In the early 1970s, Moscow had close relations with Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. Of those capitals, it was Cairo that was the Russia's main foothold in the region. But a decade later, the centre of gravity had moved to Damascus, which signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Moscow in December 1980. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union was eager to have good relations with Egypt, and its chance came when Washington failed to back Gamal Abdel-Nasser's plans to build Aswan's High Dam. This sent Cairo looking for friends in the Eastern bloc, and the 1955 Czechoslovak arms deal opened the way for a friendship that grew steadily until the 1967 war, and remained solid until 1972, when Anwar Al-Sadat decided that Washington would make a better friend. His claim that America had “99 per cent of the cards” opened the door for Washington to mediate the peace negotiations that followed the 1973 war. As its ties with Egypt went tumbling, Moscow looked for another Arab capital to lean on, and there was nothing better than Syria. The Russians had lost their privileges in Egypt, but they still had friends in Damascus, and convenient port facilities in Tartus. Now the shoe is on the other foot, with the Russians, perhaps to console themselves for the loss of Libya and Iraq, edging closer to Syria, and the Americans setting their sights on Damascus post-Al-Assad. Not exactly the Cold War, with its paraphernalia of the arms race, espionage and high intrigue. But the game of musical chairs has something familiar about it. The 25 January Revolution, and the tumultuous events that followed, reminded many Egyptians of the need to keep some balance in Egypt's foreign relations. Two and a half years later, when the army, egged on by millions of Egyptians, removed Mohamed Morsi from the presidency, the Americans took a dim view of that move, chastising Egypt and threatening to cut off aid. This was the cue the Russians were waiting for, and without delay they started offering Cairo a whole range of political, military and economic deals. During the recent visit to Egypt by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Moscow offered to sell Cairo the latest generation of MiG fighter planes, together with training programmes, and satellite services thrown into the mix, to help the army to hunt down the terrorists that are still harassing it in Sinai. The Russians have high hopes for this region. In the middle of turmoil, they — just like the Americans — are hoping to maximise their strategic gains. For all the grumbling, Washington is not dim-witted enough to give up Egypt. But the Russians are going to try as they may. They still dream of these warm waters in the Mediterranean, envisioning their fleets setting sail in the cool summer breeze from Tartus to Alexandria and back, and through the Suez Canal and onwards to Africa and Asia. The game is up, and the countries in this region are aware of its advantages and disadvantages — of the vacuum that is tempting everyone to step in, and the growing echoes of the superpower rivalries of the past. Washington and Moscow will be having a lot to talk about behind the scenes. The Americans, now far superior since the collapse of the Soviet Union, will try to keep the Russians in their place. The Russians, more energetic than they have been in decades, are going to be sweet talking the Americans into letting them in, now that it is clear that American adventures in far off places have an uncanny way of falling flat on their face. In the region, reactions are also going to be different. Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi is not Nasser, and Egypt is done with ideological grandstanding. Moscow is a much-reduced power than it once was. And the Americans, their economy teetering and their people sick of war, are walking on thin ice. Besides, the Russians want to stay on America's good side. The rivalry between the two countries is softer than it was in the past. The image of two superpowers waging wars in proxy may come to mind, but it is not what this is all about. This is rivalry of a new type, a rivalry of deals and power play — not exactly the Cold War but rather closer to the British-French imperial competitiveness of a century or more ago. It has more to do with money, oil and prestige, with companies getting deals and diplomats making their political fortunes, than it does with ideological one-upmanship, coups and counter-coups. Or so one thinks!
