Egyptian territories were fully liberated from Israeli occupation 25 years ago, but what has this meant for the country's regional profile? Dina Ezzat quizzes out Abdel-Moneim Said, director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, and Osama El-Ghazali Harb, editor of the Al-Ahram's international relations quarterly, Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya A close associate of the regime -- something that hasn't prevented him from being critical -- Abdel-Moneim Said is a political analyst who always has Egypt's interests in view. To this end he will not balk at promoting closer ties with Washington or, indeed, Tel Aviv. His capacity for challenging, indeed shocking opinions finds particularly cynical expression in debates with the Nasserists, staunch opponents of peace with Israel, but his thought will often transcend the scope of such arguments. "To start with," he says, "I have issues with the notion of Egypt's regional role -- a primarily Nasserist concept popularised in the writing of Gamal Hamdan, whose argument was that Egypt's geographical position implied political power." Not, according to Said, a very convincing line of thought: "For many centuries after the demise of the Pharaohs, Egypt had little or no role in the region; and that state of affairs lasted 6,000 years. I don't think it's right to overemphasise this idea." From the point of view of political science, what is more, Said the scholar is less comfortable with talk of a regional role than "an effective foreign policy serving interests". While it is possible and beneficial to debate "the effectiveness of a particular policy", the same cannot be said for "the rise and fall of a regional power". The impact of liberation, in other words, has less to do with the drive to formulate a regional position than with strategy. Putting an end to military confrontations that exhausted the country's resources for decades, the liberation has rather secured the territorial integrity and safety of the borders and freed Egypt of its reputation as a country with occupied territories -- even, as others argue, if Egypt came to be seen as less influential in the process. A quarter of a century has passed without any part of Egypt being occupied: in itself, Said argues, this is a sign of status. He concedes that liberation brought Egypt closer to both the US and Israel, but rather than this being an issue, he says, it should be seen in perspective as largely behind the elimination of a large part of Egypt's foreign debt; such ties have enabled the country to secure financial aid and sign economic agreements, increasing investments and employment. "Besides, when all is said and done, contrary to the arguments of those Nesserists whose arguments prove nothing but their endless nostalgia for the image of Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt is as much of an agenda setter for the region today as it was in the time of war." In either instance, Egypt started, to be followed by the Palestinians, Jordanians and finally Saudis. Said also argues that, since it would be impossible to eliminate the chance, however remote, of an Israeli attack on Sinai, today such an attack would be "no walk in the park" for the Israeli army -- far less so than it was in the 1960s. This is partly due to Egypt's ability to develop its defence apparatus and investment in the development of Sinai: "25 years ago the population was no more than 180,000; now it is one and expected to reach three million in the next few years." And there is more to Egypt's role than Israel, he argues: Egypt set the agenda for relations between the state and religious authorities, for democracy and political reform, for the fight against terrorism. It is a non-starter, he says, to say that peace with Israel -- the incumbent liberation notwithstanding -- left Egypt in a cocoon, without influence. Indeed greater regional influence on the part of Arab capitals like Riyadh, whose moral and financial weight has recently allowed it, would not go entirely amiss: such developments do not worry him; none of it is strategically at the expense of Egypt's supposed role, and in the final analysis Saudi Arabia's active interest in Gulf politics, the situation in Iran and Iraq is rather "more seasonal than permanent". Cairo should make time for internal affairs anyway, especially at a time when foreign interests seem to be secured. Internal political and economic reform could only act to enhance Egypt's status. Today more than ever before, Said believes, the average Egyptian takes more interest in internal than in regional affairs. This is no indication of a diminished sense of self, rather of the fact that such inward-looking attitudes are long overdue.
