The intensive US media coverage of the execution of journalist James Foley allegedly by the Islamic State presents terrorism in its purest form. In the footage that appeared on television and computer screens around the world, we see an image of consummate barbarism. The video imagery was fully dissected: the colours, the terrorist's British accent, the means of execution, the background, etc. The same applied to the words that preceded the slaughter. In those few moments we saw “pure” terrorism. It was chilling. By analogy, one could imagine it is akin to pure cocaine. A mere sniff sends the addict into oblivion, worlds away. In the case of terrorism, the scene encapsulates all others. This was hardly the first time ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) murdered an individual or massacred a group. This is what ISIS does, even against other terrorist groups like itself. After killing Foley, they killed 124 members of the Syrian army at Al-Raqqa Airbase in northeast Syria. In other words, the self-proclaimed “caliphate” is sending out signals to everyone — to Arabs and non-Arabs, to Sunnis and Shias, to Muslims and Christians, to people of all faiths and races. Those signals read: ISIS is bent on destroying the world. In fact, it is inviting the world to fight it. It is thirsting for an epic battle. If it wins, it will have conquered the world. If it loses, it will become an eternal legend. This is the major weak point in that new entity that has emerged in the centre of the Arab region. Until a year ago it was a small group with limited influence among dozens of other groups fighting over Syria. Now it seems like a group that has styled itself after the manner of megalomaniac Saddam Hussein, who not only imagined that he could get away with the occupation of Kuwait but also that the world would be too cowardly to do anything about it. Barbarity, murder and atrocities are a terrorist industry that sometimes ends battles before they begin, especially if the adversaries do not know how the balance of forces has changed. That was the secret behind ISIS's chain of victories. The Iraqi army was structurally weak because national armies do not just spring up — they exist within the framework of the state, which in the case of Iraq's Al-Maliki had been ripped to shreds. The Peshmerga are prisoners of the past. After more than two decades of being complacent, the Kurdish question was reduced to merely grabbing as much of Iraq as they could. The period also favoured ISIS. The US has inflicted a gaping Iraqi wound and is still uncertain whether the “Arab Spring” is a good sign or a new and chronic curse. The Middle East remains determined to produce ambiguous circumstances. The war in Gaza confirms that warfare is always present in a historical conflict. The climate was right. “Pure” terrorism was ready. ISIS stands at the top of the pyramid of the political use of religion. At the base of this pyramid is the Muslim Brotherhood, spreading an ideology founded on violence and the threat to use it. Above it come groups such as Gamaa Al-Islamiya and Jihad, which use violence against the “enemy at hand” and, at other times, against the “remote enemy.” Then comes the International Al-Qaeda Organisation, and, at the very top of the pyramid, ISIS, the unadulterated essence of a terrorist group. As occurred in the case of Saddam Hussein, the ISIS threat is sufficient for the world to be stirred into action. When the world is pushed to act the result is a foregone conclusion. Moreover, what ISIS takes as strategic assets are, in fact, strategic dilemmas. Its seizure of land and proclamation of a “state”, in fact, reduce its flexibility and increase its potential losses. It paid a heavy cost for its recent victories. It lost 500 of its fighters in the battle to seize the Raqqa Airbase. When we compare this with its previous losses in Iraq and Syria we find that the countdown to the organisation's demise may well have already begun, regardless of the victories, that are certainly only temporary. It is equally clear that although ISIS proclaimed a state, it has not performed any of the functions of a state while whatever money it has seized is only spent on itself. Nor should we overlook the fact that the organisation failed in its attempts to take Baghdad and Irbil. It only succeeded in making up for its losses there by seizing some other areas. The world has reached a consensus that ISIS presents a global threat and that this threat has to be met by armed force. Washington's use of its air force was the prelude to this campaign while the removal of Al-Maliki was an essential first step to making some reasonable arrangements in Iraq, to which testified the higher combat capacities of the Iraqi army and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Still, all this will not be sufficient to alter the balance of power. For that to occur there has to be an Arab-international coalition, as occurred in the war to liberate Kuwait. But the coalition will have to contend with far more complex conditions than those that existed at the time of the war to liberate Kuwait. At that time the theatre of operations was clear (Kuwait), the aim of the war was clear (liberation), the role of each participant in the operation was clear and when two commands were created they were fully coordinated. Today, the theatre of operations is much larger than the actual territory that ISIS occupies, because ISIS-like groups have proliferated in the region as a whole. Also, Iraq has more in common with a failed state than a real state. In Syria one is hard put to identify the boundaries between the opposition and the government. Then there is Lebanon, which is more in the nature of a state within a state. Such multifaceted conditions require close analysis and intense strategic thinking using ample information gathered on the ground and from the air and outer space. Equally important, there has to be close coordination with the rest of the world and the US above all. But Obama's Washington is very jittery about having troops on the ground again in this region. The fear is sensible as their presence here before was catastrophic for the region and for the US. However, Washington has other assets. It has abundant satellites, unrivalled abilities for monitoring, and aircraft, manned and unmanned. At the same time, the assets of this region are far from limited, bearing in mind that from a strategic perspective assets are only assets if they are deployed. The terrorist project in the Arab region must be defeated. Otherwise, the Arab state will collapse and once collapsed it will not rise again. We need knowledge, wisdom and determination to face this threat.
