While historical allusions to sectarian conflict affect perceptions, the complexity of history betrays easy comparisons between past and present, writes Mazin El-Naggar* When Hizbullah's fighters, on 12 July 2006, captured two Israeli soldiers so as to exchange them for Lebanese and Arab prisoners held by Israel, Israel retaliated with an all out war of annihilation and genocide. As the Israeli response exceeded all intelligible reactions known in international relations, it appeared that the war was not "really" for the two Israeli prisoners and, perhaps, not completely for Israel. The US was significantly involved in that war scene from the start; perhaps, it set the scene in the way it evolved, which prompted some Israeli lawmakers and commentators to raise a red flag, however. For over three weeks, the Bush administration blocked UN efforts to pass a ceasefire resolution in the Security Council that would lead to a negotiated agreement on exchanging prisoners on both sides of the conflict. Washington justified the destructive Israeli war against Lebanon as "self- defence" and considered it opportunity to implement Security Council Resolution 1559 that entails the disarming of Hizbullah and the redeployment of the Lebanese army to south Lebanon. One of the most striking aspects of the war, that perhaps influenced its course and evolution, was the position of Arab regimes. Some quickly dismissed the operation of Hizbullah as a miscalculated gamble, considering Hizbullah responsible for the consequences of the Israeli war, and discerning between Hizbullah's action and legitimate resistance. In turn, Hizbullah's leadership regarded this position as not only providing Israel's aggression with political coverage, but also directly prolonging the war and broadening its scope. Despite later attempts of such Arab regimes to arrange for a ceasefire, the popular Arab response to the position of Arab regimes was one of anger and solidarity with the position of Hizbullah, Islamist movements, and pan-Arab and national trends. The Arab public could not fathom the official Arab position; it shocked the consciousness of the masses and revealed a divergence from their sentiments and priorities; especially and ironically given that some of the criticised Arab regimes boycott Israel economically and have refused recognition of, negotiations with, or contact with, Israel for six decades. To varying degrees, the position of the Arab regimes is a reflection of another factor that represents a challenge to major players in the Arab system, namely, the Iranian role or "enterprise" in the Middle East. Manifestations of this role are Iran's nuclear energy research programme, opposing American hegemony, its alliance with Syria, its adoption of Hizbullah in Lebanon, its supporting Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and its patronage relationship with political Shia movements in Iraq. The last is the most controversial, or perhaps most provocative, aspect of Iranian influence in the region. The emergence of a divisive sectarian situation in Iraq continues to harm Iranian credibility in the Arab world and instigate anti-Iranian and anti-Shia sentiment in some Arab countries around and outside the Gulf. Official Arab discourse extends from warning against a Shia crescent extending from Iran and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon (a claim unwarranted by political and demographic realities), to blaming the US for conceding Iraq to Iranian influence and local allies, to characterising Iraqi Shias as essentially loyal to Tehran, to demanding Iran fulfil its various obligations towards its Gulf neighbours regarding its strategic and nuclear ambitions. This anti-Iranian and anti-Shia sentiment is no longer limited to the official sphere; it has expanded to touch the domain of popular sentiment. Arab alienation from Iran has extended towards Iran's allies; namely, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas. This explains the tension that characterises Syria's relations with its traditional allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and de facto Arab participation in the embargo against Hamas since it won a majority in the Palestinian legislative elections of last year. In this emerging anti-Iranian regional context, several politicians and commentators have invoked the Ottoman-Safavid conflict during the 16th and 17th centuries so as to shroud their position with historical lore. The aim is to marshal all the negative attributes of the Iranian Safavid experience, or "enterprise", and assign them to Tehran's contemporary enterprise so as to taint Iran, divest it of credibility, and contain and isolate it from the Arab world. Other voices invoke the anti-Arab racist Shuoobiyyah sentiment in the early centuries of Islam so as to identify Iran with anti-Arab Persian chauvinism. The invocation of Safavism and Persian chauvinism is not confined to anti-Iranian Arab regimes and anti-Shia trends; both motifs are exploited also by anti-Iranian secular Iraqi Shias, figures and factions, that resent the predominance of pro-Iranian Shia factions in the current Iraqi political process. The Ottoman-Safavid conflict has long been characterised as a sectarian Sunni-Shia discord; though the essence of the conflict and its context was not entirely as such. The Safavid movement was born in Iran late in the 15th century as a conversion from a Sunni-Sufi background to "Twelver Shiism" in a Persian setting that used to be predominantly Shafii, Ashari and Sufi for several centuries. Twelver Shiism, in the pre-Safavid era, is largely regarded as moderate and non-violent. In fact, Sunnism and Shiism were born in Baghdad; neither developing as a reaction or opposition to the other. Indeed, Twelvers coexisted well with Sunnis in the second Abbasid era; their founding scholars devoted great effort to establishing the academic foundations of their mathhab, school or doctrine, while their notables assumed prominent posts in the Abbasid administration in Baghdad. Despite the ascension of the Persian Shii Buwayhid dynasty to power under the Abbasid caliphate for over a century, there was no struggle or discord such as that of the Ottoman-Safavid era, save a few limited episodes. The Twelvers' scholars devoted significant effort to confronting extremist elements in Shiism; especially splinter groups with violent, anarchist, pantheistic or Gnostic orientations. Ironically, the Safavid embracing of Twelver Shiism in Iran had ensued the elimination or extinction of such extremist elements. In the pre-Safavid era, Shiism was chiefly an Arab tradition par excellence; non-Arabs had little role in its structure and movement. However, the Safavids impact on Shiism was so deep that Ottoman era traveller and historian Al-Maqrizi thought that Shiism was inherently Persian. Nonetheless, contemporary Shiism is all but Arab in Lebanon, Iraq, Hijaz, Ihsaa, Bahrain, and other Gulf states, with some exceptions. Though it is not prudent for history students to review past events according to certain presuppositions based on hindsight, I believe that the nihilistic and exhausting Ottoman- Safavid conflict was not a response to the Safavid sectarian transformation in 16th century Iran. Historical evidence indicates the role of ethnic, cultural and geopolitical factors in the collision of predominant Turkic dynasties in the late Middle Ages. The Turkic experience was characterised by the emergence of multiple sultans ( khans ) that used to compete for the status of the Khaqan, or Kagan, or supreme sultan. To accomplish this status, the most powerful and distinguished khan had to impose it on other khans if they did not concede. This perspective explains the fierce competition, and sometimes wars, among various Turkic dynasties in Anatolia, Persia, Central Asia, Egypt and the Levantine. Also, geopolitical interests played a noteworthy role as some dynasties tried to encroach on each other's dominions. Most of these dynasties were Sunnis and Hanafis. In the pre-Safavid era, the Ottoman dynasty, in Anatolia and the Balkans, was in fierce conflict with two Turkic dynasties that successively dominated the Iranian realm: the Black Sheep and White Sheep. Like the Ottomans, both dynasties were Sunnis and Hanafis. They waged major wars against Ottomans; sometimes, campaigns were mobilised due to insinuation by former rulers of Anatolian Turkic emirates that were overrun and annexed by Ottomans in the course of their imperial unification enterprise. The sectarian transformation of the Safavids towards Twelver Shiism could be attributed to the tendency of these Turkic-speaking dynasties to assure their independence from Ottoman influence and to adopt a different religious call amid competition and conflict. While the Ottoman Empire was perceived as a giant unifying power that expanded and accomplished its "Pax Ottomana" in three continents, the dilemma of the Safavid enterprise is that, since its early days, it directed its enormous militant energy inwards, inside the ummah (nation). Thus, in the classic sense, it was deemed as a project of fitna, or divisiveness, implosion and attrition with all consequent negative presumptions. The main difference between Ottoman and Safavid enterprises is the open, tolerant and universal nature of the Ottoman Empire and its self-perception as an heir to the Eastern Roman Empire and the multiple roles of the Ottoman sultan as patron of the Byzantine church, monarch for all of his subjects, caliph of all Muslims, and supreme khan of Turkic peoples and dominions. Aspects of contrast between the Ottoman and Safavid enterprises gave the former its historical legitimacy but lead to the discrediting and disparagement of the latter that had been regarded as a negative experience in Islamic history. The Safavid isolated a major geographical, cultural and human Muslim sphere from the rest of the ummah ; they alienated Shias from Sunnis as they abused the spirit and essence of Shiism, which was rightly analysed by Iranian thinker Ali Shariati who discerns between Safavid Shiism and Muhammadan Shiism. Objectively speaking, the real contemporary heir of the Safavid enterprise was the former Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. He exacerbated the chasm between Iran and the Arab world as he forged an alliance with Israel and the United States and became an agent for the latter in the Middle East. Pahlavi also sought to distort and Westernise Iranian identity and culture, espousing a hostile attitude towards Islam and Arab causes. The Shah invaded and occupied three United Arab Emirate islands further raising tension between Iran and the Arab world. Differences between the Ottoman and Safavid enterprises make reasonable criteria to review current Arab-Iranian relations. However, the real Arab crisis now is the absence of any Arab role, project or enterprise against which competing ones can be compared. The Safavid enterprise assumed its "negative" aspects only in comparison with the Ottoman enterprise. Since there is no present unifying, resurgent Arab equivalent to the Ottoman enterprise, there is no present Iranian equivalent to the Safavid enterprise. The dilemma of the official Arab position is its divergence from the ummah's moral and political compass, aspirations and sentiment. This entails inevitable contradiction and the lack of any concrete option vis-à-vis the Israeli threat and imperialist-hegemonic challenges save acquiescence, marginalisation or neutralisation. In short, the official Arab position lacks a clear or purposeful vision. Resistance in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq does not augur sectarianism, for resistance is the peoples' response to challenges and injustice. In the same country, and within the same sect, some individuals or groups resist occupation and others collaborate with it. Sectarian affiliation is a barren category that does not explain such contrasts. * The writer is a Palestinian researcher.
