At the time of writing, it appears 100 per cent certain that Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Said Hussein Khalil Al-Sisi will become the next president of Egypt. Since his name has risen in the Egyptian political firmament, he has become the subject of study and scrutiny by observers and analysts of all stripes. All are eager to get the exact measure of the man. One camp believes that he will be the last of the “pharaohs” to rule Egypt. Another group holds that he will be the first lead of Egypt's “Third Republic”, which is expected to be democratic this time. The First Republic was ushered in with the 1952 Revolution that overthrew the Mohamed Ali dynasty. It was ruled by presidents Mohamed Naguib, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. The Second Republic was inaugurated with the electoral victory of Mohamed Morsi, a senior Muslim Brotherhood leader, who was sworn into office on 3 July 2012. The Third Republic is in its formative phase, now that presidential elections are set to be held within the next few months. Although other political luminaries have been floated as possible presidential contenders, such as former chief-of-staff General Sami Anan, Popular Current leader Hamdin Sabbahi, Strong Egypt Party leader Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh and some lesser known figures such as former presidential candidate Khaled Ali, Al-Sisi's star outshines all. Indeed, he is miles ahead of the others in terms of popularity. So who is this man upon whom the largest and most populous Arab state is likely to depend? From what we know about him — which is not much — what can we foresee with regard to his presidency of Egypt and the Egyptian people? Four images of the man have surfaced during a short period of only a year. The first followed his appointment as minister of defence by the decree of 12 August 2012 issued by Morsi who had not served as a president for the Egyptian people but rather for those factions he fondly referred to as his “family and tribe”, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the extremist fundamentalist groups that it had bred. At the time, it was known that Al-Sisi and his family were very religious and, among liberals and revolutionaries in particular, this triggered suspicions of a sleeping Muslim Brotherhood cell in the army. The second image was that of the professional soldier, an image that gradually coalesced as Al-Sisi, in his capacity as defence minister, worked indefatigably to revive the combat capacities of the armed forces after their two years of non-combat tasks in the streets and squares of post-January 2011 Egypt. The field marshal's personal record of service sustained and promoted this image. The epitome of the Egyptian military career officer, he rose through the ranks from brigade commander, to infantry division chief-of-staff, to chief-of-staff of a military zone, to deputy director of military intelligence. With the latter position he became the youngest member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which assumed power following the overthrow of Mubarak. Al-Sisi's education, both in Egypt and abroad, in the US and the UK, was thoroughly military and it had superbly qualified him for military command. A year in the dreams and reminiscences of Nasserist parties and groups in Egypt began to weave the third image. The field marshal was endowed with the “charisma” that poised him for an aura akin to that which surrounded Abdel-Nasser. Certainly, the Al-Sisi songs and chocolates are a phenomenon unseen since Nasser's days. Also, the appeal of his oratory, with its Egyptian patriotic tenor with tinges of Arab nationalism, fits the bill, at least according to the Nasserist-minded groups. The fourth image differs from the three above and requires some closer inspection of his statements and, perhaps too, that experience one morning in April, last year, when he met with a large group of Egyptian writers, intellectuals, artists, opinion makers and civil society leaders. The meeting took place in a military base. It had become crystal clear that the Muslim Brotherhood was bent on transforming Egypt into a version of the Iranian theocracy in all but name, using towards this end a combination of violent operations and the stealthy consolidation of Muslim Brotherhood control over all facets of the state. At the time, many appealed to the commander general of the armed forces to step in to rescue Egypt from that fate. It was a desperate cry for help in the face of an ogre that was beginning to tighten its clutches. The general's reaction merits contemplation. He said that the armed forces was performing its duties and would continue to perform them and then asked, “but what are you doing?” The message was that the crucial issue was not what the leader would do, but what the whole of society — the people and their leaders — would do. Following this, his speeches and remarks were peppered with statements unfamiliar in Egyptian political life. He said that if he became president he would not allow Egyptians to remain passive. They would have to work day and night in order to live up to Egypt's expectations. He also said that if Egypt were truely the “Mother of the world” then Egypt would have to meet the standards of this world. He did not speak of miracles, but rather of the work and sweat that would be required and the spirit of selflessness and giving that would have to prevail. True, this fourth image — that of the “politician” forging his way forward with a new idea — is still vague. But its initial contours compel us to contemplate what the Egyptian presidency would be like under Al-Sisi's leadership. In the coming weeks and months, the field marshal will be penning a clearer picture of himself in light of his prospective presidency. The first portion will shed images that no longer conform or that are no longer valid. Certainly, he has long since put paid to that initial image, that some had entertained, of a clandestine Muslim Brotherhood member. However, he will also be required to send that image of the “professional soldier” to the background and to bring “the politician” to the foreground. After all, the legitimacy of the president after an electoral victory will be grounded on his status as a civil president in a civil state. If comparisons with George Washington, Charles de Gaulle and Dwight Eisenhower are to have any validity, then it must be borne in mind that the legitimacy of all those statesmen was grounded not in the military but in the legitimate institutions of government. As for the Nasserist image, this will probably be the most dangerous for the man in question. This is not just because of the strong lure this image has among certain political groups, parties and “revolutionaries”, but also because it belongs to a different era, one that has passed and left only painful memories. The “Third Republic” may only be a title. But we should not disregard the enormous potential. Much water has passed beneath the bridges over the Nile, which is awaiting a new chapter in its long history.
