Ali Zeidan, Libya's prime minister, is seeking help from different countries to train Libya's would-be military and police officers in order to solve his country's security problems. A dozen countries have already lined up to help Libya build a professional army and police force in order to help stabilise the North African country. On offer have been various training plans both inside and outside the country aimed at integrating the rogue militias that are currently playing havoc in Libya into the yet-to-be established army and security forces and reclaiming the country from the hands of the gangs, outlaws and tribal militias that have been controlling the state since NATO helped rebels take over the country after the fall of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The misery has now reached the level where even a personal argument between drug addicts or militia members can turn into a full-scale conflict, particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to Pentagon spokesman Steve Warren, the US is ready to “provide training for 5,000 to 8,000 personnel”, while the EU, UK and France are among the leading Western countries that have expressed their willingness to help. Countries like Jordan and Turkey have already received batches of would-be Libyan trainees. The Libyan authorities seem to think that the country's salvation lies in exporting as many criminals as possible. However, this is the wrong solution to Libya's security mess and an ill-advised policy for the country in the longer term. Such a policy will not yield a true national army, and neither will it help the Libyan government to exercise its sovereignty over the entire territory of the country. It also seems that certain countries are trying to make money out of Libya's misery. Zeidan's government cannot be trusted not only because it lacks support from the country's citizens, but also because it has a huge credibility deficiency. It is militia-infested, weak and corrupt, and it has thus far failed to deliver anything to its people. This government cannot come up with any executable plan to answer the following questions: who will be trained and for what; what are the rules to be applied; and what will be the role played by the militias in such training programmes? After failing miserably in its attempts to govern the country, the government is trying to buy time in office, presenting itself as a trustworthy partner to the international community and locals alike. Yet, in essence it is trying to integrate thousands of criminals, assassins, professional thieves, drug-dealers and terrorists into the national army and police while using the training programmes as a cover. Those who are being shipped out of Libya, or indeed are being trained inside the country, are militia members, and some of them are violent, criminals or outlaws, or have the blood of Libyan civilians on their hands. Most of them should be in jail and not be given the opportunity to recycle themselves and live comfortable lives abroad while being paid by the Libyan government, only to return home and do the same things all over again. Above all, any gang members or militia thug for that matter is only loyal to his gang, or at best to his tribe, as is the case in Libya today. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us the important lesson that gang members and militias will never be loyal to the state, since they are loyal to no one but themselves. Hodgepodge training will only serve their needs, and it will have no benefit for the state. The looting last August of an arms cache from a facility outside Tripoli used by US forces to train Libyans is only one example of the risks of such training. Before any training is offered, the Libyan authorities should ensure that not a single militia or gang member is given the opportunity to take part in the training. There may be good or bad gang or militia members, but it should nevertheless simply be remembered that the good ones are not going to come forward for training. This is because they do not trust the state, and they are too busy doing what little good they can for their communities, cities and tribes. A rigorous and comprehensive screening process should also be in place to check all individuals to be trained. The aim here is to be as certain as possible that any active or former gang and militia members, particularly those who have taken part in bloody crimes, are excluded, or, better yet, brought to justice. Such crimes have been well-documented by local and international civil-society organisations, including rights groups. Furthermore, any individual who fought anywhere in Libya after November 2011, the date when the war ended, should not be accepted as a trainee nor should he be integrated into any future police or army force. The current government, as well as the corrupt ruling General National Conference (GNC), knows only too well who those people are, just as it knows who fired on civilians, killing over 50 of them in the country recently. An independent body with no government involvement should handle the screening process for the training. Members of this body could be drawn from the judiciary and from among security experts, and they could also be helped by tribal leaders and local civil-society organisations. This might take some time, but a delayed project is better than a failed one. It should be born in mind that the Libyans have now been suffering for almost three years from violence in the country, and they will not mind further delays if this will help to guarantee the justice of the training process. All former rebel groups must be open, forthcoming and willing to share information with the government, starting by handing over lists of their rank and file to the screening body. In this way, those who formed or joined any group after November 2011 can be identified and excluded from the process. One of the reasons for the mushrooming of the rebels in Libya from a couple of thousand to well over 100,000 after 2011 was that the new gangs appeared after the war had ended. It is those groups, in addition to the jihadists, who have been the most notorious offenders. Together, they form the strongest opposition to any professional army or police. If integrated into any future army or police, they will only destroy it from within. Furthermore, members of the militias on the payroll of either the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence have been involved in criminal activities or have been suspected of such. The militia that seized Zeidan recently worked for the Ministry of Interior, while those who led the invasion of Bani Walid last year belonged to the Libya Shields, supposedly part of the phantom Libyan army. The militias that make up the Supreme Security Committee are at the top of the category of looters, thieves, torturers and property confiscators. They should not only be immediately dismissed, but they should also be brought to justice for what they have done over the last two years. In this short time they have gained a form of notoriety that surpasses even the 40 years of the former regime's security apparatus. Without due process and background checks, any training offered is likely only to upgrade and further enrich the knowledge of such criminals and gang members, making them more sophisticated. As a result, they will only be helped to do what they have been doing over the past few years: inflict suffering on Libyan citizens, hamper any efforts by the state to have its own professional army and police, and above all support jihadists in neighbouring countries, with Mali being a recent example. It is a fact that violent individuals and suspected terrorists have managed to recycle themselves into religious preachers, politicians and community leaders, and some of them have even managed to have themselves elected to the dysfunctional GNC. Abu Annas Al-Libi, for example, whether guilty or not, was living in the heart of Tripoli before his abduction by American special forces earlier this year. Many more Libyan and foreign jihadists are now living in eastern and southern Libya, and the recent bloodshed in Benghazi is only one reminder of not only their presence but also of their ability to inflict more damage almost with impunity. The tragedy at the In Amenas plant in Algeria earlier this year, in which terrorists killed and kidnapped hundreds of hostages at a desert gas facility, had a very strong Libyan connection. The latest training endeavour is supposed to be part of the EU's border security programmes that are already underway in Libya. However, it is failing precisely because of the lack of proper and adequate background checks on trainees. Since the programme started a few months ago, we have seen a surge in the number of illegal immigrants coming out of Libya. One likely cause could well be that some of these trainees, doing patrolling work on the ground, have become part of the network of traffickers, since this is financially more rewarding for them than their usually miserable government salaries.
The writer is a Libyan analyst at IHS Global Insight, an author and award-winning freelance journalist.
