We can not discuss the Egyptian role in the mid-1950s under Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership without giving pause to two historic decisions that had widespread repercussions on conditions in the Arab region and that were instrumental in triggering a shift in the entire international order from one phase to another. The first decision took place in late September 1955 and involved the determination to break the tripartite (US-Britain-France) embargo on arms sales to the region at a time when the Zionist entity was fully armed and continuing its assaults against Egypt and against Gaza, which at the time was under Egyptian administration. It was during the opening of a simple art exhibition (that was said to have been prepared especially for the occasion) that president Nasser announced that he had concluded a $250 million arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai had been instrumental in persuading Moscow to sell weapons to Egypt after Nasser had expressed this desire to him on the fringes of the famous Bandung Conference in 1955. Prague was agreed upon as the channel through which the Soviet Union would deliver the weapons to Egypt. The choice of the Czechoslovakian capital was significant in view if its long history of arming the Zionist army during and after the 1948 war. Egypt's move to break the Western monopoly on arms sales to the “Middle East” stunned Western capitals and their response was quick. The US Congress voted to refuse to contribute to funding the construction of the High Dam through the World Bank (the decisions of which were made in Washington, as they still are today). The Egyptian counter response was just as quick and delivered yet another shock. Within a few days after the World Bank announced (on 19 July 1956) that it would renege on its pledge to help fund the High Dam, Nasser (on 26 July 1956) announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, precipitating the French-British-Israeli tripartite attack against Egypt. The significance of these two historic decisions extends beyond the military dimension (in the case of the breaking of the monopoly on arms sales to the region) and the economic dimension (in the case of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal). Both combined expressed a boldly independent drive on the part of the Egyptian leadership headed by Nasser, opening vast horizons not only for the Egyptian national movement but also for the pan-Arab national movement and national liberation movements around the world. They simultaneously underscored the close interconnection between the national, Arab and international spheres in any project for development, liberation and advancement in Egypt and the Arab region. These two decisions have particular relevance today because Egypt has just experienced two developments of similar substance that are also likely to trigger wide-ranging repercussions that, in turn, may reinvigorate the Egyptian national movement, the Arab nationalist movement and the global liberation movement that is rebelling against the hegemony of the unipolar order that has afflicted the world since the 1990s. The first event is the $3.5 billion arms deal that Egypt has just concluded with Russia ending nearly three decades of US control over Egyptian armaments sources. Since the 1980s, the Egyptian armed forces had become so dependant on the US not just for its arms purchases but also for related training and consultancy services that this had become a means for US political blackmail whenever Egypt showed signs of independent urges. The second development relates to the success Egyptian economic bodies have met in their campaign to enlist public financial support for the Suez Canal expansion and development project. Within a few days, these organisations sold certificates for this purpose valued at around LE60 billion (or roughly $8.5 billion), of which $5 billion is needed to carry out the project of expanding the canal, after which work will begin on a global centre to furnish logistic services in the canal basin. As was the case with the two decisions taken under Abdel-Nasser, the significance of these developments extends beyond their immediate military or economic dimensions to embrace an important strategic dimension shaped by a resurgent independent will. The Egyptian reorientation towards Moscow began with Egypt's liberation from the system of Western dependency on 25 January 2011, a development that embraced other dimensions beyond the military, as Field Marshal Al-Sisi explained during his visit to Moscow when he was defence minister and then again during his first visit to the Russian capital after being elected president. Some analysts have noted that this step was part of a larger Egyptian movement towards capitals that had begun to complain of and rebel against the US-dominated unipolar order, such as China, India, Brazil and other South American countries, South Africa and other African Union countries. It is noteworthy that with respect to the latter, Egypt has begun to revive the “African sphere” regarded by Abdel-Nasser in his “Philosophy of the Revolution” as one of Egypt's “three spheres”, together with the Arab and Islamic spheres, in the post-1952 revolutionary foreign policy outlook. As for the decision to fund a mega project of the scale of the expansion of the Suez Canal through public subscription, the results have surpassed even the most optimistic predictions. It even brought a slight decrease in the exchange rate due to the fact that many Egyptians dipped into their dollar savings in order to purchase the Suez Canal certificates. This development has also shown that, in spite of the current economic difficulties, Egypt has huge resources that it can tap in order to stimulate economic growth and to lift the country out of a position to which it had been relegated for 40 years; namely, the position of having to solicit aid here and there while being kept in conditions of bare subsistence and degradation. The success of the campaign to attract Egyptian investment in a national development project puts paid to all “theories” that link economic growth with the flow of foreign investment. In general, this process works by attracting domestic savings into the branches of foreign banks and then directing those savings back to the countries of origin in the guise of foreign investment. It is one of the biggest con jobs in international financing. The national drive to fund the expansion of the Suez Canal from home is, in effect, a second “nationalisation” of that vital facility that Egyptians have long regarded as their “national oil”. Indeed, the canal has been the largest source of hard currency ($5 billion per year and due to increase considerably following the expansion). The success of the Suez Canal certificates is also indicative of a grassroots surge in the spirit of civic responsibility. The huge numbers of Egyptians that queued in banks to register their names in this drive was not that different in spirit to the lines of Egyptian volunteers who reported to Egyptian army camps in 1956 to defend their country and their canal from the Zionist and colonial invaders who were trying to seize control of it again. Just as Nasser chose a very modest occasion to unveil an earth shattering decision to break an arms monopoly, the Egyptian people took the recent two steps without great fanfare and in fraught circumstances characterised by successive bombings and attacks whose chief purpose is to distract Egyptians from the pursuit of their national priorities and to embroil their armed forces and the entire nation in petty civil wars meant to serve major foreign agendas. Nearly a year ago I had the opportunity to meet with the great Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in his home in Cairo and discuss with him Egyptian expectations from their country towards Palestine, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen and other countries. After I explained to him my view regarding a dialectical relationship between Egypt's role domestically, regionally and internationally, and its ability to undermine the schemes to destroy and shatter countries from within, he responded: “Do not rush Egypt. Everything has its own time and season. What counts now is that we have an elected legitimate leadership to which the Egyptian people have given a mandate to take right decisions in all fields.” I did not conceal from the eminent journalist and political historian my conviction in the need for national reconciliation and in the detrimental effects of exclusionist attitudes and policies. Heikal shares this conviction, as do all rational people in Egypt who agree that politics is like tango: it takes two. I felt heartened when I emerged from that meeting that day. Today, in spite of all the turmoil and the gloom, I believe that the optimism expressed by Heikal and likeminded people is justified. When Sadat signed the Camp David Accords we did not despair for Egypt. Nor did we despair after all the acts of negligence, corruption and despotism, and policies of dependency, that undermined Egypt's role and stature. Now, today, our hopes are revived in the prospects of Egypt's resumption of leadership of an Arab project that will complement and intersect with the projects of our partners in geography, creed, civilisation and a collective fate that seek an independent and stable region that forms a central regional order in today's world. With this cautious optimism I also reaffirm my solid conviction that these achievements need be fortified at home using security measures to remedy security flaws and political measures to remedy political imbalances. The writer is a Lebanese political analyst.
