Egyptian territories were fully liberated from Israeli occupation 25 years ago, but what has this meant for the country's regional profile? Dina Ezzat quizzes out Abdel-Moneim Said, director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, and Osama El-Ghazali Harb, editor of the Al-Ahram's international relations quarterly, Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya Osama El-Gazali Harb, an establishment figure, has more recently been among the regime's staunchest critics; the reason for this is that he fell out with the National Democratic Party's influential Policies Committee, of which he had been part, and is now planning on starting his own party. He has therefore paid less attention to foreign policy than he might in recent times, but his views on the political apparatus have interesting implications for Egypt's regional future: he believes the state should have more influence, whether at home or overseas. The ebb of Egypt's influence is not, he contends, irreversible; he feels it is something that must be conceded, however, and sooner rather than later, if Egypt is to resume its once uncontested position as the leading Arab state. Harb feels it is important to register the connection between liberation and inward-looking political attitudes, clearer than ever in the last five years: "Nobody on earth could question the significance of the liberation of Egyptian territories -- a truly glorious feat." The question is, rather, what Egypt has done with it. Instead of reinforcing its influence following a difficult war and a decent peace treaty, Egypt let things slip: "Peace ushers in prosperity and influence. This is the traditional lesson of history. But in the case of Egypt the story has been more complex." Internal and international as well as regional factors all had a part to play in preventing Egypt from turning peace to strength, Harb argues. Decision-makers, for one thing, have embraced a somewhat overblown concern with the consequences of a confrontation with Israel or the US -- a fear that has its roots in 1967 and prompts too cautious an approach. "Such caution has fluctuated over the years," he says, "but in the last five years it climaxed beyond reason, reaching an incredible degree of excess. Certainly, liberation merited some degree of caution, to avoid a relapse, but careful foreign policy is one thing, an excessively restrictive code of conduct that eventually results in Egypt abandoning areas of traditional influence quite another." Aside from the cumulative effects of excessive caution, Harb is also concerned about excessive closeness to Israel and the US -- and the incumbent regional isolation: "I for one will not hesitate to declare that I was wrong to support the peace treaty that resulted in the liberation of Egyptian territories. I was wrong because it was this peace treaty that gave way to the isolation of Egypt from the Arab community, which lasted officially until the mid-1990s. On resuming connections with the Arab world, Egypt has not assumed the leadership position it had held before 1973." All of which provides Harb with food for thought: "Maybe it would have been wise to stop and think about going ahead with a unilateral deal. I can see the impatience of the Egyptian leaders of the time to liberate their territories -- a legitimate sentiment. But Egypt should have made more effort to convince other countries whose land was occupied to conclude peace settlements, which they eventually did." It could have given such countries more time, even at the cost of delaying liberation for a few years. Rather than the "comprehensive peace bargain", Egypt opted for a partial and confused peace process. By the time Egypt resumed its Arab role, Arab states were doing exactly what it had done: pursuing unilateral peace deals with Israel and reaching out for American help at the expense of inter-Arab ties. "The result is the situation we see today all across the Arab world." The fall of the Soviet Union and the spread of unchecked US hegemony further compounded the situation: playing to Washington's tune became inevitable not only for Egypt but for all, including stronger Arab states. For this and other reasons Egypt did not stand to gain much from the liberation of its territories. Egypt should have made more of that gain on the internal front: earlier, more radical reforms. These would have afforded the inner strength necessary for confronting increasingly difficult foreign-policy challenges. By hesitating on both internal and external fronts, Egypt not only compromised its regional influence but left democratisation and development to the last minute. "And here we are 25 years on, having failed to achieve what we should have achieved and what the nation deserves." Harb has many disappointments: Egypt's modest growth rates compared to other regional countries, for example, Israel's being the highest, or else Egypt's significantly reduced capacity for intervention in regional crises; by way of example, he mentions Palestine and Sudan. Still, Harb is keen on affirming a vision of hope: "It is time to rethink our attitudes, re- conceptualise our position." To this end, he feels, it is necessary to reform Egypt's foreign policy, especially with reference to Arab-Israeli relations, an arena in which Egypt must develop from a facilitator to a patron of peace-making. He also hopes to see more daring, "more profound" moves in the direction of democratisation. Without a firmer foreign policy and a more enlightened internal agenda, liberalisation will remain an opportunity missed.
