The Muslim Brotherhood thought that the so-called Arab Spring was the last step before they reach what they call the “empowerment” phase, in which they dominate and rule. But this did not happen. They did not rule, they were not completely empowered at the end of the Arab uprisings of 2011, although in Egypt they took power for about one year before they collapsed. The reason for not realising their dreams of empowerment and for their quick fall, as in Egypt, was the violence, extremism and terrorism that they used to fight those who fearfully refused their rule as autocrats based on their false belief that they are implementing the decisions of Allah (God) and that no one can object. So, the Muslim Brotherhood believe that violence is the only way that would enable them to apply what they call “the rule of Allah” and realise their project in this world. They are smart enough to hide this violence and mobilise and polarise in a convincing and a relatively wise way. The Muslim Brotherhood has two faces. The first one is peaceful, civic and modern, and this face can be seen in their political parties and civil society organisations. This civic face is to market the ideologies and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood to local masses and at the same time to a sceptical international community, to reassure them they are not “terrorists”. The second face is the fundamental one, and which is the real face, and the decision-maker. This face is what tells others when, and when not, to use violence by giving instructions that must be implemented as sacred and divine orders. In Yemen, for instance, Muslim Brotherhood used — and is still using — violence in two different ways: through protests and demonstrations, and sometimes using weapons covertly inside these protests to provoke authorities to author more killings. Then they portray themselves as victims and the wronged, justifying counter-violence. The second way is using direct violence to strike the vital centres of government, like army camps and strategic roads and airports, along with oil and gas installations. This is what they did in Yemen during the 2011 crisis and what they are doing now during the transitional period. To mention but one example, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood mobilised armed tribesmen to blockade a key army camp in Arhab on the northern outskirts of the capital Sanaa. This well-equipped unit was for Republican Guard forces that were assigned to protect the international airport of Sanaa. Muslim Brotherhood leaders would say the tribesmen were blockading the army in Arhab only to prevent them from coming to Sanaa to kill protesters in “Change Square”. This justification for blockading and killing soldiers was duplicitous, because the majority of army units were inside Sanaa and the government did not need to bring forces from outside to “kill” protesters. It was but a pretext to cover the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood to exploit the uprising and the blindly enthusiastic youth and then plunder heavy weapons from the camp and control Sanaa's airport. However, they failed, because their ill intentions were discovered by Yemenis, including some of those who were involved in the tribal war against the army. The Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen is dominating the compromised transitional government, and because of this they are encouraging their militias to help in spreading their influence by hook or by crook, by consent or by force. According to credible reports, the Muslim Brotherhood has now about 40 militias scattered across the country. These militias are involved in sectarian and tribal wars, such as the tribal-sectarian war in Saada in northern Yemen between tribesmen of Salafi Sunnis and Houthi Shia. The biggest enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood now in Yemen is Al-Houthi, after the collapse of the semi-secular party, the People's General Congress — ex-president Saleh's party. The common friend for Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood is Al-Qaeda, which is connected to leaders of both. The Muslim Brotherhood are using the Dammaj-Saada war to weaken their biggest enemy, the Houthi, and at the same time to make political gains on the way to “complete empowerment” and then rule by the “orders” of Allah. This ongoing war in Saada may lead to the failure of the national dialogue and the transitional political process as a whole. Traditionally conflicting parties would return to point zero — and likely to war — if dialogue fails. Not only because the warring parties are the Houthi Shia and Salafi Sunnis, but because of the place of war (the far north) and because of the unseen players behind this potential war — the Muslim Brotherhood and their traditional allies. The northern provinces of Saada and Amran and neighbouring areas have long been the homeland of the two main rival tribes of Yemen: the Hashid and Bakil. The two tribes were, and still are, called the two wings of rule in Yemen. Which means without the loyalty of these two influential tribes, no one can rule Yemen peacefully, whoever he is. The current war in Dammaj-Saada between Salafi Sunnis and Houthi Shia is only an expression of competition between the Hashid and Bakil on the one hand, and an expression of conflict between the tribal sheikh and Hashimite Faqi within the same two tribes. The tribal sheikh in this case is Sheikh Sadeq Al-Ahmar and his nine brothers whose departed father claimed to be the sheikh of sheikhs of Hashid. The Hashimite Faqi is represented by Sayed Abdel-Malik Al-Houthi who claims to be descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, and is the top leader of the Houthi Shia movement. Al-Ahmar is from Hashid Amran and Al-Houthi is from Bakil Saada and they are now conflicting in the ongoing war of Dammaj with their eyes on Saraa — the power of Yemen, not only their areas in the north. The tribal leader Sadeq Al-Ahmar and his brothers are seen as influential leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their departed father, Sheik Abdallah Al-Ahmar, was the top leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Islah Party. But he would always vote publicly for Ali Abdallah Saleh and his semi-secular party. The late Al-Ahmar would justify this by saying, “I vote for him because he is my president and I am his sheikh,” referring the then strategic alliance between him and the strongman of Yemen for 33 years. Saleh lost much after the death of Al-Ahmar senior in December 2007. The Muslim Brotherhood are using the Dammaj war not only to weaken their obvious enemy, the Iranian-supported Al-Houthi, but also to pressure and blackmail transitional President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, a compromised president who is trying to please everyone, and depends mainly on international support. For his part, Hadi himself needs cards to play with different opponents. So, the Dammaj war seems to be good thing for Hadi, to weaken both Al-Houthi and the Muslim Brotherhood and their tribal and military allies, such as Al-Ahmar, and General Ali Mohsen, who helped the Muslim Brotherhood to oust President Saleh in the 2011 uprising. In the end, President Hadi wants to be the arbitrator between those involved directly and indirectly in the sectarian-tribal war of Dammaj, after being weakened by this war. Former President Saleh and his PGC seem to be neutral and gaining a lot from the Dammaj war, because it shows the contradictions and hostilities of the warring parties: Houthi, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Ahmar, and General Mohsen, all of whom were behind the 2011 “revolution” against Saleh. A lot of Yemenis see the warring parties in Dammaj as using religion for political gains. However, Saudi Arabia and Iran cannot be ignored when talking about this Sunni-Shia-tribal conflict. Iran wants to help Houthi Shia to expand at the southern part of the Sunni Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Saudi Arabia wants the Salafi Wahhabi to spread across Yemen, to strengthen its influence for when need arises. Al-Qaeda announced it is a player in the war against Al-Houthi, but the Salafis denied this when they felt that Al-Houthi would take advantage of it by saying they are fighting Al-Qaeda terrorists, thus gaining international sympathy and possible direct support.
