“Operation Dignity”, the military campaign led by forces under the command of retired General Khalifa Haftar against Islamist militia groups in Benghazi, has brought the Libyan conflict to a new crossroads. That it has drawn the support of some military forces and some influential tribes in both the east and the west suggest that it is more in the nature of an attempt to alter the nature of the dominant relations in the interim authority by means “military/social” alliances or by a movement to build up a minimum level of social support for a military drive to impose political change. Otherwise put, we are looking at a sophisticated version of the type of military coups d'etat that occur in Africa. Initially, the aim of “Operation Dignity”, as Haftar and his supporters billed it, was to purge Libya of the militant Islamist groups the threat of which has proliferated inside the country and in the region as a whole. It then expanded to include political aims related to the nature of the current interim authority. Haftar now demands a freeze on the activities of the General National Congress (GNC), the formation of an emergency government, the creation of a civil assembly of judges to administer the state and supervise general elections. The broadening of the objectives reflects the political motives behind “Operation Dignity”. It seeks to build up a challenge to the mounting grip of the Islamist alliance (the Muslim Brotherhood, the former jihadist forces now involved in the political process and the Libyan Shield militias, which are made up of Islamist fighters the majority of whom hail from Misrata) over the interim government, especially since this alliance's success at narrowing the leverage of the liberal leaning National Forces Alliance by using militia pressure to force through a political isolation law in advance of the elections of July 2012. More recently, the Islamist majority extended the term of the GNC, which had been set to end in February, until December 2014. Then they succeeded in ousting prime minister Ali Zeidan and in appointing a new prime minister (Ahmet Maetig), said to be close to the Islamists, in spite of the challenge in the Supreme Constitutional Court against the voting process. Unfortunately, the Islamists' growing political clout was unaccompanied by remedies for the many problems that have plagued the interim phase, such as the secessionist trends in the south and east, the proliferation of militias and political violence, and the inability to build a national army strong enough to monopolise the performance of the country's security functions. The importance of the Haftar drive derives from the fact that it seeks to alter the balances in the domestic conflict by means of a broad alignment of forces united behind a single aim: confronting the Islamists in both their Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist factions. Towards this end, Haftar has capitalised on his popularity among former officers of the Libyan army, the regional anxiety of the mounting threat of Islamists in eastern Libya and his network of international relations. Haftar spent 20 years in the US after rebelling against the Gaddafi regime during the Libyan-Chadian war in the 1980s. In addition, after about two months of campaigning for support in eastern cities, Haftar succeeded in bringing on board a number of tribes in the east, such as Al-Obeidat, Al-Baraesa, and the armed wing of the federalist movement in Cyrenaica that manned the blockade of the oil exporting ports. In the west, he has the support of the Zintan tribes, the traditional foe of the Misrata tribes, and the Sawaeq, Qaqa and Madani brigades in Tripoli. The operation has also precipitated rifts in the national army. For example, the Tobruk air force brigade and the commanders of the Special Forces in Benghazi and of the military police and aerial defence forces in Tripoli have come out in support of the Haftar operation. This alignment around Haftar, although still in the process of coalescing and lacking a political framework, prompted the caretaker government of Abdullah Al-Thinni to propose suspending the activities of the GNC until general elections are held at the end of June. The GNC snubbed the initiative at first but then backtracked and announced that general elections would be held in June 2014. However, it also began to prepare for the likelihood of a protracted battle, especially around Tripoli, assigning the task of protecting the capital to the Libya Shield Central forces, which are allegiant to the Islamists. An anxious regional and international climate: Libya's domestic crisis was aggravated by regional developments, most notably those in Egypt after 30 June 2013. The fall of the model of Muslim Brotherhood rule through the military establishment's support of mass protests against the Morsi government not only forestalled the development of the lines of regional Islamist support for the “Islamist-Misrata” alliance, it also gave impetus to the idea that toppling Islamist rule would require forms of “military-social coalitions”. Naturally, it is important to bear in mind that the Libyan context is different due to the absence of a strong central army or national military establishment. Egypt, which has been affected by the instability in Libya, especially with the mounting threat emanating from eastern Libya as the result of arms smuggling, jihadist networks and the targeting of Egyptian workers in Libya, is closely monitoring developments in the Haftar drive there. Cairo's first step was to tighten border security in order to prevent the battles from spilling over into western Egypt. Algeria and Tunisia have undertaken similar precautions. Internationally, Western responses to the Haftar operation have been remarkably guarded, in keeping with the policy of non-intervention on the ground in Libya after the NATO participation in toppling Gaddafi, due to the heavy costs of engagement in a country teeming with militias. Perhaps this is intended to encourage the thinking among Western observers and analysts that Libya needs a central force in order to restore security and confront the mounting threats at home that also threaten regional and international interests. Thus, the reactions of the US and NATO have been limited to condemning recourse to violence and denying any contacts with Haftar's forces. At the same time, Washington has put limited forces in Cyprus on alert in anticipation of any emergency in Libya. It appears that Western nations are waiting to see how Haftar's operation plays out on the ground before declaring any stances. As “Operation Dignity” could be perceived as targeting the Islamist groups that attacked its consulate and killed its ambassador in Benghazi in September 2012, compelling the US to apprehend Abu Anas Al-Libi from Libyan territory, Washington at this stage is unlikely to want to encourage the idea that it is promoting parties that promote its interests. Directions of the Libya conflict after the Haftar drive: There are several likely scenarios for the Libya conflict after “Operation Dignity”. One is a shift in domestic balances of power sufficient to compel the Islamist alliance to negotiate and hold general elections. Naturally, this will be contingent on the ability of the operation to sustain its momentum and compel forces in the west to build up the pressure for the elections. At the present stage, this scenario appears the most likely. Firstly, Haftar's forces would face formidable challenges in a bid to seize control of the bastion of power in Tripoli. Secondly, the alignment behind “Operation Dignity” is unlikely to evolve from statements of moral support to active engagement in combat against Islamists, apart from some intermittent confrontations in Tripoli. A second scenario is that Haftar's forces succeed in taking control of the east and then seek to drive back the Islamist influence domestically, building the Hafter alignment into a broader national coalition that would seek the backing of regional powers with an interest in reducing the sources of jihadist threat, such as Egypt, Algeria and some countries of the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Such a drive would be a preliminary phase to what would most likely be a protracted battle around Tripoli in view of the difficulties that Haftar's forces would encounter due to the tribal/militia alliance that is supported regionally, and above all by Qatar. The third scenario is the inverse of the foregoing and based on the premise that Haftar's alignments fail, which could happen if his military operations lose their impetus in the east and domestic and regional support recedes. In such a case, the opposing alliance will draw on its relations with Islamist militias to weaken the Haftar drive, which would turn eastern Libya into a multi-fronted battlefield. The levels of instability and security deterioration would grow worse than they currently are and the Haftar drive would fail in its bid to reduce the influence of the Islamists. The writer is a political researcher at the quarterly Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya (International Politics) published by Al-Ahram.
