A few weeks before the consultative Gulf Summit, the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had met on 17 April in Riyadh. The meeting was supposed to follow up on the implementation of decisions adopted at the last Gulf Summit, hosted by Kuwait at the end of last year. Kuwait holds the rotating presidency of the GCC until the end of 2014. The Riyadh ministerial meeting convened in a tense situation within the GCC after Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Doha early March in protest at what they termed Qatar's failure to comply with a cardinal principle in the GCC: namely, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other member states and its failure, as well, in reigning some leading members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, that had found refuge and protection in Doha. The three countries complained, and rightly so, that the Qatari capital was being used as a springboard to destabilise not only Egypt but also the UAE and — ultimately — Saudi Arabia. The Qatari position became more delicate when the Saudi government announced immediately after recalling its ambassador from Doha that it had decided to put the Muslim Brotherhood on its list of terrorist organisations. With Kuwait in exercise of the GCC, diplomatic circles expected that it would play a significant role in trying to negotiate a way out of the serious dilemmas that faced Gulf States and that were the direct result of changes that have been taking place in the Arab world for the last three years, especially in Egypt. As a matter of fact, the foreign minister of Qatar said immediately after the announcement of the recall of the ambassadors from Qatar that the differences were not centred around questions and issues within the Gulf, but rather they had to do with the situation in Egypt after the 30 June Revolution. All Gulf countries had stood by Egypt with the exception of Qatar, which did not oppose publicly, at least, the toppling of the Brotherhood regime but opened the door for the fugitives of this organisation to settle in Qatar for a while, allowing them, too, to wage a war from afar against the new authorities in Cairo through the Al-Jazeera channel, a channel that has become the mouthpiece of the Brotherhood. Not only did Kuwaiti diplomacy play an important role in working out the differences within the Gulf Council, but I believe the talks that President Barack Obama had conducted with the Custodian of the Holy Shrines in Saudi Arabia on 28 March 2014 played, indirectly, a role in pushing the Qatari government to change its position and start a process of reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. And with Egypt as well, albeit, in the latter case, the shift will be slow and gradual and its success will depend on how the Egyptian government and media will manage this period of transition. It is to be noted, as an example of the slow changes in the Qatari positions, the fact that the firebrand Youssef Al-Qaradawi, the preacher par excellence of the Brotherhood, stopped giving Friday sermons from Doha for the last six weeks. The Saudi-American summit of March was a turning point that helped persuade the Qataris that the winds of change blowing in the region necessitate a repositioning on their part concerning two main questions that will define Middle Eastern politics for the next few years. The first is related to the future of the Muslim Brotherhood; the second is related to post-June Egypt, which is due to elect a new president at the end of May. In this context, it is interesting to note that the emir of Qatar said during his first tour in some Arab capitals — which included Amman, Khartoum and Tunis early April — that Qatar had begun to change its policies with regards to Egypt but they were taken by surprise by the campaign orchestrated by the Egyptian media against Qatar. The meeting in the Saudi capital on 17 April and the decisions adopted therein could, if they would be adhered to and respected by all member states in letter and spirit, pave the way for the return of the Saudi, Emeriti, and Bahraini ambassadors to Doha. The date of their return will depend, to a large extent, on how Qatar will deal with those decisions and how fast. According to the communiqué issued by the Secretariat General of the GCC after the meeting, the member states have agreed that the policies of one member country should not adversely impact on the security and stability of other members without prejudice to the sovereignty of each. Also, the meeting reviewed, in a comprehensive way, the way member states approach reaching decisions with regards to foreign and security policies. They stressed their commitment to adopt decisions in this respect by unanimity. There is no doubt that the decisions taken by the six member countries are very encouraging from an Egyptian point of view. The rift among them would not have served Egyptian interests in the medium and long term. One important principle in Egyptian foreign policy has been to cultivate strong relationships with Arab Gulf countries. For the simple and obvious reason that the Gulf region represents a strategic depth for Egypt. In other words, Egyptian national security cannot be separated from the security and stability of Arab Gulf countries. And this calls for an Egyptian diplomacy that is open to all member states in the GCC. It is counterproductive from the standpoint of vital Egyptian interests to have less than cordial and friendly relations with any member state in the GCC. The Riyadh Document, as the decisions of 17 April are called, is vital to Egyptian interests and we should hope that the GCC turns the page. The next consultative Gulf Summit this month in the Saudi capital will be the crucial test of the successful implementation of this important document. The writer is former assistant to the forgeign minister.
