Family relations continue to be a vital political tool in revolutionary Iran, argues Mustafa El-Labbad* On the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution, the regional presence of Iran in the Middle East can easily be described to be at its greatest in modern times. Despite this, many characteristics of its political elite are still unknown to researchers and politicians alike. One of these is the deep influence that family ties have played in the formation of Iran's elite after the revolution. Throughout history, the institution of marriage has reflected a mutual recognition of a common identity that binds the two parties of this relationship, including the spouses' families. It also has additional dimensions and specificities in the Iranian context. Family relations and intermarriage between powerful Iranian families is still a crucial determinant in the creation of the Iranian elite. It constitutes an essential ingredient for the political rise of this elite. Due to the scarcity of scientific research and references on this important subject, this modest study aims to promote future in-depth research about the elite and its formation in revolutionary Iran. In this context, it is necessary to emphasise that the analysis of the characteristics of the political regime and the Iranian revolutionary elites cannot be done in accordance with the use of static theories, but must be based on the historical, cultural, and national particularities of Iran. Family relations have played a significant role in the formation of the Iranian elite compatible with the legacy of Iran's historical and cultural characteristics. Iranian culture represents a combination of national Iranian elements in addition to the Shia element, as well as a variety of other features derived from the geographical location and previous experiences of the Iranian nation. The conversion to Islam in the seventh century changed the features of social and cultural life in Iran, and created new political realities. However, many elements remain present in the structure of society and the social and cultural habits, or blended with the new elements making up the identity of contemporary Iran. The Iranian conscience is a unique combination of these elements, so we cannot talk about Shia Muslims, without considering Iran, and we cannot speak about Iranian culture without addressing the impacts of Shia Islam on it. Shia Muslims were persecuted in the majority of Islamic societies. This fact played a key role in the spreading of Shia Islam geographically, especially in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Iraq and the Levant. Due to the presence of Shia holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala in Iraq (the first being the burial site of Imam Ali bin Abi Talib and the third Imam Hussein bin Ali), Shias from various countries have gone there to get religious education. It was also a good place for cross-border intermarriages between Shia families of the region. Therefore, no one can easily distinguish the origins of famous Shia families, as many of them have branches in more than one country. For example, the Behbahani family is located in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and other Gulf states. The Hakim family, which became very important in Iraqi political life after 2003, cannot be classified as an Iraqi or Iranian family only. There are dozens of families in similar situations. Intermarriage is still an excellent social practice by powerful Shia families to establish influence in a country and expand it beyond its political borders. Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi's family was not an exception in the Iranian context. Intermarriage was an excellent mechanism for members of the political elite to acquire power or earn legitimacy. The Pahlavi family lacked historical roots to the "Peacock Throne", as Reza Shah Pahlavi, founder of the family was merely an officer in the Iranian army with no royal blood. Reza mir Banji, or Reza Shah, planned to establish legitimacy for his son, crown prince Mohamed Reza, via intermarriage with the oldest royal family in the Middle East at that time, the ruling family in Egypt. The late Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi married Princess Fawziya, sister of king Farouk of Egypt to enhance the legitimacy of the Pahlavi family in Iran and abroad. The royal marriage opened the door for another -- the marriage of Princess Ashraf, sister of the Shah, to an Egyptian citizen, Ahmed Shafik. This marriage put Shafik in a position to be the director of Iranian civil aviation, which was an important post in Iran, which lacked highways and modern transportation to connect its vast territories. The intermarriage of Iranian upper class members with relatives of the shah allowed them to obtain high functions and positions. For example, Ardeshir Zahedi, the son of General Zahedi, commander of the coup d'état against the democratic government of Mohamed Musaddaq, had married Princess Shahnaz in 1957 before he became ambassador of Iran to the United Nations and later minister of foreign affairs. After his divorce from Princess Fawziya, the Shah remarried twice: first Soraya Esfandiar, and then Farah Diba. Apart from emotional circumstances which accompanied those marriages, the marriage with the German-Iranian Soraya Esfandiar had a foreign policy dimension. It aimed to strengthen the relation between Iran and Germany politically and economically. Soraya was unable to produce a crown prince, so the Shah married Farah Diba, to get a crown prince on one hand and to maintain a balance between the ethnicities of Iran on the other hand. Farah Diba belonged to the Azeri ethnicity, the second largest after Persian in a multi-ethnic Iran. The Persian identity dominated politics and culture in Iran before and after the revolution; however, the Iranian state took this fact into account and always gave an important place in its upper ranking positions to Azeris to preserve the unity of Iran and its security. The Qajar family that ruled Iran from 1794 until the takeover of Reza Shah in 1925, belonged to the Azeris, while the clearly Azeri Safavid family ruled Iran from 1501 until 1736. Even today we can find many additional indications of the influence of Azeris in the Iranian state. The number one in the Islamic Republic of Iran is Ali Khamenei, an Azeri native. Family relationships and intermarriage were an excellent mean to stabilise the internal balances in the era of Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, and they remained important after the revolution, but had additional aspects. Family relations and intermarriage play a role in the reproduction of the Iranian elite and even the exclusion of some from the political arena. That does not mean that family ties play a pre-eminent role, but, they occur along with other factors. We should not undermine the influence of ethnic and regional factors, which also played a crucial role in the political life of revolutionary Iran. Because the population of Iran is composed of different ethnicities (Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Beluchis) this factor still plays a key role in defining the political elite. This does not mean that Iran's system is like apartheid, or that the political elite in revolutionary Iran is limited to Persians and Azeris. Ali Shamkhani, an Arab native, played a role in revolutionary Iran and held the post of minister of defence for years. There are other examples of Kurds and Beluchis, however the two big ethnicities are Persians and Azeris who still dominate the political scene in revolutionary Iran. The political elite in Iran was and still is dominated by Persians, who constitute about half of the population, followed by Azeris. Therefore, intermarriages in the era of the Shah were a means to achieve internal political goals, such as mitigating the national contradictions (the third marriage of the Shah), or to achieve political goals outside the country (his first Egyptian intermarriage and second German intermarriage). Intermarriage played a great role in shaping the history of revolutionary Iran. The father of Imam Al-Khomeini, founder of the Iranian revolution and its leader, originally hailed from India. Upon marrying an Iranian woman, he acquired Iranian citizenship that was inherited by his son, Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini. If this marriage hadn't happened, the whole history of Iran would have been different. Imam Al-Khomeini adopted the same Shia tradition of intermarriage: one of his nieces married the son of the prominent Shia Ayatollah Haeri Yazdi, given the title of "Marji Taqlid", the highest ranking clerical position of Shias around the globe, until 1937. Khomeini's granddaughter, for example, married Mohamed Reza Khatami, the reformist leader and brother of former President Mohamed Khatami. In addition, the eldest daughter of Khomeini married a member of the Ishraqi family, Jaafar Ishraqi, whose role in the Iranian oil sector was regarded as natural, despite Ishraqi's lack of any formal educational qualifications in the field. Furthermore, the former Iranian president Mohamed Khatami married a woman belonging to Al-Sadr family, which possesses considerable influence and clout in the Iraqi and Lebanese political spheres. Familial relations in revolutionary Iran differ from those prior to the revolution due to the rise of "political families", a social dynamic in which family members play a conspicuous political role together and in parallel to one another, as opposed to intermarriage before the revolution where only one or two members assumed such political salience. It is important to note, however, there still exists intermarriage among the ruling elite, most notably between the son of Khamenei and the daughter of Hadad Adel, as well as between the son of President Ahmadinejad and the daughter of his former deputy Mashaii. Thus, Iran has distinguished itself from its neighbours by virtue of an elite class whose constituents hail from virtually the same family, a situation which had previously been unknown in Iran. Conflict materialised among the supreme Shia spiritual authorities when the Iranian revolution took place led by Imam Khomeini. While his leadership adopted a political character, the influence of traditional Shia sources cannot be denied. The influence of these sources extended to a popular and doctrinal base, which did not threaten the sole power of Imam Khomeini's political and spiritual authority. His status as an undisputed political and spiritual leader did not change for even one day. This is due to the hierarchical infrastructure of other spiritual sources, all placed and categorised in their respective stations and ranks within Shia Islam, such as Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Kalpiqaniy. The role of intermarriage between families was an essential factor in the distancing of Ayatollah Shariatmadari from any potential competition; he would accuse his son Mohamed after the triumph of the revolution of a variety of ethical charges, which kept Shariatmadari from the spotlight in Iran. After the triumph of the revolution, Imam Khomeini, in 1983, appointed Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri as successor to the post of leader of the revolution upon the death of Imam Khomeini. The situation continued as such until two months before the death of Khomeini in 1989, when Montazeri was ousted from office for reasons relating to the shifting balance of power in Iran. Familial relations changed the face of modern Iran, the reasoning believed to stem from Khomeini's becoming Iranian, which also paved the way for the leadership of the imam separately after the success of the revolution, as well as the exclusion of his rival Shariatmadari due to the reservations of one of the members of his family. Familial dynamics were also pointed to as the primary justification for the overthrow of Montazeri and thus the emergence of the current political leadership of Ali Khamenei. Having returned to overthrow Ayatollah Montazeri, Khamenei made use of familial relations to justify his removal from power, justifying the policy and conduct of Mehdi Hashemi's brother, Mohamed Hashemi, son-in-law of Ayatollah Montazeri. Mehdi Hashemi was tried in 1986 on charges of spying for the United States and executed in a speedy trial. Mehdi Hashemi was considered part of the radical movement in revolutionary Iran, one of the most important opponents of the pragmatic wing of the Iranian power system. Because of this, the secrets of the "Irangate" scandal were disclosed to the world, concerning a deal under which Iran obtained weapons from the Reagan administration during its war with Iraq. The consequence was to undermine the prestige of Montazeri and, therefore, to justify his removal from power, demonstrating that personal reputation is not above reproach. Family ties are still one of the most fundamental justifications for the political roles played in Iranian politics. This applies to political figures from the second generation of the revolution; among the most important instances of this is the family of the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His brother Hojjatoleslam Hadi Khamenei is considered by the reformists and the editor of a number of Iranian publications to be among the most important of the Iranian elite. This may have been offset by a split with Badria Khamenei, his sister, and her escape with her husband to Iraq during the rule of former president Saddam Hussein, who used family ties to Badria to weaken the influence and prestige of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran. Badria escaped, but this is not mentioned in the media. Rafsanjani's family embodies the greatest example of the role of family ties in the Iranian elite, where the head of the State Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is rector. Sheikh Rafsanjani is one of the most important pillars of the current Iranian regime and one of the most influential people in revolutionary Iran, where there is volatility in the upper echelons of the Iranian state. His daughter, Faizah Hashemi, is one of the most famous women in Iran, and has a significant role in Iranian politics. The president's brother, Mohamed, is the former director of the Office of the President of the Republic, the current executive director of the Expediency Council, while his brother, Muhsin, runs the businesses for the family in Iran and outside as well. It is possible to review the role of extended family relations in the third generation of the revolution through the examples of Mohamed Khatami, Iran's former president, and Ali Larijani, the speaker of the current parliament, and perhaps the most promising candidate for presidential elections next summer. Despite the diversity of each man's political leanings, both are at the centre of Iran's political system. Khatami and Ali Larijani possess similar academic and familial qualifications, as both are sons of a senior cleric, the first, son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khatami, and the second, son of Ayatollah Hashem Amoli. Both married within religious families, the first marrying the daughter of the sister of the famous cleric Moussa Al-Sadr and the second, marrying the daughter of Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari. The presence of the two families is not limited to just royal and religious descent, but Reza Khatami, brother of former President Khatami, is considered the historic leader of the Participation Front, the largest reformist party in Iran. Ali Khatami, the younger brother served as director of the Office of the President during the period of Khatami's presidency, while his sister Fatima was elected a member of the Municipal Council by Khatami Ordekan, a Sunni Muslim family. On the other hand, Ali Larijani, is involved in the public life in Iran, as his brother, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, is a member of the Supervisory Board of the Constitution, the Council. The second brother, Mohamed Javad Larijani, is a university professor and director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics and Mathematics in Tehran, as well as a former deputy in parliament, a former president of the Research Council of the Iranian parliament and a former deputy minister of foreign affairs. The third brother is Bagher Larijani, who holds the office of president of the University of Tehran medical faculty, and the fourth brother Fadel Larijani is cultural attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa. Intermarriage is not only a political tool of the major players of the Iranian Revolution, but extends to some of the leaders of the Iranian opposition abroad. The evidence for this link was made prominent by Iranian opposition leader Abu Hassan Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Massoud Rajavi, leader of the regulators "MKO", married the second daughter of Bani-Sadr. After the failure of this marriage, he married Rajavi Maryam Rajavi, who was appointed by her husband to the office of "President of the Republic in exile". In this context we also note that Maryam Rajavi, in turn, belongs to the Azerbaijani nationality which is important in the balance of the Iranian state. It was no surprise that in the first government formed by the Mujahideen, the political opposition in exile in Hedayet, was the grandson of the great Iranian nationalist leader Mohamed Musaddaq, thus granting legitimacy to this government in exile through family ties. It could therefore be argued that intermarriage remains vital among the Iranian elite as a social tool to achieve political goals, and that after the revolution came about there emerged further "political families" that characterise the political elite of Iran today. Intermarriage has played a significant historical role as a social tool to achieve political objectives. This was shown in the three marriages of the former shah. Familial relations continued to play a significant role in the production of Iran's political elite after the revolution, from the first generation of the revolution represented by Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri and Ayatollah Shariatmadari, through the second- generation leaders, Ali Khamenei and Sheikh Hashemi Rafsanjani, to the third generation represented by former president Mohamed Khatami and Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani. The Iranian revolution resulted in the phenomenon of "political families", with no break with the legacy of the historical revolution of Iran with regard to the role of marriage and family relations in the stabilisation of political relations within and outside of Iran, or in the formation of the elite, but these relationships have developed differently. Revolutionary Iran might distinguish itself from the rest of the history through the emergence of the role of the "political family", whose members play parallel roles in the upper floors of the state, represented in the relation between the families of Khatami, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. The ruling elite in Iran is considered among the most highly educated class in the Middle East; its education is no longer limited to theology, as the case may have been after the triumph of the revolution. Obtaining a doctorate degree from Western universities has become commonplace. Increasing opportunities for individuals belonging to the "political families" have meant the emergence of new conditions, the most important of which include improved political performance and the attainment of higher education, as well as involvement in the "history of struggle", that is, engagement in the process of revolution, especially, participation in the Iraq-Iran War, as well as belonging to one of the major ethnic groups in Iran. * The writer is director of the East Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies, Cairo. This article is based on a paper presented at the conference "Thirty Years of the Iranian Revolution", Rutgers University, USA, 6 February 2009.
