Rather than a theoretical ideal, collective Arab action is an increasingly pressing necessity, writes Hassan Nafaa* Invitations to conferences, seminars and workshops over the past few weeks have led me from Cairo to Alexandria, Amman, Damascus and Manama. As diverse as the themes of these meetings were, a common denominator prevailed: overwhelming anxiety over the future of the Arab world. The mood was expressed in the underlying premise of virtually every paper that was read and discussion that was had; that the Arab world is passing through one of the worst phases of its history because of designs being imposed by certain international and regional powers and because of ignorance, folly and active complicity on the part of various local political forces and vested interests abetting those ambitions. The mood was expressed by the unanimous prediction that unless the countries of this region take appropriate measures to counter and reverse the decline, the Arab order will collapse entirely and the whole region will fall into protracted chaos and bloodshed. Finally, it was expressed in the overwhelming sense of urgency with which was proposed a collective drive to rescue the region from disaster and steer it towards comprehensive revival. The precise nature and mechanisms of such a project are still subject to intense and heated debate. Little effort is needed to realise the magnitude of the peril facing us. It is blatantly obvious that the abject weakness and fragmentation of the Arab world has whetted the appetites of regional and international powers and lured them into aggressive adventures. Until recently, the Israeli occupation of Palestine seemed the exception -- the last remnant of colonialism, the end of which was almost in sight. Now, not only has that glimmer of light vanished, the shadow of foreign occupation has begun to creep over the entire region, beginning in Baghdad and perhaps not ending until it reaches Mogadishu. Although our current plight is largely the work of outside powers, there is a growing awareness that a considerable measure of the blame for foreign interventions falls upon the failure of Arab political elites to find and implement appropriate solutions to the latent contradictions and inconsistencies in our social and governing structures, and that this neglect has allowed the pernicious effects of these contradictions to accumulate and to be deliberately aggravated by hostile powers to explosive levels. Iraq, for example, is not only the victim of foreign occupation. It is simultaneously prey to several internal conflicts at various levels that threaten to propel it towards full- scale civil war and eventual partition into several petit states. Similarly, Palestine is not only victim of the Israeli occupation and an international embargo; factional rivalries still smoulder beneath the surface and could still flare out of control, jeopardising one of the most just causes in the modern world. Foreign intervention in Somalia encouraged an Ethiopian invasion and occupation. But it was the failure to contain the long raging tribal conflict in that country that encouraged intervention in the name of restoring security and stability. Sudan, too, is drowning in ethnic and religious conflicts that threaten renewed civil warfare and, again, fragmentation and partition. The rest of the Arab countries appear somewhat better, but their turn may come soon, what with terrorism, unemployment, stalled political reform and horrendous disparities in the distribution of income gnawing relentlessly at their bones, forming time- bombs ready to go off at any moment. Clearly, the longer this situation persists the greater the risk of comprehensive chaos and the fragmentation of the Arab world into rival sectarian entities whose strings would be manipulated by Israel on behalf of global powers. At the same time, it has begun to dawn on Arab political elites with stunning clarity that the preservation of national unity has become their most cherished goal. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s we had regarded the so- called sub-regional state as a colonialist invention that had to be dismantled so that the Arab nation could rise from its ashes, today the most urgent task is to keep the existing states from shattering into even smaller entities founded upon narrow sectarian, ethnic or tribal affiliations. Paradoxically, Arab political elites are now convinced of the dire need for a new drive towards regional unity and revival; one studied, conceptualised and comprehensive. Only through a careful analysis of the diverse economic, social and political problems and challenges will it be possible to come up with original and viable solutions, and to avoid the illusions and pitfalls of previous attempts. Fortunately, a concrete vision has taken shape and much of the credit goes to the Arab Unity Studies Research Centre. After 10 years of unflagging efforts, since it took the initiative to host a conference dedicated to this purpose, the centre has formulated a project that merits the highest praise. The Arab Civilisational Revival Drive, now in its third draft, was presented to the 18th session of the Arab National Congress, held at the beginning of this week in Manama. That several hundred intellectuals and political activists attended this conference from across the Arab world -- the largest gathering this forum has attracted since it was founded -- is, in itself, indicative of growing enthusiasm for the project. The Arab Revival Drive, the final version of which the Arab Unity Studies Centre hopes to complete by the end of this year based on the input of around 300 experts from across the Arab world, is about 50 pages long and consists of eight parts. The first three parts address the need for revival and continual rejuvenation; the concepts, values and approaches that should come into play; and the structural relation between the individual states and the whole, and the social and democratic foundations of this relation. Part four addresses the need to adopt democracy as a social and governing order and the mechanisms to achieve and strengthen such an order. The fifth and sixth parts are devoted, respectively, to the concept, aims and means of autonomous development, and to the policies and mechanisms for attaining social justice and the relationship of these to public and private ownership and the means of production. Part seven focuses on national independence at both the state and regional levels, in which context it discusses the strategic aims of liberating Arab land, eliminating foreign military bases, confronting the Zionist enterprise and resisting all forms of foreign hegemony. The last section discusses the social and political forces that need to be engaged in the drive, the resources that need to be allocated, and the mechanisms and institutions needed to transform aspirations for revival into reality. Although any one of these subjects is too involved to discuss at length here, I would like to make some preliminary observations. It is only natural that such an ambitious project would encounter a certain amount of scepticism. It is important, however, to distinguish between two types of sceptics: those with good intentions and those who are not so well intentioned. We can expect, for example, to hear some rounded dismissals of the project as unrealistic and a complete fantasy. To these we can answer that every ambitious vision contains the dream of transcending a painful reality. However, in this case, imagination was tempered by sustained and rigorous academic discipline and the prolific work that went into it; therefore it does not deserve to be shrugged off without serious discussion. Others are certain to home in on alleged structural inconsistencies that they will claim render the project entirely unviable. But then that is their element of wishful thinking, because their aim is to obstruct any project for Arab revival from the outset. If indeed this were the motivation behind their criticisms, perhaps it would be better to avoid engaging them in futile debate that will only sap energies more constructively spent in rectifying flaws in the project. It would seem therefore worthwhile to establish certain ground rules for what we hope will be a productive and rigorous debate on the project. This entails identifying common areas of consensus that cannot brook debate and areas that can remain open to difference until they are resolved. For example, it is difficult to imagine anyone seriously disputing the fact that the overwhelming crisis of the Arab world compels us all to work together to overcome it and that unifying ourselves behind an Arab project as an alternative to the American-Zionist one is the way to achieve this end. On the other hand, details regarding the means and mechanisms of the Arab project are, inherently, the type of subject that can and should be put to debate, one hopefully that will involve the broadest possible segments of our societies. The Arab Revival Drive was designed to attract the support and participation of as broad a spectrum of political outlooks as possible. It is, therefore, absolutely vital that debate does not degenerate into a game of political one-upmanship and mudslinging between the various ideological camps. Above all, we cannot afford at this stage a scenario in which zealots or opportunists from the Arab nationalist camp seize upon a project that is Arab nationalist in character as an opportunity to cast aspersions on the intentions either of liberal or Islamist interlocutors, or to call into question the right and ability of people from these camps to a full and equal say in the project. When the architects of the Arab Revival Drive addressed the aspirations and demands of independence, unity, democracy, social justice, autonomous development and cultural specificity their intention was not, as such, to market the project to as diverse a segment of public opinion as possible but to formulate a scheme that practically responds to the deepest and most urgent needs of the Arab people. The result of their indefatigable efforts should be matched by an equal earnestness in our discussions of the project and an equal sincerity in the desire to steer the Arab world out of its present era of darkness for the onset of which we all share at least some responsibility. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
