"I hope to be exempted." The above is a widespread wish for many youths between the ages of 18 to 30. Military service is an obligation for all Egyptian men, who must report for duty before their 30th birthday to see if the army will take them. Before conscription, many wish to avoid this duty due to the long time commitment it represents: from 18 months to 3 years, depending on the level of education of the draftees. After completing their service, however, many of these young men are proud of their service, what they have learnt and their endurance during conscription. One commented: "It makes you a real man; you became part of a great institution." Many young men would share the same sentiments about belonging to their country's military; going through conscription experience gives them some sort of a shared identity. Today, Egypt has the biggest military in Africa; its army, navy, air forces and the air defence force comprise approximately 468,000 soldiers, according to the website of the armed forces. Since 30 June the military's return to the political scene has been a controversial and divisive issue among the people. There appears to be a great number, estimated in the millions, who are in favour of the military's ouster of president Mohamed Morsi. Simultaneously, another crowd, mostly from the Muslim Brotherhood, rejects the military's invention, dubbing it a "coup" and challenging it through holding sit-ins and organising marches to demand the return of the elected president. This problematic situation challenges the image the military has acquired overtime. This article looks into the history of the military and how it is perceived today. How the image developed Since the Pharaonic period, Egypt has maintained a regular army with its own culture and traditions. Inscriptions on monuments attest to ancient battles, victories and expansionist campaigns fought and launched by the army. Despite times of rise and decadence, the established image of the strong Egyptian military has lasted for millennia. Its image has gone through many incarnations, particularly during Egypt's modern history. After the British invasion in 1882, Egypt's military was weakened and its competence dwindled. Resistance and attempts to restore independence came to no avail until the 1952 coup d'etat, when the military suddenly took centre stage in national affairs. One of the principles of 1952 coup was to establish a strong national army. The military's image was reinvigorated as a national institution and as a founder of the modern Egyptian state; its leaders, the Free Officers led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser were seen to have abolished the monarchy, terminated the British occupation, ended feudalism and achieved social justice. Mohamed Kadry Said is a retired major general and head of the military studies unit and technology advisor at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. "[The army] represented independence from occupation, and it was composed of Egyptians coming from the middle class, not the upper and aristocratic classes, like before 1952. This composition is central in understanding why the army is seen as a representative national entity," he explains. According to Said, the popularity of the military and the patriotic image it gained was derived mainly from the Free Officers and particularly Abdel Nasser who had nationalistic rhetoric and a social agenda that made people believe in him and his vision for the country. "The Free Officers were all well-known figures to the Egyptian public. The masses memorised their names, followed their news; they knew about the leaders of the military because those leaders were part and parcel of the political scene," said Said. However, this status did not mean people were blind to the injustices and the mismanagement that took place under the army's rule at that time. Alia Mossallam is an oral historian based in Cairo whose research documents Nasserite Egypt. "Contrary to popular information, the image of the military over time was not homogenous throughout Egypt. For example, people in Aswan were deported to build the High Dam and their practical experiences were bad despite how the dam was portrayed as a national project for Egypt initiated by President Nasser," she says. During this period, the military was involved in many different social, economic and political fronts, including the process of land reform, developing the industrial and financial sectors and nationalisation. This led its efficiency and competence to fall. Nasser prioritised the military from the beginning of his tenure, and signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia to supply Egypt with modern weapons in 1955. After the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, however, the equipment of the army proved woefully insufficient to protect the Suez Canal from British, Israeli, and French forces. Following the setback of the war with Israel in 1967 the image of the army was badly tarnished; people felt disappointed by their armed forces, and took to the streets demanding trials of the military leaders responsible for the failure. Consequently, the setback minimised the army's power in politics until it made a return after the 1973 victory. "The people wanted Nasser to stay despite his attempts to resign," said Said, explaining that the president was able to maintain his popularity because he had "delegated the responsibilities of the armed forces to Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer who took the blame for the defeat of 1967." "During the Nasser era, the Egyptian armed forces were portrayed as the agent of social transformation," explains Yezid Sayigh in his article Above the State: the Officers' Republic in Egypt. Under President Anwar El-El-Sadat, the army was seen as a guardian of the nation after the 1973 war. "To gain legitimacy, El-Sadat hedged on the 1973 war and the moment of the Suez Canal crossing," says Mossallam. Adding: "For example, in Cairo propaganda images featured the 6 of October victory. However, people in cities like Port Said and Suez (the actual places) where the battle happened saw the military differently than people in Cairo." Mossallam explains that the testimonies she heard from Suez residents showed that they did not know about the crossing of the Suez Canal. "While Egypt celebrates 6 of October, Suez celebrates 24 October because the people there had to fight their own battle against the occupation." In Hosni Mubarak's era, the image of the military remained intact as the guardian of the state because Mubarak himself came from a military background. He also hedged on his role in the 1973 war as the commander of the air force who contributed to victory. During his 30 years of rule, the military's political role was diminished and the institution of the presidency became the central institution of political decision-making. Ruling in and out of politics According to Steven A. Cook's, Ruling but not governing: the Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, after the coup Egypt had a military-dominated regime in which the military indirectly ruled through influencing political decisions and affairs. The regime achieved this by establishing institutions to sustain itself; officially, the constitution and security institutions provided legal and structural frameworks. Unofficially, Egypt under Nasser set the scene for a long-term marriage between the institution of presidency and the military. What reaffirms this notion is how later presidents also came from a military background; a characteristic that ensured the military's inclusion in the political decision-making process. Under Egypt's three presidents; Nasser, El-Sadat and Mubarak, the legal framework of the military remained similar. The non-formal proximity between the presidency and the military was preserved under Nasser, but it started to break away under El-Sadat and Mubarak. "Due to El-Sadat's economic ‘open door' policy, a new economic class emerged in Egyptian society; this class had money, was well-connected with the presidency and in time it was a new competitor for the army," says Ziad Akl, a senior researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Under Mubarak, these businessmen posed a threat to the army's hegemony. "Egypt's role in the region has changed. After the peace treaty with Israel, the army was not at war anymore. All these changes in the 1980s and 1990s in addition to the rise of the economic capitalist and political elite, replaced the army," Akl adds. This does not mean that the military did not retain power. It did, but it was ruling from afar. According to Sayigh, in order for Mubarak to keep the military at bay and guarantee its loyalty, he co-opted and depoliticised the institution. Military retirees were offered administrative positions in all levels of local government. As long as the interests of the military were preserved, the military was in accord with Mubarak's regime. When the military's interests were jeopardised by the rise of the new guards (Gamal Mubarak's businessmen associates in the National Democratic Party), it started to demonstrate its discontent through neoliberal policies and privatisation of state-owned companies. One such example is the Omar Effendi chain store; the Supreme Administrative Court recently annulled its privatisation, and it will be restored to public ownership. "The army and the people are one hand" After the January 25 revolution, the military returned to the centre of politics recalling and emphasising its image as a national protector; this time the military was the guardian of the revolution. Analysts and academics such as Zeinab Abul Magd, assistant professor of history and political economy at Oberlin College and the American University of Cairo, explain this return as an attempt to protect its privileged position, and to protect its economic interests; according to academic and media estimates, the military controls about 25 to 40% of the economy. In her article, The Army and the Economy, Abul Magd says the army makes "huge profits … from the production of non-military good and services... in addition to profiting from its control over vast amounts of land." The military has the right by law to seize any public land, which is then administered by the agency of the Armed Forces' Land Projects. A 2008 Wikileaks cable from a former US ambassador to Egypt described the Egyptian Armed Forces as "a quasi-commercial enterprise." It seems, however, that the issue of military budget and finances carries less weight outside of academic and political debates. For most of the Egyptians with whom the Daily News Egypt spoke, what matters is sustaining the military's image and Egypt's security. Ahmed, a 26-year-old chemist, believes the military is like any other armed force: in need of constant developing on several levels. "I see no problem with the military intervening in politics because at the end of the day, the military comes from us the Egyptians… and its interests are ours. So the fight over the budget and even making it public is irrelevant and unimportant because what we want is a strong military with the state-of-the-art weapons," he said. The International Crisis Group said that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) under Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi in 2011-2012 had no "clear and consistent timetable for the power transition," in its report, Lost in Transition: the World According to Egypt's SCAF. In its constitutional declaration of March 2011, the SCAF set dates for parliamentary elections, but no dates concerning the actual date of a handover of power, which prolonged the transitional period. In its decisions, the SCAF alienated various political forces which led to mass demonstrations against its roadmap. During this unstable political atmosphere, security forces cracked down on Copts protesting at the Maspero State TV and Radio building in October 2011 and dispersed the sit-in at Tahrir Square, resulting in mistrust of the military, and a decline in its popularity. Following the demonstrations of 30 June and its announcement of Morsi's removal, the military is once again a main actor in politics, this time under a relatively new, young leader, General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi. Demonstrators in Tahrir chanted "the army and the people are one hand" on 30 June alongside "the people demand the fall of the regime," and rejoiced at the military intervention; many are distinguishing between the old leadership under the SCAF and the new leadership. Mohamed, an artisan in his 60s, said: "I think the Egyptian military is the voice of reason. [It] is the security of this country internally and externally…Under Tantawi we did not feel that way because he wasn't like Al-Sisi, the difference is morals. Tantawi was Mubarak's man and the military didn't have much say under him unlike Al-Sisi who seems to be in control of everything." Nadia agrees with Mohamed. A nurse in her 40s, she believes the military is the only institution left to save Egypt's future. She says: "if the military had not intervened, this country would fall apart. General Al-Sisi deserves to be our president. He sought people's approval and support and did not wait to take the order from a president (unlike Tantawi), he took the order from the Egyptian people who demonstrated in millions." However, not everyone shares the views of Nadia and Mohamed. Adel, an employee in his 50s, believes the military intervention is dividing people and is betraying the nation. "The military is betraying Egyptians. It is siding with those who want to take down an elected president. It is acting against what God wished for us to have. We should have given President Morsi a chance to finish his term," he says. Future prospects Ziad Akl also believes current leadership and the old leadership under Tantawi are not the same school. According to him, Al-Sisi's leadership is trying to be communicative its rhetoric, as well as more inclusive than Tantawi. "When Al-Sisi came out on TV, he was joined by Mohamed ElBaradei (symbol for opposition), the pope (representing Copts), Al Azhar's Sheikh (representing Muslims) and Al Nour's party's representative (representing Islamists)," he says. "With the lack of any other legitimate institution, presidency, parliament, or opposition, the only institution standing on its feet is the military," he said, highlighting the importance of education in contributing to respect for the institution. "Go back to how the military was portrayed. Education ensures the image of the military remains glorified in our national memory. It's not all of a sudden that our military has played a national role," Akl elaborates. The question that remains is: with the resurrection of the role of the military in politics, will the issue of military financial transparency and accountability be raised? Mossallam and Said believe they will. "I think the young generations who took part in the revolution and even those in high school at the moment are curious about the political situation and they are following up what's going on around them. They have scepticism, so I think questions about transparency of the budget will evolve in the future," says Mossallam. The image of the military has fluctuated throughout history, yet the institution has never left the political sphere. Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military was seen as the force behind social, economic and political change. Although that positive portrayal was great impacted by the loss of the 1967 with Israel, the military institution regained its popularity following its 1973 victory and was viewed as the guardian of the state. Under Hosni Mubarak, the military institution's image as a national guardian was preserved, yet the institution was depoliticised and co-opted by the Mubarak regime. After the January 25 Revolution the military returned to the political scene, and was seen as a protector of the revolution. In the weeks following the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, many still see the military in this role.
