The term “emerging generation” was coined in the Nasserist era to describe those born around the 1952 Revolution and that were raised during the 1950s and 1960s. This generation was supposed to represent the outcome as well as the future of the 1952 Revolution. Put differently, the new or emergent generation represented the masses that had a stake in the continuation of the revolution. In general, the vast majority of this generation received free education up to university level, and at the same time was guaranteed employment in the government or newly created public sector. Accordingly, the emerging generation became subject to a process of intense political indoctrination spanning from primary school to university, not forgetting the role of the mass media in shaping the consciousness of the entire population, including the emerging generation. Yoav Di-Capua highlighted that, “Egypt's new revolutionary regime not only acknowledged the importance of the new generation but with characteristic enthusiasm did everything at its disposal to conscript youth for its cause.” Many joined the Arab Socialist Union, then the sole political organisation, particularly its Youth Association dedicated to identifying and nurturing new leaders who could take the responsibility of continuing the mission of the elder generation that led the 1952 Revolution. Haggi Erlich has identified a cluster of ideological, practical and institutional reasons for the strong link between the Nasserist regime and university students throughout the 14 years of Nasser's rule. A striking example of the strong association between Nasser and the emergent generation was the latter's positive response to dramatic changes in the military conscription system, introduced shortly after the 1967 setback. Under the new system, university graduates were required to join the military corps for indefinite terms. Michael Barnett mentions that, “The only real protest emerging from the new policy did not oppose service per se, but rather objected that such military service was not matched by political liberalisation.” In fact, the Vanguard Association of the Arab Socialist Union was a major pipeline through which passed many of those who occupied high calibre political positions during the rule of both of Anwar Al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Yet typically, emerging generation representatives did not find their way to becoming new leaders of the post-1952 Revolution socio-political order. The term “mezzanine generation” has been coined by thinker Mustafa Al-Feki to describe the desperate situation of the emergent generation failing to gain leadership of state and society. Numerous factors contributed to the derailment of the emerging generation and its failure to achieve its purported mission. Disillusion with the Nasserist project in the aftermath of 1967 setback was a major reason for some sectors within the emergent generation to desert the whole Nasserist project, if not the entire era, finding solace in a nascent Islamic fundamentalism. Typical examples of this trend are Khairat Al-Shater and to a lesser extent Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh. The latter among many other Islamists eventually joined the Muslim Brotherhood, the historical adversary of Nasser, his regime, and his project. By the same token, growing numbers of what could be described as “dissidents” identifiably lost confidence in the regime, its policies, and even its revolutionary credentials. The famous demonstrations of 1968 were a clear example for such rising tensions in one of Nasser's strongholds. Important to mention that many of the emerging generation fought in the 1973 October War, where their education was essential to coping with the sophisticated arms introduced after 1967 setback. In effect, the October War was the last victory of this generation. Another reason for the derailment of the emerging generation pertains to the 1970s, with its turbulent and massively changed political environment, particularly with the de-Nasserisation moves led by Sadat's regime. It was not easy for many of the emergent generation to see their dreams of Arab unity, socialism and freedom dashed under slogans like “Egypt First”, the “Open Door Policy” and strategic partnership with the new American friend. A few, like Ahmed Abdallah Rozzah and Hamdeen Sabahi, remained categorical opponents to Sadat's new orientation, while suffering deliberate exclusion from the ruling regime. Sadat's era dispersed and displaced many such potential leaders, with his insistence on developing a new political and economic elite that had a visceral hatred for Nasser's era. Moreover, such new elites, especially the stars of the Open Door Policy era, have had vested interests in further tarnishing Nasser's era. In sum, Sadat's era represented not just a retreat from Nasser's policies but also laid the foundations for a deeper change in the value system of many members of the emergent generation. University students for long remained a major force for the Nasserist regime. As a result, Sadat's regime spared no effort in building up the Islamists as a force that could counterbalance the Nasserist trend within university students during the 1970s. Many belonging to the emerging generation became trapped between the pressures emanating downward from the regime with its coercive policies, inward from the Islamists, and from below, as exerted by the suffering masses. The 1977 food riots represented a major confrontation between Sadat's regime and many such sectors of the emerging generation. Sadat's policies alienated growing sectors within the emergent generation. Ironically, and tragically, Sadat was assassinated by one of the emerging generation that became alienated not just from the Nasserist project but also from the history of modern Egypt, if not the whole of human civilisation. Mubarak's era added further exclusion to the emerging generation. Obliteration of the political horizon, particularly in the last decade of Mubarak's long tenure in office, overtly confiscated the prospects of potential leaders. Few true leaders have ever had a real chance to self-actualisation, if not just to express their competencies and talents. Highly significant in this direction has been the case of Ahmed Abdallah Rozza, the highly charismatic leader and Cambridge graduate, who passed away in the aftermath of a shocking loss in the 2005 parliamentary elections. The resulting generation gaps in leadership became so serious that the pipeline providing leaders previously virtually dried up. Accordingly, it should not have been a surprise that the vanguard of the 25 January Revolution belonged to an utterly different generation. Many of the emergent generation's leaders and its masses were predominant in the revolutionary corps. However, the revolution has, for a variety of reasons, lacked leadership as well a coherent ideology that could act as tool to sustain the revolutionary momentum. On 15 January 1919, Nasser was born. The transformations he introduced to Egypt's state and society have been tremendous. Casting his shadow still on the political scene, whether direct or indirect, Nasser was a larger than life leader. The story of the emerging generation, as reflected in the events of the June 2013 revolution, remains unfinished, particularly with the near consensus on identifying army chief Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi — belonging to this generation — as the ideal candidate for the next presidential elections. The writer is a political analyst.
