Saudi Arabia has seen far-reaching changes since the death of King Abdullah in January. The latest of these changes at the top echelons of power in the kingdom surprised many Saudi watchers. Last week, the Saudi monarch, King Salman, relieved Crown Prince Muqrin of his post and appointed the former crown prince, Emir Mohamed Ben Nayef, as crown prince while promoting his son, Emir Mohamed Ben Salman, to deputy crown prince. Both have kept their ministerial portfolios. The former remains the minister of interior. The latter has kept his job as minister of defence. Another major change saw Emir Saud Al-Faisal, the long-serving foreign minister, replaced by the Saudi ambassador in Washington. The change at the Saudi Foreign Ministry came at the request of the former foreign minister, probably because of health reasons. These drastic changes were made to meet not only the challenges of the present, but also to help the kingdom face future challenges, within and without. The first and most important challenge comes from inside Saudi Arabia itself. The growing power of the younger generations, even within the ruling family, had to be dealt with. By appointing both a new crown prince and deputy, in their fifties and early thirties respectively, the Saudi monarch has assured the stability of Saudi Arabia for many years to come. That does not mean that friction will be absent within the ruling family, but the road ahead will not pose threats to the internal balance of the House of Saud. That is a big plus for Saudi Arabia, taking into account the growing gaps between the generations of the 20th century and those who have studied at the most advanced academic institutions in the Western world. Supposedly, both the crown prince and his deputy are in a better position to speak on behalf of those rising generations. The other challenge is both domestic and regional, namely the growing appeal of extremist organisations among Saudi youth and within the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia. The late King Abdullah made sure to rein in the most extremist elements within this establishment, but the position of King Salman in this regard remains a bit of a mystery. Related to this is how Saudi Arabia will deal with the situation in Syria. The final outcome will have a direct impact on the security and stability of the kingdom. The basic Saudi position is to insist on the overthrow of President Bashar Al-Assad. What changed with the passing of King Abdullah is how to go about it and with which regional powers. Under King Salman, Saudi Arabia has apparently moved closer to Turkey, which means an opening, to a certain extent, for the banned Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Will Saudi Arabia take this terrorist organisation off its own blacklist drawn up in March 2014 during the reign of King Abdullah? Or will Saudi Arabia cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood via Turkey to fight Iran across the Middle East and in the Arabian Peninsula? The latter is more probable in the foreseeable future. The three most pressing questions facing the Saudi monarchy include how to deal with Iran if the framework agreement concerning its nuclear programme becomes final on 30 June. The second pressing question is Yemen, and the third is Syria. In all these questions Iran looms large. Under King Salman, the world has witnessed more assertive Saudi diplomacy with a penchant for the use of force, in Yemen and in Syria. That does not bode well for the Arab world. Any miscalculation, either on the part of Saudi Arabia or Iran could ignite a religious war in the Muslim world that would be extremely costly to all parties without exception. That is where Egypt comes in. Saudi Arabia, alongside Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, supported Egypt politically and financially after the June 2013 Revolution. Without such generous support Egypt would have faced a very critical situation, both politically and economically. The three countries, with Oman, provided Egypt with $12.5 billion dollars at the Sharm El-Sheikh development conference in March. Some Egyptian politicians and commentators have called for a complete alignment with Saudi Arabia. But the question that we should ask is how best could Egypt help Saudi Arabia strategically in the ongoing wars in the Arab world? I am not sure a complete alignment of Egypt with Saudi positions will help either Egyptian or Saudi interests in the long run. Undoubtedly, a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran will not solve the grave deterioration in the security situation in the Middle East and in the Arab Peninsula. On the contrary, it will only aggravate it to the detriment of Egyptian interests in the Levant and in the Gulf. Maybe this explains the one-day trip that President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi made to Saudi Arabia on 2 May to meet the Saudi monarch and his two new crown princes. One immediate result of the visit was the Egyptian decision to extend the deployment of Egyptian forces in Yemen for three months, as announced on 3 May. Let us hope that by the time this extension expires a political solution will have been agreed upon in Yemen. Egypt should become the arbiter and the balancer, as well, in the region. Otherwise, powers like Erdogan's Turkey will destabilise the Middle East for a long period to come. The fall of Syria will be a case in point. I hope the Saudis will take this into consideration as they plan their next strategic moves in the highly dangerous and volatile environment in the Middle East, the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula. The writer is former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.
