Egypt presented at a conference of the Centre for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University, 3-4 May 2004. The articles look at the issue of reform from both a Coptic and an Islamic perspective The Islamist perspective Examining the complex transformation of Islamist currents in Egypt's recent history, Ammar Ali Hassan underlines the need for clarity as well as a commitment to compromise The debate on political reform involves three issues: First, whether reform should be introduced gradually or at one go; second, whether reform should originate from the top (from leaders) or the bottom (from the masses); and third, whether it should be generated from within or follow from outside pressure. The Islamists are throwing themselves headfirst into the foray, hoping to benefit from any move that would impart on them political and legal legitimacy, allow them to accede to power, or at least grant them a political foothold. The debate over whether reform should be sudden or gradual goes back to the late 19th century, that is, since the Islamic revival movement was championed by the likes of Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and his acolyte, Mohamed Abdou. The former thought reform should come all at once. The latter argued that reform is a gradual process, a view that led him to placate the British and disagree with Army Chief Orabi. Islamist groups of our time still differ over the same issues. The Muslim Brotherhood believes in gradualism. Gamaa Al-Islamiya and Jihad, until recently, were for seizing power all at once. Islamist groups may differ in opinion over sudden and gradual change, but they have no plans to entice existing authorities to adopt reform. What they want to do is remove the powers that be, gradually or in one full sweep. When Muslim Brotherhood members call for education and propagation, what they really want is to prepare society to accept their rule. Radical Islamist groups, when they took up arms against the regime, were not pressing the government to reform. The reason is simple: reform is not in their favour. Reform would actually cede credibility to the regime. Their true aim was to bring down the regime and seize state power. This strategy was abandoned once the regime won the armed showdown. Only then did the Islamists begin to call for democracy, as a low-cost, safe way of coming to power. This may explain why those Islamists who prefer political action to violence reject the regime's call for gradualism. The gradual approach postpones their moment of legitimacy, the moment they are awaiting to ride to power on a wave of popular sympathy. As for the bottom-up, or top-down question, the Islamists take a dual approach. They call on the leader to reform and urge the people to change. The Muslim Brotherhood's initiative involves a moral call as well as a package of political demands that are deemed commensurate with reform. The Islamists' approach to reform can be best examined through a look at the platforms of various Islamist parties still under formation. The Wasat (centre) Party calls for reform from below. In its platform, the party states that Egypt's problems are caused by the disintegration of social values. The Sharia Party calls for reform from the bottom up, for dialogue among all political forces, and for trade union activism. It also calls for reform from above, urging the state to remove recent restrictions on civil society. The Islah (reform) Party, seeking to conform to the political status quo, urges a gradual change that would eventually grant Islamists a better position in the political scene. Islah, therefore, calls for reform from above, with the government showing more respect for public freedoms, holding free elections and ending restrictions on the formation of political societies and groups. Concerning the question of whether reform should be internally or externally induced, Islamists tend to reject any change from the outside. They associate any foreign call for reform with attempts to undermine Islam. But they are not averse to benefiting from external pressures. They would love to see the government bow to these pressures and introduce reforms that may grant them political and legal legitimacy. Last March, the Brotherhood launched an initiative that encapsulated the attitude of Islamists in general to political reform. The initiative called for respecting the republican, parliamentary, constitutional, democratic regime in the framework of "Islamic tenets" and with "full recognition that the nation is the source of all powers". The initiative endorsed the rotation of power, the right to establish political parties, freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate. The initiative further states that the army should be kept out of politics and that the police and all other security agencies should perform their civic duties in accordance with the constitution and with the aim of protecting state and society as a whole, not just the government. The initiative called also for the president not to have any party affiliation or to stay in office for more than two terms. It urged an end to the state of emergency and to torture. Despite this initiative, the regime still refuses to grant the Islamists political legitimacy. Why? Because they are not democrats, claims the regime. This begs the question: Is there such a thing as democratic Islamist current? Some people argue that this is impossible, maintaining that there are structural reasons inherent in the political and religious discourse of Islamist groups that make them incapable of acting democratically. Others disagree, maintaining that there is no doctrinal or theoretical impediment to the integration of peaceable Islamist groups into the democratic process. The outcome of the political process, we are told, depends on the political and social climate in the country as a whole. One has to make a distinction between text and practice in Islam. If one goes by the text, there is nothing that indicates that Islam accepts tyranny and corruption. If one refers to history, it is obvious that Muslims have accepted monarchical succession without missing a beat. Generally speaking, no followers of any religion apply its tenets to the letter. No religious discourse is inherently undemocratic, even if some diehards on the fringe were to fight against democracy. Such diehards exist on the extreme left and right in virtually all democratic societies in Europe. To speak of a structural flaw -- of something inherent in Islamic thinking that rules out democracy -- would be unfair to a religion that cherishes the faculty of thinking. Islam equates oppressors with those who tolerate them. It instructs its followers to disagree with their superiors if they order them to do harm to others. It allows no human being the right to subjugate another. Whatever stagnation has seeped into Islamic doctrine it is not because of a structural flaw in Islam, but because of the reluctance of its followers to innovate. Some reformers have been trying to clean up Islamic discourse from within. Others were hoping that Westernisation would inspire much-needed change. But the home-inspired reformers did not break free completely from the rigour of past man- made texts; of the mouldy footnotes that have accumulated over centuries. Foreign-inspired reformers were too timid, afraid of being called heretics. In the end, both strains of reformers failed to coordinate their efforts, to accept one another, to encourage tolerance and entice debate. The past few years have witnessed a change in the discourse of the Islamist movement in Egypt, at least as far as politics is concerned. But the pace of change is still too leisurely, partly because the movement has not clearly figured out how to proceed, and partly because the regime has not allowed it much freedom of movement; a political foothold through which it may engage in the affairs of society. Instead of recognising that society as a whole can benefit greatly from any change in the thinking of Islamist activists, the regime has preferred to protect its own interests. The authorities have blocked the formation of the Wasat Party, one whose very existence could have led to a change in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the Brotherhood remains in the grip of the old guard, who are still faithful to the outdated doctrines of Hassan El-Banna, the group's founder. The regime has also blocked the formation of Islah and Sharia, two parties that in essence challenged the thinking of Jihad and other Salafi (fundamentalist) groups. Meanwhile, the authorities were elated when the Gamaa Al- Islamiya leaders revised their views, although there is no guarantee that this revision is irreversible. What would be useful, for Egypt's stability and future reform is for political authorities to stop regarding the Islamists as potential "traitors" and to approach them as a societal and political force with potential. Once this happens, the Islamists would be able to engage in a dialogue with other societal and intellectual trends in the country. This dialogue would help them revise their discourse and refine their attitude. This is not a farfetched scenario. Over the 1990s, the ideas of politically oriented Islamist groups in Egypt have changed in a profound manner. First, a middle generation has appeared within the Brotherhood. This generation has sought to form a political party that would have ended the group's stagnation, increased its visibility and clarified its programmes. Second, the Gamaa Al-Islamiya has come up with an initiative to end violence unilaterally and unconditionally. The initiative was spelled out in four booklets that reversed past attitudes. Gamaa followers are no longer encouraged to view rulers as ungodly, society as heathen and armed confrontation as the only option. Third, Jihad has broken up, with one section joining forces with Al-Qa'eda, another opting for peaceable involvement in political life, a third retaining its old ideas but refraining from violence. Fourth, several Islamist parties have applied for legal licence to operate. The followers of these parties are still determined to pursue peaceable political means. Fifth, more communication is underway between the Salafi trend and independent Islamists, with those involved interacting fully with the rest of society. The authorities are still branding the Islamists as undemocratic, but this attitude is more discrediting to the authorities than the Islamists. One cannot justify the exclusion of the Islamists by simply ruling them out as undemocratic. Integration in the political process is the best way to encourage moderation. The Brotherhood's recent initiative is proof enough that Islamists are willing to deal with the "secular state". The initiative is fraught with "thou shall" clauses, and mixes up the obligations of the regime with those of the Brotherhood, but it contains numerous signs indicating that the Brotherhood is changing and willing to become part of a legitimate political process. Although Egypt's Islamist movement has rectified some of its stances, it is yet to make its position irrevocably clear on the following issues. First, political legitimacy is based in the community, not on Sharia law. The people, not Sharia, are the source of power. Second, consistency is needed in matters of propagation as well as government. Open and accommodating when not in power, the Islamists must not turn on the political game once in power. Third, religion may be laced with politics, but religion is not to be politicised. In other words, politics can be given a moral context, as early Muslim philosophers wished it to be -- indeed, as the European enlightenment did -- but religion should not become a political gimmick, a way of toying with popular sentiments. This would be insulting to religion itself, above all. Fourth, integration, not segregation is the way forward. On the one hand, Islamists should not act as if they have a divine mandate; as if the rest of society should follow their lead with no questions asked. More importantly, the Copts have indisputable rights that must not be diminished in any shape or form. The Brotherhood's initiative admits "Copts are a part of the fabric of Egyptian society, partners in homeland and destiny, with equally rights and obligations." Fifth, the debate over shura (consultation) and democracy must end. The early reformers (Al-Afghani, Abdou and Mohamed Rashid Reda) all agreed that democracy is an appropriate form of shura. Later on, the point was muddled with the rise of Salafi thinking. The emphasis on democracy has to be clearly stated. Sixth, bai'ah (pledge of allegiance) is not an acceptable alternative to elections. The latter involves a contest through free votes among rival candidates. The former allows for referenda to take place. The Islamists, who now demand democracy, have to make a commitment to elections as the sole option. Finally, if religious text were to contradict public interest, it has to be overruled. There are precedents in Islamic history of caliphs overruling scripture in favour of common interest. The second caliph, Omar, once suspended the punishment of theft during a time of famine.
