Iran's influence Iranian policies in Syria appear to be part of a bid to redraw the regional map along factional lines Two decades ago, the Iranians did not have much say in Syrian affairs. They were close to former Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad, the father of the incumbent president, but they could not tell Damascus what to do or when to do it. Now, some say that Tehran is running the show in Syria, with President Bashar Al-Assad being little more than a puppet. Paradoxically enough, it was probably Washington that pushed the Syrian regime into Iran's arms in the first place. When then US president George W Bush labelled Iran, Iraq and North Korea an “axis of evil,” a term he first used in 2002 but repeated throughout his presidency, the Iranians reacted by upgrading their relations with all potential allies in the region, especially countries with a considerable Shiite presence, and Syria was at the top of the list. Although Syria has been on the US list of countries “sponsoring” terror since 1979, the two countries did not really come to blows until the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri in 2005. From that point onwards, Damascus was so threatened by the Americans that it started leaning more on Iran, the most powerful of the US regional adversaries. Eventually, Al-Assad forged a strategic alliance with Iran, one that did not have much popular appeal domestically, but made him feel more secure. Both Damascus and Tehran posed as the defenders of the region against the Zionists and their allies, as well as champions of the two militia outfits that still dared to engage Israel in battle: Hizbullah and Hamas. Increasingly, Tehran developed an appetite for redrawing Syria's internal and external policies. Relations between the two countries graduated into a blood pact once Al-Assad decided to clamp down on what started as a pro-democracy movement in Syria in 2011. As the brutality of the Syrian authorities alienated the majority of the Arab countries, Iran stepped in to fill the vacuum, offering the regime not only military support, but also hands-on logistical guidance. As the confrontation turned into a fully-fledged civil war, Al-Assad abdicated most of his authority to the Iranians, allowing them to run the day-to-day battle with the opposition. The Iranians, once in charge, brought in the battle-hardened combatants of Lebanon's Hizbullah to the scene, sent in military experts to train the pro-regime paramilitary, and then raised volunteer outfits in Iraq to send to Syria. The battle in Syria may have looked like a beleaguered regime trying to stay in power against the odds. But it was not long before it morphed into a proxy battle in which the Iranians seemed to be one of the top players, along with Al-Qaeda affiliates and splinter groups. What was once considered to be an insurgency led by moderates to oust a despotic regime became a web of proxy conflicts in which Iran, Russia, the US, Turkey and the Gulf states all had their client armies, militias and paramilitary outfits. The tangle of conflicts that unfolded in Syria gave Iran the kind of power it could have only dreamt of in the past. With its influence unchallenged in Baghdad and Damascus, and its paramilitaries active in Syria and Lebanon, Iran is now reserving for itself a place at the table of any future talks concerning the region. Add to this Iranian influence in Yemen, where the Houthi movement, which many now consider to be its client militia, poses a credible challenge to the central government, and it becomes clear that Tehran is not thinking like a beleaguered nation of modest regional ambitions, a shaky economy and controversial nuclear schemes, but as a country which is determined to recreate its past imperial glories. There are dozens of Shiite military outfits operating in Syria, some including non-Syrian combatants, and almost all with connections to Iran. The infiltration was gradual at first, with the first brigades formed allegedly to protect “Shiite shrines,” but this pretence is now all but forgotten. Instead, Iranian officials now brag openly of their control over Damascus. Syria is Iran's 35th governorate, Mahdi Taeb, the cleric heading the Ammar Strategic Base, a group active in deflecting a so-called “soft war” on Iran, has announced. Iran's current borders are on the Mediterranean, has chimed in former Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander Rahim Safavi. Iranian war efforts in Syria have split the country along sectarian lines, for most Syrians are Sunnis, and they are increasingly angered by the interference of Iran and Hizbullah in their country's affairs. As the grip of the Al-Assad regime in Syria has weakened, there have been reports that some areas of the country are now considered out of bounds for all but the Iranians and their armed outfits. Even the Syrian regular army is not allowed to approach these areas. The Americans are not necessarily displeased with this result. The current war in Syria, which has claimed the lives of nearly 200,000 people, has wrecked the Syrian army, bled Lebanon's Hizbullah, and exhausted Iran's financial and military resources. All at no expense to Washington, which has refrained repeatedly from offering “lethal” help to the moderate Free Syrian Army. Across the region, a prophecy once made by the Jordanian monarch is coming true: a Shiite crescent is indeed taking shape, running through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and with reverberations in Yemen and Bahrain. If the Iranians once secretly dreamt of reviving the Persian Empire, they can now see their fantasy taking shape. And if they make a deal with the Americans on their nuclear programme, their stamp of approval will almost certainly be sought in any future remapping of the region. Ali Al-Abdallah, a Syrian opposition writer, believes that Iranian strategists may not have any particular map in mind, but are playing the odds as the game unfolds. Speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly, Al-Abdallah said that the Iranian strategy was not to challenge the current borders, but to win positions of influence inside the existing countries. Whenever the opportunity presented itself, Iran would try to buy out, or coerce, regimes to do its bidding, he said. “I don't think that Iran wants to divide the region along sectarian or ethnic lines for many reasons... One is that more than half the Iranians (55 per cent) are of non-Persian origins, including the Azeris who inhabit northern Iran, the Kurds in the northwest, the Arabs in the southwest, and the Baluchis in the east of the country.” Also, 35 per cent of Iranians are Sunnis, Al-Abdallah pointed out. As a result, an Iranian policy actively promoting sectarian cantons across the region could backfire domestically. “The strategy of Iran and its regional moves are based on respecting the current maps and international borders and attempting to win influence within them,” he added. According to Al-Abdallah, Iran is trying to win influence with the existing countries either by controlling the regime, as in the Syrian case, or by creating Shiite political parties and forming sectarian militia, as in Lebanon, or through backing parties with Islamist or militant agendas, as in Palestine, Egypt and Iraqi Kurdistan. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Al-Quds Force, once bragged that he had created a dozen Iranian mini-states outside Iran, Al-Abdallah pointed out. In Syria, Iran has been able to extend its influence outside the sectarian boundaries of the Shiite communities. A significant proportion of Syrian Marxists, leftists and nationalists still think of Tehran as a natural ally, remarked Syrian former minister Marwan Habash. This view may run against the principles of freedom and democracy, for which some of these groups often claim to stand. But pro-Iranian groups are likely to “support the new regional maps which Iran hopes to draw for the region,” Habash said. Syria's big five Of the rival armies and military outfits involved in the Syrian civil strife, five now dominate the scene As the Syrian conflict escalated over the past three years, it morphed from civil protests into an insurgency and then into a free-for-all conflagration in which dozens of militias are operating. But among the rumbling of the guns and the rubble of wreckage in its wake, five distinct groups can be identified that now hold the nation captive. Their promises of liberation have turned into a land grab. Their high-flowing rhetoric has become a matter of the blood and tears of civilians caught up in the endless carnage. The brutality of the regime gave birth to an armed opposition whose mantra of salvation, backed by scant organisation and inadequate munitions, failed to summon the future for which millions had hoped. Trusting in Western help that never came, the moderate opposition remains weak and divided, short of political plans as well as the muscle to persuade its allies of its worth. As the conflict took on regional proportions, Iran was the first to join the hurtling wagon of the civil war, rescuing the regime at the expense of the nation, and fomenting sectarianism under the pretence of protecting Shiite religious sites. Hundreds of Shiite fighters came into the country at Iran's bidding, first from Lebanon but before long also from Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and other countries. As the Sunnis appeared to be the main target of the regime, the jihadists, some affiliated with Al-Qaeda and some home-grown, started waging their own holy war, culminated in the spectacular declaration of a caliphate by the most rabid of them all, the Islamic State (IS). Not to be outdone, the Kurds came up with what appears to be a trial run for secession. In the northern part of the country, they established self-rule with what appears to be the implicit consent of the regime. Now, after the IS began attacking them, they have asked the Peshmergas, the military outfits of Iraqi Kurdistan, for help. The main five groups now in control of the country are: the regime, Iran and its affiliates, the moderate opposition, the jihadists and the Kurds. THE REGIME: The regime is currently in control of about one third of the country, an area that covers five entire governorates and parts of three others. In the remaining six governorates, the regime has lost all control. The military power of the regime has been seriously degraded due to attrition and defections. Of an army of 400,000, there are only about 200,000 servicemen still loyal to the regime. And because the regime knows that even the loyalty of these may be questionable, it is keeping most of its troops in the relative safety of Damascus and the coastal areas. Nearly half the tanks and planes of the regime have either been destroyed or are out of service. IRAN: According to opposition sources, about 40 Shiite military outfits with fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere currently operate in Syria under Iranian control. Opposition sources put the number of Hizbullah fighters at 20,000 and of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) at 10,000. Most IRG servicemen are not involved in active combat, but offer training and guard important buildings in the capital. Shiite militias are active in central and southern Syria, with aerial and artillery support from the regime. The area Iran and its affiliates control may be only one-tenth of the country, but this is of usually high military value, as in the case of strategic roads and key towns. THE MODERATE OPPOSITION: The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed initially by servicemen defecting from the regime's army, but it soon attracted large numbers of civilian volunteers. The number of combatants affiliated with the FSA is said to be as high as 300,000. But divisions in its ranks, and its lack of strategic focus and quality weapons, have impeded its ability to oust the regime, which is its declared intention. At present, the FSA includes three distinct factions: (a) those still loyal to the secular goals of the revolution; (b) the Islamic Front, which is an alliance of moderate Islamists; and (c) the Salafi groups who often cooperate with the Al-Nusrah Front. There are at least 1,000 outfits associated in one way or another with the FSA, and between them they control nearly one-third of the country. THE JIHADISTS: The number of combatants loyal to the IS and the Al-Nusrah Front is close to 15,000, according to US sources. But opposition forces believe that the number could in fact be as small as 8,000. The IS has gained control of large swathes of eastern and northern Syria, close to one third of the country. Its gains may turn out to be temporary, as the group has no grass roots support, and its shocking tactics are not endearing it to the local population. The Al-Nusrah Front controls no land on its own, as it operates strictly in cooperation with other revolutionary groups. Despite Washington's designation of it as a terrorist group, it has gained a measure of respect among locals and is trusted by the moderate opposition. THE KURDS: The Democratic Union Party (PYD), a branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), is now in control of all areas in which the Kurds are in a majority in northern Syria. The PYD is believed to hold secessionist ideas, and it has refused to cooperate with the FSA, preferring instead to rely on the Peshmergas of Iraqi Kurdistan in matters of defence. The PYD has not released information about the number of its combatants, but it is commonly believed that it has 5,000 men under arms. In order to receive funds, food and ammunition, the competing militias need to have links with the outside world, which is why much of the fighting often focuses on the control of border crossings. The regime is currently in control of five of these: Kessab and Qamishli leading to Turkey, Al-Walid leading to Iraq, Nasib leading to Jordan, and Al-Masnaa leading to Lebanon. The moderate opposition controls four crossings: Bab Al-Hawa and Bab Al-Salam leading to Turkey, Qoneitera leading to Israel, and Daraa leading to Jordan. The IS controls four crossings: Bukamal leading to Iraq, and Jarablus, Tel Abyad and Al-Raye leading to Iraq. The Kurds control three crossings: Derbasiya leading to Turkey, and Smalka and Yaarabiya with Iraq. No moral high ground The fast-changing realities of the Syrian conflict have brought disappointment to the major players across the board Looking back years from now, few will reckon that the Syrian conflict was a good war. The fruits of land grabbing, the rewards of client regimes, the victories worth boasting of, and the assertions of the moral high ground have all turned out to be illusionary. One major player after another has now realised that they either acted too soon, or too late. Everyone was wrong-footed in Syria, those who stood by the regime, those who stood by the opposition, and those who hoped that the conflict could remain contained and not splash back onto their own land. The Syrians have suffered and their torments are far from over, but those who pulled the strings behind the scenes have also been burned, or are about to be. The Syrian regime had hoped to clamp down on the revolt, dismissing its calls for freedom and democracy as manipulations, labelling the revolutionaries as terrorists, and clinging on to power at any cost. But its plans backfired, for it has now been reduced to one fighting faction among many. If it is lucky, the regime's best bet now is to keep its control over a portion of the land. Huddled in the precarious safety of its own clan, the regime and its allies will always be remembered for the destruction and death they unnecessarily inflicted on their fellow citizens. The Syrian opposition asked for the moon and was rebuffed at every turn. These rebuffs were partly its own fault, for it has turned out to be divided and bickering, unable to come up with a clear plan and incapable of persuading regional or international allies to support it. Much time was wasted on which faction should be considered the primary spokesman of the Syrian people. In the end, the opposition failed to rise to the occasion, which would have meant acting selflessly and promptly and setting aside its differences for the common good. As it is, it is now fighting a rearguard war to stay relevant, and it seems too exhausted to come up with the guidance and inspiration the nation needs. While trying to protect themselves against the worst, the Americans and Europeans wasted time splitting hairs. Examining the anatomy of the revolution, they opted for denying the opposition the arms it so urgently needed, which gave the jihadists the chance to dominate the scene. As a result, the excuse that Western diplomats gave for not arming the opposition, namely, that terrorists might get their hands on the weapons, seems very ironic considering the arms depots that the Islamic State (IS) has now ended up grabbing along with large swathes of Syrian land. Belatedly, the West has now decided to take on IS, but the damage has already been done. The hundreds of foreign fighters trained and indoctrinated by IS will continue to pose grave threats to Western nations even if the latter manage to smash the ultra-radical jihadists, or push their so-called caliphate underground. Throughout the crisis, the Americans have seemed to be listening more to the Israelis than anyone else. Why defuse a war in Syria if this war would bleed the regime, Hizbullah, Iran and the Arab nationalists who are all active or potential enemies of Israel? Listening to Israel's advice is likely to be costly, however, for the new breed of jihadists seems to have transcended Al-Qaeda's earlier iterations, replacing the standard formulas of horror with even more deranged forms of psychosis. Russia seemed more interested in retaining a say, and a foothold, in Syria than in maintaining even a modicum of fairness. It vetoed every UN Security Council decision that seemed to challenge the regime, even if that decision was purely about humanitarian logistics. The Russians will soon see the error of their ways, for the political tremors they have unleashed in Syria are already sending ripples all the way to their borders. Iran is the one country that went for broke in Syria, wagering on a bankrupt regime in a bid to fortify its Shiite sphere of influence in the region. But Tehran has also been stretching itself too thin, and it is creating enemies by the day. The bloodshed in Syria will tarnish Iran's image in the region for years, and any goodwill it could have expected to find among its Arab neighbours is being replaced by mistrust and disdain. Through its policy of sectarianism, Iran may have made temporary gains, but it has also opened a Pandora's Box of grief. Turkey wanted to strike a moral tone, but lost its focus as the crisis became out of hand. The jihadists who were allowed to move easily across its borders have ignited a conflict that is no longer easy to contain. Meanwhile, Kurdish separatists have won a foothold across its borders in what may turn out to be an additional destabilising factor. Turkey made fewer friends than foes during the war. As a result of the conflict in Syria, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, drawn up by Britain and France to decide the future of the region, is now in tatters, with Syria and Iraq the most likely candidates for redrawing. The old maps may not have made much sense, but the new maps – if they materialise – may be worse. The ethnic and sectarian partitioning of Syria and other countries in the region, which already has its supporters, is not going to bring freedom and democracy. On the contrary, it will heighten the mistrust and apprehension in an already volatile region. Drawn to partition The demographic changes introduced by the Syrian regime in Alawite-dominated regions may be paving the road to partition According to the Syrian opposition, the Syrian regime is trying to carve off certain sections of the country to create an Alawite mini-state once the guns have fallen silent. The regime is said to have set its heart on controlling three governorates of the country. But to get away with such a plan, the regime has had to encourage other ethnic or sectarian communities to do the same, and the Kurds in particular seem to have taken to the scheme with methodical zeal. In public, the regime says that it is opposed to partitioning, eager to preserve the country's unity and defending the whole region against encroachment by outsiders. But in reality, its actions have caused deep rifts among the country's ethnic components, causing sectarian cracks that may take years if not decades to heal. Syrian officials tell journalists and diplomats that the last thing Damascus wishes is to see the fault lines of the past few years coalescing into a divisive reality. But behind the scenes, the regime has used the past few months or so to reinforce the foundations of a possible Alawite mini-state in the coastal and central parts of the country. Differences have existed between the Sunni majority in Syria (70 per cent of the population) and the Alawite minority (10 per cent) over the past few decades. But these differences were papered over, and the preferential treatment the state offered the Alawite community was not considered an imminent threat to the country's social fabric. When he took power in 1971, Hafez Al-Assad, current President Bashar Al-Assad's father, reshuffled the government, dismissing Sunni officers from sensitive posts in the army and police and giving top civilian posts to his Alawite cronies. Before long, every senior post that mattered in the security, intelligence, army and the state was dominated by Alawites. The ruling Syrian Baath Party and the government apparatus were constantly under surveillance from the Alawite-dominated security services. Contracts, perks and even college fellowships went first to Alawites, trickling down to vetted members of other communities only on the scale necessary to retain the thin illusion of fairness. Alawite businessmen and officers won most contracts with the state. The best commercial and tourist deals were handled by an increasingly affluent circle of the regime's Alawite cronies. These perks, handed freely to members of the Alawite community, are what gave the regime a slim political niche that it now hopes to bank on. For fear of losing their privileged status under the Al-Assad family, the Alawite community in Syria at large sided with the regime, and young Alawites had no qualms joining the pro-regime paramilitary outfits once the conflict escalated into a bloody civil war. Tens of thousands of Alawite volunteers are believed to have fought on the regime's side for the past three years or so. With the bulk of the country's security services, intelligence and Special Forces made up of Alawites, the regime's war then became theirs, with the political battle turning ethnic by default as well as by design. In the course of the past three years, the regime and its allied paramilitary outfits have bombed and torched all areas associated with the revolution in what amounts to scorched-earth tactics. With such blood on their hands, the Alawites have had to rally more around the regime, fearing retribution if the balance of battle were to tip against Al-Assad. A demographic shift then ensured. Seeking safety in numbers, the Alawites gravitated towards the areas in which they already constituted the majority, which is especially true along the coast. And, preparing for the worst, the regime decided that if it lost its hold on the country that it was daily wrecking, it could at least fall back on the areas inhabited by its natural supporters, the clan with which it has curried favour for over four decades. The ground work for an Alawite mini-state is almost there. And the regime is pursuing this design with bloody resolve, alienating the Sunnis, encouraging the secessionist Kurds, and allowing foreign jihadists to grab large swathes of the country. If partitioning is the final aim of the regime, it has played its cards right, and ruthlessly. It has fomented sectarian sentiments among the country's ethnic and factional components, implicated its own clan in war crimes, and stirred up hostilities that will be hard to allay. The regime's message to the Alawites has been that, if it is ousted, they will be at the mercy of their brutal adversaries. This blood pact, unthinkable only a few years ago, is the regime's last gamble. Over the past three years, the regime has ordered its Alawite paramilitaries to destroy homes and massacre civilians, practically committing the ethnic cleansing of the Sunni villages it intends to control. Entire Sunni villages have been emptied of their original populations, just because they were too close to Alawite villages for comfort. Sunni property has been destroyed and looted by pro-regime Alawite militiamen. The location of the villages that were most brutally attacked suggests that there was nothing random about this scheme. The massacres blazed a trail of destruction along a path running from Latakia and Tartus on the coast to Homs and Damascus in the heartland. Somewhere among these lines is what the regime hopes will be the location of its future mini-state. The cruelty of the scheme is underlined by the fact that the challenge to the regime was never factional or ethnic in essence. The cities that rose up against the regime may have been predominantly Sunni, as most of the country is, but they did not rise up for a Sunni cause. The revolt they took part in was about freedom and democracy, not about factional or ethnic supremacy. Even when the conflict turned bloody, the revolutionary outfits that emerged demanded the ouster of the regime and the end of totalitarianism, not the dominance of one community over another. Yet, the regime used its media and political apparatus to promote the illusion that this fight was about sect and clan, about Sunnis against Shiites, a false narrative that it had to cement with the blood of its own community as well as that of others. On a more practical level, the regime also transferred most of the gold and foreign reserves in the country's Central Bank to Alawite banks on the coast, say opposition and Western intelligence sources. Furthermore, the regime transported much of its heavy weapons and sophisticated planes to warehouses and airports in the Alawite-dominated areas. To advance its schemes, the regime offered its support to a Kurdish state in the north. It may have also been open to a Druze state in the south in order to further dismember the country. The Sunni majority, it seems, will have to satisfy itself with parts of the centre and the east of Syria, areas over which it will have to fight with the jihadists for control. In the self-declared Kurdish areas in the north, Kurdish officials have begun speaking of an independent state, or of a federal formula allowing them something akin to independence. Already, they hoist Kurdish flags over buildings and ban ethnically Arab Syrians from entering certain zones without permission. Kurdish has replaced Arabic as the official language in such zones. Observers are reminded of the creation of an Alawite state along the Syrian coast in 1920, a scheme that did not last as it contravened the Sykes-Picot Agreement drawn up for the region by Britain and France. Bashar Al-Assad's own grandfather was a major proponent of such a plan.
