When Barack Obama assumed power in 2008 he was determined to reverse George W Bush's concepts and strategies on foreign policy. He regarded the war on Iraq with its material and human costs as “disastrous”, hence his promise not to engage America and American soldiers in other conflicts. Obama tried to honour his promise in several emerging conflicts. In Libya, although he participated in the campaign against Gaddafi, his participation was described as “leading from behind” and not engaging ground forces. In Syria, regardless of his “red lines”, the Russian initiative on removing Syrian chemical weapons was an excuse not to attack the Syrian regime. In the Ukrainian crisis, he limited his response to economic sanctions. Obama's approach to these conflicts was criticised by his Republican opponents. He was accused of reluctance, weakness, degrading America's status and role in the world, leading to the frustration of friends and encouragement of adversaries. When the terrorist organisation Islamic State (IS) emerged in Iraq, threatening that country and the region beyond, Obama on 8 August addressed the nation asking the US Congress to authorise air attacks on IS bases in Iraq. Paradoxically, those who had accused him of weakness viewed his new step as “return to Iraq” and a reversal of his initial promise not to engage in additional conflicts. Before examining the view that Obama shifted his initial pledge of non-interference we need to discuss Obama's motivations to interfere against IS. From the beginning he was clear to define his intervention as “limited”, repeating that it will not include ground forces. In his address at the MacDill Air Force Base, Obama said, “As your commander-in-chief, I will not commit you and the rest of our armed forces to fighting another ground war in Iraq.” He has said that he will not act unilaterally but through a regional and international coalition. Obama's intervention came after IS had made significant gains in Iraq, reaching Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, as well as Irbil, where oil resources and American military and diplomatic assets are located. Other motivations include the notorious behaviour of IS, including the abhorrent killing of two American journalists. Intelligence reports have also indicated that IS might threaten American and European homelands, a possibility raised by British Prime Minister David Cameron, who said that IS could “attack us in our streets.” There was also the NATO summit in Wales on 4-5 August, which established a “rapid deployment force” against threats to its members. At the same time, internal developments in Iraq, including the removal of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, whose relations with US and Gulf States were strained due to his connections with Iran, facilitated America's arrival to train the Iraqi National Guard. With this background, we can argue that Obama tried to reconcile his initial concept of not engaging America again in foreign conflicts with responding to emerging threats, committing himself not to send ground forces and working with regional and international partners. The broader meaning and implication of renewed US intervention in Iraq, and eventually in Syria, raises the debate of Obama's strategy of “pivoting” to East Asia — a strategy that was interpreted as disengaging from the Middle East. I believe that Obama's intervention in Iraq supports scholars and analysts who have argued that the conflicts in the Middle East, which affect American national and security interests, will not allow the US to disengage itself from the region. The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
