“In the West, we think we know about Iran, but what we think we know is often misleading or simply false. Many people, even otherwise well-educated people, think of the Iranians as Arabs, but they are not. They speak Persian, an ancient language of Indo-European origin, like Latin, modern German and English. It has an elegantly simple grammatical structure, much more like that of German or English than that of Arabic,” Michael Axworthy surmises in his latest seminal study of Iran. Iran literally means “Land of the Aryans”, but like the ancient Aryans of India, these are contrary to received wisdom, not necessarily blue-eyed blondes as Adolf Hitler and the Nazis would have us believe. The term “Aryan” refers more specifically to a linguistic heritage. Arabic is classified as Semitic linguistically, an entirely different language family from the Persian of the Indo-Europeans. True, because Iran is a predominantly Muslim nation, over the centuries Persian has borrowed many Arabic loan words, primarily in a religious context. It used to be fashionable to say that Persian has lost its polish with the introduction of Arabic terms, but actually Arabic phraseology in Persian has enriched the language. Nevertheless, certain Arabic loan words have slightly, sometimes politically significant, differences in Persian. “Enqelab”, Arabic for coup d'etat, is rendered “Revolution” in Persian, for instance. Syntax remains resolutely Persian. Grammar, too, is distinctively Persian and so is the vocabulary. Iran has always been and always will be special. I am reminded of Axworthy's earlier oeuvre: Iran, Empire of the Mind. A sense of the sublime in this unique Muslim nation comes across clearly in Axworthy's work. The language and semantics apart, the author's almost photographic vignettes of certain memorable scenes in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran are astounding. Axworthy, after all, is Director of the Institute of Persian and Iranian Studies at the University of Exeter, Britain. His infatuation with this extraordinarily culturally unsurpassed land and its people is palpable. Yet, Iran was historically misunderstood. Since the Greco-Persian Wars of ancient times to the Islamic Republic, Iran was viewed in the West as the very embodiment of “Oriental Despotism”. Axworthy argues that this is a false impression. “Iran is often depicted as an aggressive power, but it has not waged a serious aggressive war since the time of Nader Shah, in the mid-eighteenth century, and its defense spending today is moderate to low for a state that size, not faintly comparable with that of militaristic states like the Soviet Union during the cold War, for example. Since the eighteenth century, Iran has fought wars, but normally defensive ones, notably the long devastating Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In that war the US and other Western powers supported Saddam Hussein in Iraq against Iran, in the belief that it was necessary to contain Iranian religious extremism. For similar reasons, the US later funded the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,” the author extrapolates. Nevertheless, to understand the political dynamics of contemporary Iran it is prerequisite to understand Islam, and in particular Shia Islam. “Religious law has a much wider significance in Islam than in Christianity and other religions. In principle, it is meant to govern every aspect of a Muslim's life. This gave clerics a role much more important than that of mere prayer-leaders in the mosque,” the author elucidates further. It is also imperative to grasp that Iran is essentially a developing nation. It is not a superpower, and it is perhaps linguistically-speaking Indo-European, but that does not make it a Western nation. Indeed, the entire purpose of the 1979 Islamic Revolution was to buttress Iran's Muslim credentials. “The monarchy was a parvenu regime that resembles other nationalist military dictatorships of the 1920s and 30s elsewhere with the difference that it came later to be seen in the eyes of many Iranians (somewhat unfairly) as tainted from the outset by the hand of the British in its establishment,” the author notes. Like Kemal Ataturk in modern, post Ottoman Turkey, the Shah of Iran wished to Westernize his country, to rid it of its conservative traditions, the parochial vestiges of a medieval Islam. And, so did his father. “Ordinary people wanted predictability, order and stability to return to their lives, and the chance for economic recovery. Reza Shah delivered that. His priority from the first was to build a modern army,” the author notes. Yet, the contradictions of contemporary Iran, like other developing nations with a Muslim cultural heritage, came into play. “South Tehran was full of young men, newly arrived from conservative-minded villages, with either no jobs or with poorly paid jobs. For many of them that meant little prospect of being able to afford to marry or support a family,” Axworthy stresses. “But if they paid a small fare for a shared taxi to the richer central and northern parts of the city, for nothing they could see pretty young women parading up and down the streets, dressed in revealing Western fashions , unaccompanied or with girlfriends, flaunting their freedom, money, beauty and, from a certain point of view, immorality and disregard for religion.” A predicament identical to young men in contemporary Cairo. “On boarding, garish posters of half-dressed women advertised the latest films: The threatening forwardness of the posters was increased by the large number of tough and sullen-looking young men hanging around,” the author observed. This could be nothing short of contemporary Cairo. “Status, and the lack of it, is not just about money, it is also about sex and desire. For those that had moved there from the country, Tehran was a place of aspiration, but in the late 1970s it became a place of resentment, frustrated desire and frustrated aspirations for many,” Axworthy elaborates further. This particular societal paradox brought the Mullahs, religious clerics, to power in Iran. And, this likewise catapulted the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt and several other predominantly Muslim nations. Religion, and religiosity had little to do with the political success of Islamists. Social injustice was the key component to the understanding the political success of the Islamists in nations like Egypt or Iran, Tunisia and Turkey. Religion was the solace of the poor and the frustrated unemployed or poorly paid youth with no economic prospects. Political Islam was simultaneously the consolation and the promise of the poor. The rich and powerful elite did not need God, so to speak. They needed nothing. The theme of political Islam runs deep in Muslim majority countries, like Egypt and Iran. So why did Muslim Brotherhood rule last for barely one year, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran reinvented itself periodically but essentially remained loyal to the Islamist ideal? But, then there was a question of timing. Egypt 2014 is not Iran 1979, and one cannot help but draw parallels. Iran was ripe for revolution. And, the author explains precisely why. The prologue persuasively sets the scene, and the first chapter “The Background”: Ma Chegoneh Ma Shodim, How Did We Become What We Are, is spellbinding. The final chapter, “Everything Must Change, So that Everything Can Stay the Same”, is captivating. Axworthy's narration of the episode of the hostage taking by student guards in 1979 is equally gripping. The holding of 52 Americans hostages for 444 days during the daring United States embassy takeover was unprecedented. The captors of the Americans were angry young men who had the nerve and the determination to take America on. It was one of the most humiliating moment of modern American history. To this day the incident has significant ramifications. Most recently, last week, the United States rejected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's nomination of Hamid Aboutalebi as Iran's chief representative at the United Nations on the pretext that Aboutalebi was among the student guards who held the Americans hostage in Tehran. The Iranian authorities and Aboutalebi himself have vigorously denied his implication in the hostage taking historical incident. The author's depiction of ex-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran (2005-2013) as something of a rogue precisely because of his anti-Western populist rhetoric is thought-provoking. The story of how Hashemi Rafsanjani “probably the most powerful president in the history of the Islamic Republic after his election in 1989” and his subsequent fall from grace is fascinating. The author has an uncanny knack for detailing the details. Axworthy's opinions are powerfully elucidated and elegantly put forth. The retelling of contemporary Iranian history is anything but tedious. His familiarity with the intricacies of Iranian politics is intriguing. The secret of how and why the Islamic Revolution lasted so long in Iran is revealed in a most compelling manner. The very ethos of the Revolution seems to incorporate the country's popular mood. The Iranian political establishment understand perfectly the need for change periodically, of course, within the confines of the concept of the Islamic Revolution. There is a semblance of democracy in Iran. That is precisely the balancing act the leaders of Iran have had to perform since 1979. Iranians know that they have a choice between the likes of hardliners such as Ahmedinejad and the relatively liberal silver-tongued Rouhani. So what exactly is going on in the corridors of power in Tehran? Velayat-e-faqih is a principle that continues to dominate the power politics in Iran. It is the theoretical foundation or the Islamic Republic. This implies that the secular authority of any non-Islamist government is illegitimate. The very term faqih, as the author explains, signifies a jurist, an expert in Islamic law and government and the two are inextricably intertwined. The author dwells at length on the personality and political significance of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder f the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even in exile in Paris, Khomeini exerted a powerful influence on events in Iran. “He was like an Old Testament prophet denouncing a sinful world from the wilderness; like John the Baptist denouncing the corrupt court of Herod from his underground prison”. Herod, was, for sure, the Shah. But, unlike the Biblical story, Iran's “John the Baptist” triumphed and it was the country's “Herod” who experienced a most unhappy end. Khomeini, of course, traced his lineage back to the Prophet Mohamed's daughter Fatima and her husband, the Prophet's Shia Muslim venerated cousin Ali. The descendants of the Prophet, like Khomeini, are denoted by the title “seyyid”, literally “master” and are distinguished by their black turbans. But, I was intrigued by Axworthy's elaboration of Khomeini's Indian origins derived from the fact that his grandfather had borne the name Seyyid Ahmed Musavi Hindi”. Khomeini's ancestors had apparently settled in the vicinity of Lucknow, perhaps the “most Persianized city in India”. The Shia rulers of Awadh, where Lucknow is located, were a dynasty of Iranian origin. But, back to the tale of the contemporary Islamic Revolution of Iran, the author highlights the terrible war between Islamist Shia Iran and secularist Pan-Arab Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The two men, Khomeini and Saddam Hussein were ideological opposites. Both, however, were determined and resolute on matters they personally deemed pivotal to their people's interest. It is important to bear in mind that a majority of Iraqis, some 60 per cent, are Shia Muslim, like Iranians. Saddam Hussein himself was Sunni Muslim, and the ruling clique in Baghdad was predominantly Sunni Muslim. “Between the murder of Ayatollah Mohamed Baqr Al-Sadr in April [1980] and the outbreak of the [Iraq-Iran] war [1980-1988 in which millions perished] there was sabre-rattling on both sides, After the murder, Khomeini called on the Iraqi people to rise up against the Baath regime and destroy it,” the author extrapolates. Taking his cues from the West, Saddam Hussein provoked Iran into open hostilities. “On 7 September an Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter destroyed one of five Soviet-built Iraqi Mil Mi-15 attack helicopters near Zain Al-Qaws. This incident was significant in a number of ways. It was the first air-to-air combat kill achieved by the new Tomcat fighter in any theatre. The F-14 was one of the most powerful and sophisticated air superiority fighters in the world at the time,” Axworthy denotes. And, the rest as the cliche goes, is history. The Iran-Iraq War was a tragedy of unspeakable proportions. “In the long series of Iranian offensives, with their propagandistic titles and numbers, Karbala-4 was perhaps the most miserable and wasteful. It was another offensive associated particularly with Hashemi Rafsanjani, but seemed to have been warned of the troop build-up by US satellite intelligence,” the author elucidates. The hidden hand of the West in this most destructive war was clear for all to see. Yet, how did the Islamic Revolution survive such a cataclysmic combat? Saddam Hussein's Iraq eventually collapsed in the aftermath of the catastrophe. Iraq, however, is not the subject matter of this seminal work. Iran is. And, the author explains how Iran survived the war. “So less than two months after Khomeini's death Iran had a new, conservative-aligned leader and a skillful centre-right/pragmatist president, along with the previous, leftist Majles [Parliament]. Some have called this convulsion in Iranian politics the Thermidor of the Iranian Revolution, thereby comparing it with the coup in July 1794 [in France] that ended the radical rule of Robespierre and Saint-Just, bringing in a period of reaction and moderation”. Axworthy's masterpiece does not focus exclusively on war, political intrigue and history. He also tackles several social issues, not least the position of women under the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Even Ahmadinejad had seemed to acknowledge the new status and political power of women when in 2006 he he attempted to organize a change in the rules by which women had been prevented from watching football matches. Strange though it may seem, this had been forbidden by religious experts previously because they believed viewing the naked limbs of the strapping lads would excite desire among female fans”. In short, it is asides such as this that make Axworthy's study read like a riveting novel.
