The presidential campaigns are heating up and the candidates have taken off their gloves. They have not begun to hurl punches at each other yet — it is too soon for that — but rather at the many things that they believe have to change in Egyptian life. Although the possibility that victory will go to the Nasserist candidate Hamdeen Sabahi cannot be ruled out entirely, the signs are that Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has the greatest prospects of leading Egypt from the presidential palace, more commonly referred to in the media as Ittihadiya Palace. Perhaps Sabahi's dreams of securing the votes of all the injured and wary, from the Muslim Brotherhood to the groups of youth of the first revolution and a number of political parties that have a lot of press but little knowledge of the people. The past is an important part of the legitimacy of this candidate, from the old Nasser era to the era of the 25 January and 30 June Revolutions. Al-Sisi has gone beyond this to addressing the general Egyptian public about the Egypt he would like to see: a state that has recovered its prestige, in which the poor emerge from their poverty, and that attains the place it merits. Al-Sisi's primary source of legitimacy is the future, the ability to shape it and the faith in the possibilities it holds and in the means to tap these possibilities, which is round-the-clock work and investment.
Both candidates have voiced their ideas and visions extensively since the campaigns kicked off. Perhaps the saying “speak so that we can see you” holds truer for Al-Sisi than for Sabahi. After all, the latter has been a familiar figure in the Egyptian political scene for decades, so there is nothing new. The idea is to return to days that he regards as happy ones while many others see them as wretched ones, filled with shame and pain. As for the former, his ideas are shrouded in a considerable degree of ambiguity. Part of this stems from the military background of the man. Another part derives from the complexity of the Egyptian condition within its matrixes of north and south, river and sea, urban and rural, and rich and poor. Indeed, the recent succession of revolutions has underscored the reality that Egypt is not as simple as many of its people and leaders had believed. It is very diverse in its social composition.
The Al-Sisi enigma led me in a previous article to discuss the four commonly perceived faces of the man: the cryptic Muslim Brother, the career military officer, the politician and the saviour. The first has been put paid to entirely. The second surfaces from time to time as an important historical background to have when leading the contemporary Egyptian state. While he maintains that the armed forces should not play a part in political and civil life, he has noted a reservation: that military man are best qualified to lead the border governorates. The third — political — face is a source of some confusion. Although he has served as deputy prime minister and minister of defence and military production, his political profile has been much higher than his official position. Often he outshone the interim president. The fourth is the face that will live for us a long time. The saviour, here, will not just be the man who rid Egypt of Muslim Brotherhood rule and who succeeded in turning a popular revolution into a constitution and a roadmap to the future. He will also be the leader who will assume the task of translating his ideas into reality within the next four or eight years.
Al-Sisi has no small amount of charisma. Physically, he is thoroughly Egyptian. His complexion is dark. His wide black eyes evoke a hint of sadness, or sympathy when called for, or wisdom when inspiration strikes. Nasser had some of these features. But the flashes in his eyes, the brassiness of his voice and his hand gestures all conveyed Pharaonic messages. Al-Sisi has not displayed such an aspect. Perhaps the time for that will come. But so far his predominant trait is concern for Egypt's future and the chief tool his hard work.
I recall that, in my first encounter with then General Al-Sisi, during a celebration in honour of the 9th Division on 28 April 2013, intellectual, media figures and artists attempted to press the need for the army to intervene to rescue the country from the Muslim Brotherhood. His response on that occasion, which had not been attended by a single Muslim Brotherhood member, was that the matter was not that simple. But he added that the question was also not what the army would do but rather what “you will do” to help Egypt forward. In saying this, Al-Sisi reminded one — in spite of the vast differences — of Mohamed Al-Baradei who when in February 2010 a group of intellectuals asked him to lead a revolution responded that, first, he wanted to see five million Egyptians in the street so as to make it possible to change the regime in Egypt. Al-Sisi also wants to see millions of Egyptians, but not in the street but rather in the fields, factories and other workplaces.
This brings us to the second instrument for progress: investment on the part of Egyptians who have the financial means and property. This instrument has the potential for stimulating a quantitative and qualitative breakthrough in the Egyptian condition. The third entails a blend of Arab and international cooperation arrangements, diverse in their scope and, more importantly, intensive in their timeframes and results. Al-Sisi is not weighed down by historical complexes of one sort or another; he supports a sturdy Arab alliance, on the one hand, and sophisticated relations with all countries in the world, including the US and Europe, on the other.
In applying these strategies, will Al-Sisi build Egypt's “Third Republic”? Will this republic differ radically from the July 1952 republic and from the Muslim Brotherhood republic? The answer is no. Egypt is far too complicated to be seen as moving through various forms of republics. This said; there would most likely be a considerable amount of change alongside no small degree of continuity. The exact blend between the two will depend on the time and prevailing conditions.
Al-Sisi does not appear to favour expansion of the public sector. When he said that he would not privatise the national press, he also said that he would not subsidise it in any way. It is also noteworthy that he gave his first television interview to a private and independent channel, rather than to a state-owned one.
Such signs suggest that the “Third Republic” will not function on the familiar mass mobilisation mode, but rather on a development mode. In this context, it will stimulate and hasten the reformist trends that had prevailed during the last years of the Mubarak era and blend these with a contemporary touch featuring a mixture of democracy and security. Exactly how all these equations will be applied on the ground will depend on the administrative team that will work with the field marshal and the programme of action that is to be carried out.
Perhaps more important is how the Egyptian people will respond to what Al-Sisi says. Will they roll up their sleeves and apply themselves to building and construction, in which Egyptians have always excelled in the past? Or will they see this as an extra burden weighing upon their already miserable circumstances? Perhaps this is the heart of the problem.
