Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal has warned that Iran is showing “hegemonistic tendencies in the region.” “Iran is taking over Iraq,” he said. “We see it involved in Syria and Lebanon and Yemen and Iraq, and God knows where. This must stop if Iran is to be part of the solution and not the problem.” Prince Saud's scathing criticism of Iranian support of Iraq's Shia-led government may not have broken new ground but it does raise questions about the kingdom's strategy of dealing with the myriad crises simmering across the region. Saudi Arabia, worried about Tehran's growing influence in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated regime in 2003, has long refused to establish full diplomatic and political ties with the Shia-led government in Baghdad. But Prince Saud's blunt remarks reflect growing anxiety in Saudi Arabia over increasing Iranian involvement in the war-torn country. In the wake of advances by the Islamic State (IS) group, which now controls a third of Iraqi territory, Iran began building Shia militias in Iraq. The elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG) has been mobilised to fund, train and arm an Iraqi Shia paramilitary force. Iranian commanders are spearheading Iraqi attacks on IS-held towns. Major-General Qassim Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, the IRG's special operations arm, is directly overseeing offensives against IS, leading to fears of sectarian reprisals during operations to drive IS militants out of Sunni towns. Prince Saud referred to the ongoing offensive in Sunni-populated Tikrit as an example of overt Iranian involvement in Iraq. A combination of 30,000 Iraqi security forces and Shia Popular Mobilisation Units launched an offensive to retake Tikrit from the terror group this week. Tikrit, the hometown of former president Saddam Hussein, is a key foothold for any assault on Mosul, IS's self-declared capital. Members of the Popular Mobilisation Units have been accused of abuses against civilians in areas Iraqi forces have retaken from IS. A number of human rights groups are increasingly concerned that the campaign in Tikrit could lead to atrocities. Recent speeches by Iranian leaders reflecting Tehran's ambitions in Iraq have sounded alarm bells in Riyadh. On Sunday, Ali Younesi, a senior advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, boasted that Iraq has already become part of Iran. “Iran today has become an empire and its capital now is Baghdad. As it was in the past, Baghdad today is the centre of our civilization and our culture,” he said. Saudi leaders are increasingly worried by the influence Iran will wield in Iraq if it succeeds in defeating IS militants, and the consequent erosion of Saudi Arabia's leadership role in the Muslim Sunni world. Though Riyadh has adopted a multipronged approach towards influencing events in Iraq, its success remains limited. Saudi Arabia believes empowering Sunni Arabs is central not only to ending their exclusion from power, which began following Saddam's ouster, but to resisting Iranian influence in Iraq. Riyadh has therefore relied on chequebook diplomacy to cement ties with Iraq's Sunni tribes and political and religious figures. But despite its generous support, no credible Iraqi Sunni leadership has emerged. Until the Sunni minority develops a united voice and platform to engage with Iraq's Shia majority, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to push for meaningful change in Iraq's pro-Shia, pro-Iranian policies. An additional problem is that Saudi Arabia's ability to advance Iraqi Sunni interests is being undermined by accusations that its policies play a role in supporting jihadi-style extremism. Riyadh has also used oil as a weapon in its battle to win greater influence over the Shia-led government in Iraq. As the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia is in a position to threaten the Iranian and Iraqi economies by keeping production high and prices low. Lower oil prices have certainly harmed the short-term economic outlook of both Iran and Iraq, but both countries have remained stalwart in the face of Saudi pressure. Tehran may have to grapple with economic difficulties caused by the slump in oil prices, but there are no signs that this will impact its military and political backing of Iran's Iraqi Shia allies in their confrontation with IS. There is no indication that Tehran is feeling battle fatigue. Indeed, it has consistently appeared to be ahead of the game in its clashes with Saudi Arabia over other regional disputes in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Saudi Arabia has been actively trying to block any rapprochement between Iran and the United States, with Riyadh petitioning Washington for reassurances that any nuclear deal with Tehran will not be part of a bigger “grand bargain.” Here again, Riyadh's room for manoeuvre is limited. Although the Obama administration has tried to ease the kingdom's concerns about a comprehensive deal with Iran, a nuclear agreement looks more likely than ever. Washington is clearly not as concerned as Saudi Arabia about Iran's role in Iraq. Last week General Martin Dempsey said Iran's involvement in the fight against IS in Iraq could be “a positive step” as long as the situation does not descend into sectarianism. The US military chief claimed that almost two thirds of the 30,000 strong Iraqi offensive force comprised Iranian-backed militiamen, meaning that without Iranian assistance and Soleimani's guidance the offensive against IS-held towns would not have been possible. The fourth strand of Saudi policy — the attempt to build a broad regional Sunni bloc to contain rising Shia influence — has also proved problematic. Riyadh has been assiduously courting Turkey in the hope of establishing a bipolar, sectarian-regional system. Such an alliance has enormous implications for the regional balance of power and could reshape relationships across the Middle East. Turkey, which until now has succeeded in steering clear of taking sides in any sectarian polarization, may find it counterproductive to be part of a Sunni bloc against its powerful eastern neighbour. Following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Riyadh last month, Turkish commentators were quick to point out that an anti-Iranian or anti-Shia front would only escalate sectarian tensions in the region and holds no benefit for Turkey. Such an alliance could also threaten Ankara's key strategic interests, including the Kurdish issue and Turkish relations with its large Allawite minority. Iran has successfully used the 12 years since Saddam's downfall to engineer a situation in Iraq that gives it leverage over its Sunni neighbours and deprives them of any strategic advantages or the ability to become a new source of threat. During the same period, Saudi Arabia and Iraq's other Sunni neighbours have failed to come up with a viable plan to cool down Iraq's simmering ethno-sectarian conflict. Unfortunately, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is likely to escalate. There are sources of tension across the region, though nowhere is the competition for influence more intense than in Iraq.
