The withdrawal of the Salafist Front, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party and, before them, the Watan (Homeland) and Islamic Jihad Parties, from the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy (NASL) begs several questions. What are the reasons behind this spate of withdrawals? What bearing do they have on the forthcoming parliamentary elections? Will NASL survive and, if it does, will the Muslim Brotherhood remain in the driver's seat? While Istiqlal's departure from NASL came as no surprise, the fierce attack against the Muslim Brotherhood by the party's secretary-general, Magdi Hussein, did. In a statement to the press, he announced: “The secretariat-general of the Istiqlal Party has decided to freeze its membership in [NASL]. I had been urging this step for a month. Remaining in the alliance would have meant continuing to work under the banner of the Muslim Brotherhood which has failed to respond to a single one of our demands.” Hussein's broadside continued: “The Muslim Brotherhood reduces support for legitimacy to a single point: the return of Morsi. They are not concerned with any issue beyond recovering their position in power and pursuing the same policies and the same understandings with the US — the recognition of Israel and everything pertaining to the Camp David accord, normalisation with Israel and the QIZ agreement … [the Muslim Brothers] are not interested in the causes of national independence or social justice. The Muslim Brothers care only for their relationship with the US and the West.” Hussein says many other Islamist parties share Istiqlal's position. “They are all of the opinion that we must content ourselves with the democratic process and return to the ballot box,” he said. “Our continuation in NASL, which does not consider our views on matters that we consider essential, would make us a mere appendage to the Muslim Brotherhood. Our departure from the alliance does not signify any compromise with the 30 June order. Our positions remain the same and we will coordinate with any Islamist or other revolutionary movement over any actions we regard as necessary. “We will not abandon the cause of freedom and will continue to oppose any harassment of the Muslim Brothers without proper legal foundation, fabricated cases brought against them and the media campaigns vilifying them.” He concluded on a more personal note: “I am not prepared to end my life in prison because of subordination to the Muslim Brotherhood. The current leadership is hopeless, although we have hope for the [Brotherhood's] youth. “Egypt and the Islamist movement will not overcome the current crisis until it moves beyond the Muslim Brotherhood, whose historical role has come to an end. On the other hand, I would willingly stand trial and face imprisonment and even death on charges unconnected with the Muslim Brotherhood, charges that pertain to our own activities.” Hussein's announcement of Istiqlal's decision to freeze its membership in NASL triggered a crisis within the party. Adel Al-Sherif, a member of Istiqlal's political bureau, resigned and unleashed his own attack against Hussein, accusing him of “allegiance to Hezbollah and the Iranian regime.” Al-Sherif said he had observed how much Hussein admired the Iranian revolution and Hezbollah: “This was evident even before the revolution. However, the exposure of his Shiite position and his contempt for the Sunni world and its revolutions are now obvious to anyone with eyes other than the eyes of Magdi Hussein, who still defends Bashar [Al-Assad] and attacks the Syrian opposition and the Free Army.” Responding to Sherif's charges, Istiqlal Vice-President Abdel Hamid Barakat said his party's decision to freeze its membership in NASL had nothing to do with the Iranian revolution or the Shia. The decision, he said, was driven by internal considerations and organisational hierarchy. While Hussein made one of the reasons for his party's withdrawal from NASL explicit — the Muslim Brotherhood's monopoly on decision-making within the alliance — we are left to infer another. The decision followed closely on the heels of the government decree to ban NASL. The party was abandoning a sinking ship. While the Istiqlal Party “froze” its membership, the Salafist Front announced its “official and final” withdrawal from NASL. In its statement, the Front noted that it had joined NASL at the outset but now saw the need to work within broader political horizons “based on extending bridges, aligning ranks and reaching consensus as long as this does not violate religious and national principles.” The statement did not detail the reasons the Front suddenly decided to leave NASL. Its spokesman, Mohamed Galal, said that revealing the reasons would do more harm than good. In remarks to the press, Galal said: “During the year and a half I was part of NASL I defended the principles of the alliance in the face of attempts to weaken it. I offered support and advice and exerted pressure to raise the ceiling and improve the movement as a revolutionary group that does not espouse an accommodating, reformist approach. “In this role we met with considerable success in light of given realities. But then I reached a point at which I was no longer able to offer what I once had and therefore decided that it was right to withdraw. “This does not mean that I agree with the Muslim Brothers on the choices it has taken. I stood by their side, but I did not melt into them or agree with all their choices. There are strategic and political decisions that no side can impose on another. Just as we cannot impose our views on NASL or the Muslim Brothers, we will not let the alliance bind us to choices and courses of action that do not conform to our vision.” Galal joined Hussein in praising the Brotherhood's younger ranks. “I fully realise that they are the hope for the future. Their influence on everyone, including the Front, will be pivotal.” Some observers suggest the Salafist Front's withdrawal from NASL was triggered by the Muslim Brotherhood's last-minute refusal to take part in the demonstrations the Front called for on 28 November. The references in Galal's statement to hopes held out for the Muslim Brotherhood youth, and the implicit criticism of the Brotherhood's leadership, lend weight to this contention. Other analysts suspect the spate of withdrawals has much to do with the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The problem with this hypothesis is that the popularity of Islamist parties has plummeted so drastically it is difficult to imagine them opening up a fresh page with the public at this stage, especially given the scourge of terrorism with which they are associated. One can only conclude that the parties that withdrew from NASL had finally reached the limits of their patience with the Muslim Brotherhood. NASL is indeed a sinking ship. For some time it has been little more than a clearinghouse for statements released on social networking pages. Meanwhile, its dominant member, the Muslim Brotherhood, will go on calling for protests that attract a few dozen diehards who confine themselves to side streets. Soon all of its friends and allies will have abandoned ship.
